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Part I   
 
Theoretical framework, context, and method 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
On December 5, 1970, the ongoing tension between left and right wing students of 
İstanbul Çapa Higher Teacher Education School caused armed conflict between these 
groups. 2 left-wing students died as a result. Friends of these students took an oath for 
revenge. On 31 January, 1976 around two thousand women participated in a 
demonstration, “End Our Grief of Losing Our Children”, against violence organized by 
women who lost their children during conflicts. The same year, on September 16
th
, 
workers left a black wreath to Taksim monument and announced “general mourning” 
against the then government and State Security Courts (Ersel et al. 2002). 
 
These are only some examples of protest events organized in Turkey in 1970s. By 
the late 1960s, students in Turkey, as in many other countries over the world, 
were   demonstrating for their demands on the streets. This was also the starting 
point of a long wave of collective action that rose and fell from the late 1960s 
until September 1980. It can be claimed that social movements of mid-1960s in 
Turkey basically followed a similar path with their counterparts in Western 
Europe since the movements of 1968 diffused through Turkey and the repertoire 
of action was imported by these (Uysal 2009). People demanding new rights, 
access to power and sometimes revolution started to appear in the streets 
employing direct, confrontational and/or violent collective action. By doing so, 
these people opposed the elites, attacked the authorities and disrupted the 
institutions (Tarrow, 1989: 1). Students, mainly the university youth, were the 
early risers of the sixties in Turkey, as in Western Europe as well as other parts of 
3 
 
the world. While the protests in Turkey started in a peaceful environment, 
especially after the early 1970s, they entered in a new and extremely violent phase. 
This was also the case for some other countries in Europe such as Italy and 
Germany. However, the situation was far more severe in Turkey: the number of 
fatalities witnessed in Turkey in a week during early 1980 was more than the 
number of fatalities that happened in Italy and in Germany during the entire 
decade (Sayarı, 1987: 21; 2010: 198) and widespread political violence became an 
ordinary and daily feature of politics in Turkey. Talking about the wave of protest 
in Western Europe, Tarrow (1989:1) writes that “disorder contributed to the 
broadening of democracy where it was strong and to its consolidation where it 
was weak”. However, in contrast to this observation about Western societies, the 
wave of protest in 1970s in Turkey and its aftermath did not contribute to the 
consolidation of Turkey’s weak democracy:  the outcome in the Turkish case was 
a military regime established with the coup d’état held on September 12, 1980 and 
lasted for three years until the general elections held in 1983.  
Besides the difference in the nature of the repertoire used (i.e. widespread 
and intense use of violence) the wave of protest in Turkey in 1970s reveals 
different characteristics with regards to the actors compared to its Western 
counterparts: While the wave in Turkey started with peaceful left-wing student 
actions demanding university reform, it soon expanded to other segments of the 
society who adapted various ideological stances and was able to mobilize workers, 
peasants, teachers, Kurdish society, etc. 
Departing from these points the present study focuses on the protests 
which took place in Turkey in the 1970s and early 1980s; to be more precise it 
covers a 15 years period, from March 1971 to January 1986. This study aims at 
4 
 
two things: the first aim is to reconstruct the wave of protest while focusing on the 
institutionalization and radicalization dynamics, which are discussed to occur 
together over the course of a cycle or wave of protest (Della Porta and Tarrow 
1986; Tarrow 1989; Koopmans 1993; Kriesi et al. 1995; Taylor and Van Dyke 
2004). The second aim, on the other hand, is to make a contribution to theoretical 
debates in social movements literature by applying the political process approach 
to Turkey, a “non-Western” society and less developed country. I am intending to 
do so by focusing on the mutual relation between regime changes and 
mobilization, an area that is less-studied.  
What happened in Turkey in 1970s is still an important part of the political 
agenda and frequently becomes an issue of discussion in news media and press. 
The reason behind this fact is argued to be the “wounds that are not scabbing” of 
these years (Ergüden 2012). Whatever the reason is, it is obvious that these years 
still occupy a significant place in contemporary Turkish history and politics. The 
actors of those years, both from the right and left wings, today, claim that they 
have to make self-criticism with regards to their mobilization and action dynamics, 
mainly referring to the violent repertoire used in these years. Some of the left-
wing organizations, for example, claim that they have “abandoned” the repertoire 
of action of 1970s and adopted more peaceful ways to protest.  The last military 
coup held in Turkey was on September 12, 1980 and it still has a persistent legacy 
in the state through the 1982 Constitution and the related laws such as the Law on 
Elections (issued in 1983). The coup also has its reflections on the streets: in 
2000s people are still protesting against that military intervention in politics. In 
addition, the constitutional referendum held in September 12, 2010, on the 30
th
 
anniversary of the military coup can be understood as another example of the 
5 
 
significance of the military coup and its legacy for Turkish society, as it aimed at 
removing some articles in the Constitution remained from that era including the 
ones providing judicial immunity to the leaders of the 1980 military coup.1 All 
these facts and references made to those years while speaking about contemporary 
mobilizations, demonstrate us the importance of the 1970s in Turkey. Despite this 
importance, 1970s in Turkey remain as an under-studied decade. As it is 
mentioned in a recent special volume of a prominent journal published in Turkey, 
Toplum ve Bilim (2013, no.127), 1970s are accepted as a “dark” and/or “lost” era 
and represent the “darkest” period with regards to the numbers of studies covering 
this period.  
Some scholars advanced the notion of a “movement society” (Meyer and 
Tarrow 1998; Rucht and Neidhardt 2002) and argue that “repertoire of political 
participation has expanded from electoral activities (e.g., voting, working on 
political campaigns) to include activities typically associated with social 
movements (e.g., protest, demonstrations)” (Soule and Earl, 2005: 345) and thus 
the protests became a “normal” part of politics. However, it is rather difficult to 
maintain that it is the case for Turkey: the level of mobilization in Turkey is 
relatively low compared to Western European countries
2
, and protests are not 
accepted as “normal” ways of doing politics and participating. I would argue that 
one of the reasons for this is going back to the pre-coup (pre-1980) period and is 
related to the collective memory of the society related to this specific period of 
contemporary history of Turkey. In addition, the coup itself changed the nature of 
politics in Turkey by creating (at least aiming at) a demobilized society and a new 
generation who is not interested in politics. Thus, I would claim that what 
                                                     
1
 See Arato (2010) and Kalaycıoğlu (2012) for further details on the referendum and the debates 
about it.  
2
 Uysal (2006:82) indicates that the average level of protest events in Turkey per year is 1700. 
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happened in those years changed the nature of “the political”, at least in Turkish 
society and for Turkish politics. 
Departing from these points, I would argue that the first aim mentioned 
above is going to serve as a basis to understand contemporary dynamics of the 
“street”, protests and “the political” in Turkey since the wave of protest and elites’ 
reactions to it conditioned how the next wave of conflicts would be fought. 
Most of the academic work based on the political process approach in 
social movements literature mainly focuses on advanced industrialized 
democracies. In order to broaden the scope of the political process approach, we 
should look beyond Western democracies (Tarrow 1999, Meyer 1999).  In this 
regard, Turkey is a good case to study effects of regime change on social 
movements since it witnessed two coups d’états, a memorandum and two other 
military interventions, which all implied dimensions in the POS. From 1971 to 
1986, Turkey was governed by 14 different governments, eight different prime 
ministers (some of them acted as the prime minister in several governments) and 
three different presidents (and two different acting presidents). Moreover, Turkey 
witnessed one interim regime and an overt military regime in this period: the 
interim regime started on March 12, 1971 with a military memorandum, after 
which three leftist militants were executed by hanging, and lasted until the 
national elections held on October 14, 1973. The overt military regime, on the 
other hand, was established by the coup d’état on September 12, 1980 and lasted 
until the national elections held on November 6, 1983. The remaining period, 
from October 14, 1973 to September 12, 1980, and from November 6, 1983 to 
December 31, 1985 can be considered as “normal” periods of governmental 
regime. However, still, these “normal” periods of governmental regime also 
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represent different characteristics as the former period was characterized by 
coalition governments
3
 and the latter saw the single party rule after a long period 
of chaos and military rule. Thus, the concept of “regime change” would be useful 
in order to understand Turkish politics. While the concept is generally referred to 
transitions from authoritarian regimes to democracy, in some cases the country 
can be founded as a “democratic” (or semi-democratic) state and then this 
democracy could be suffered, as in the Turkish case. In this study, the term 
‘regime change’ will be used in its broadest sense including transitions from 
single-party rules to coalition governments and vice versa. It will also cover the 
periods of transition from democratic regimes to authoritarian ones and vice versa, 
by taking the military coups and interventions as the indicators of this change. 
Table 1.1 shows the division of the period into four episodes: 
 
Table 1.1: Periodization of Turkish politics, 1971-1986. 
 
Period Regime Type 
March 12, 1971 - October 14, 1973 Interim regime established after 
military memorandum 
October 14, 1973 - September 12, 
1980 
Civilian rule, period of coalition 
governments
4
 
September 12, 1980 - November 6, 
1983 
Coup d’état, military rule for 3 years 
November 6, 1983 - December 31, 
1985 
Civilian rule, single party period 
 
                                                     
3
 See Heper and Başkan (2001) for a detailed analysis of coalition governments in Turkey between 
1961 and 1999.  
4
 A general amnesty is announced during this period, on May 1974.   
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Although there are several studies on social movements related to the political 
context in general and political opportunity structures (POS) in particular, such as 
the works of Tilly (1978), McAdam (1982), Kitschelt (1986), Tarrow (1989), or 
Kriesi et al. (1995), the number of studies focusing particularly on the effect of 
regime changes on the social movement dynamics are limited. Nevertheless 
regime changes had important effects on political mobilization, and thus on social 
movements, especially in regions such as Latin America and Eastern Europe. I 
suppose that by focusing on regime changes within a country that witnessed two 
coups d’états, a memorandum and two other military interventions my research 
can make a significant contribution to the literature. On the other hand, existing 
literature on the effects of regime change on social movements considers regime 
change as a transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes (for example 
Pickvance 1999) because of the general understanding of non-existence of social 
movements under authoritarian regimes. The present study is focusing on periods 
preceding and following both authoritarian and democratic regimes.  
As several social movements scholars mention, analyzing the cycle of 
protests is also useful to study political violence, as violence is frequently one of 
the outcomes of a cycle of protest (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 190; Della Porta, 
2008: 222). This is a valid proposition also for Turkey. Apart from the political 
instability, this period of contemporary Turkey is marked with political 
polarization and violence which almost became a daily routine especially from 
mid-1970s until the military coup. The reason that legitimated military 
interventions in the eyes of their perpetrators and wider public was the use of 
extreme violence; several people were killed from both left-wing and right-wing 
groups per day and newspapers were publishing the number of deaths regularly. 
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This fact makes Turkey a good case to study the use of violence as an action 
repertoire.   
All these facts and changes witnessed in the political system in this time 
period in Turkey, in my view, make the country a very good case to test 
hypotheses related to the relationship between the political system, violence and 
social movements and thus, I think, the Turkish case deserves much more 
attention than it has received in the past.
 5
  
In short, it can be claimed that the cycle of protest in Turkey produced 
counter movements, violence and demobilization, differently from its European 
counterparts and the country manifested the distinctive effects of its particular 
history and politics.  
Moreover, studying Turkey can make a contribution to the social 
movements literature and the literature on Turkish politics itself since there are 
very few studies on Turkey from a social movements perspective. With regards to 
the former, this study is aiming to handle the protests in Turkey in the pre-coup 
period within the political process approach and threat the period as a wave of 
protests. However, the political process approach and the concepts that it’s using 
to analyze social movements and protest phenomena are mainly developed in and 
for explaining developments in “Western” societies and states. Thus, applying it 
to a non-Western society as in Turkey will also help us to understand the limits of 
the theory itself. I am intending to do this departing from the radicalization and 
institutionalization processes which are debated to be the main outcomes of a 
wave (or cycle) of protest in the literature. With regards to the literature on Turkey 
and social movements in Turkey, while there are several studies on different 
                                                     
5
 The existing literature on Turkey about the mentioned period and cycle is mainly consisted of 
personal memoires, biographies and organizational or ideological histories. 
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movements in Turkey, such as the student movements (Taylak 1997, etc.), youth 
movements (Kabacalı 2007; Feyizoğlu 1993, etc.), labor movement (Sülker 1968; 
Güzel 1993, etc.), Islamist movement (Narlı 1999; Bayramoğlu 2001, etc.), these 
studies are not framed in a social movements’ approach. Besides, there are several 
studies depending on the memoires of political activists or the observations of 
journalists, or bibliographies (Feyizoğlu 2000; Soner 2009; Çubukçu 1996, 
Çobanlı 2008, etc.). On the other hand, there exists a literature on social 
movements in Turkey regarding different kinds of movements, and different 
aspects of social movements such as the works of Şimşek (2004) who examined 
the ‘new’ social movements in Turkey after 1980, Uysal (2003, 2005, 2009) who 
studied anti-globalization movements in respect to a particular social movement 
organization and diffusion of protest, Baykan and Lelandais (2004) who 
elaborated the emergence of anti-globalization movements in Turkey, etc. In 
recent years two scholars applied the political process approach to study social 
movements in Turkey: while Mello (2007) wrote about the labour movement in 
Turkey from 1945 to 1980, Alper (2009, 2010) focused on the student movement 
in Turkey respectively from 1960 to 1971 and the cycle of protest in the 1968-
1971 period. In spite of this literature, there is a lack of work on the mobilizations 
of 1970s whose effects are still significant for social movements in Turkey, and a 
lack of systematic work trying to elaborate the relationship between the political 
opportunity structures and social movements. 
The time period selected for this research is a period of 15 years, from 
1971 until the end of 1985. Since the aim of the research is to analyze waves of 
protest, I propose to start from 1971, a year when Turkey witnessed a military 
intervention, in the form of a memorandum. This memorandum actually achieved 
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its goal to end the political mobilization in Turkey that had started in mid-1960s, 
at least for a while. The military junta, came to power with a coup d’état on 
September 12, 1980, and left the government to civilians on November 1983. The 
covered period is terminated at the end of 1985, because I believe it is important 
to demonstrate the effects of a transition to a democratic regime from a military 
one on social movements.  
Ergüden (2012: 82) points out that when we are talking about the 1970s in 
Turkey, we actually talk about the period between 1974 and 1980 due to the 
military intervention of 1971 and the interim regime that lasted until the elections 
held in late 1973. This is confirmed by the data presented in this study as we do 
not observe widespread mass protests under the interim and military regimes. 
However, I did not want to limit my research to this 6-year period since 
evaluating the times preceding and following a wave of protest can give us more 
information about its development and it is possible to “relate the parabola of 
mass mobilization to the creation, the strategies, and the development of 
movement organizations and to the responses of the parties and interest groups 
they challenge” (Tarrow, 1989: 10).  
The study is divided into four main parts. The first part (Chapters 2 and 3) 
elaborates on the theoretical arguments, and methodological tools. Thus, this part 
presents the conceptual toolkits required to develop a dynamic understanding of a 
cycle of protest, and how it can be empirically examined. The second part 
(Chapter 4) focuses on the political, economic and social developments in Turkey 
in 1970s in order to provide a better understanding of the political opportunity 
structure in this particular state. The third part (Chapters 5,6 and 7) reveals 
empirically the features of the cycle of protest respectively focusing on the actors 
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of the cycle, their repertoire of action and the issues raised by several groups 
during the protests. The fourth and the last part (Chapters 8 and 9) deals with the 
dynamics of the cycle by focusing on the changes during its life course and 
interaction between the state and the protestors.  The individual chapters consider 
different features of protest and politics in Turkey in 1970s. In the following, I 
will briefly summarize them. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the theories of social movements, and the debates in 
the literature. At first, it clarifies what is meant when talking about social 
movements and protests. The chapter also discusses different theoretical 
approaches (classic and structural approaches) to the study of social movements 
and collective action. By doing so and focusing on the political process approach, 
the chapter traces the concepts central to this approach, such as the concept of 
political opportunity structures. Repertoires of action and cycle of action are two 
other concepts that constitute core of the study and are clarified in this chapter. 
Following the clarification of these concepts, and thus presentation of the 
theoretical toolkit of the study, the chapter portrays the main hypotheses of the 
study based on the theories of social movements.   
Chapter 3 concludes the first part by presenting the main research method 
used in the study to trace protest politics: Protest Event Analysis (PEA). 
Considered as one of the major advances in social movement research during the 
last decades, this specific method, mainly based on newspaper data, has also 
sparked methodological debates in the literature (see for example Koopmans and 
Rucht 2002; Oliver et al. 2003; Earl et al. 2004). After describing the method and 
briefly mentioning the discussions in the literature, the chapter provides 
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information about the data collection, generation and coding procedures used in 
this study.   
 Chapter 4, constituting the second part of the study, provides information 
on the state of politics and economics in Turkey in 1970s. It has two aims: first to 
present background information on several developments that shaped the socio-
politics and economics in those years in Turkey to the readers who are not 
familiar with Turkish politics. Secondly, by doing so, the chapter aims at 
characterizing the features of the political opportunity structure in Turkey. Finally, 
it gives brief information on the protest politics in Turkey in the years covered by 
this study.  
As the first chapter of Part II, Chapter 5 opens up the empirical analysis of 
protest politics in Turkey in 1970s by focusing on the actors that were active in 
the mentioned period. In this regard, information is provided on the emergence 
and development of the student movement, the labor movement and the radical 
right movements in Turkey. The analysis is supported by the data presenting the 
evolution of the protests organized by these groups. In addition, the chapter 
presents the organizational structures of movements and involvement of various 
forms of organizations in protest events.  
Chapter 6 empirically examines the repertoire of action used by the actors 
explained in Chapter 5. By doing so, a closer look at the strategies of social 
movements in Turkey is provided. As explained in the chapter, excessive use of 
violence stigmatized the collective memory of those years in Turkey. Departing 
from this fact, Chapter 6 analyzes the reasons lying behind the use of violence by 
diverse actors. However, the chapter does not solely focus on violence; the 
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dynamics of use of other conventional and unconventional forms of actions are 
also covered in Chapter 6.  
Chapter 7 adds another piece of information and examines the issues 
raised by collective political actors involved in protest politics. Departing from the 
newspaper data analysis, the chapter depicts the major issues that triggered people 
to take the streets.  
Chapter 8 opens up Part IV of the study by examining the dynamics of the 
cycle of protest and how it evolved in time. More specifically, the chapter 
analyzes the processes of institutionalization and radicalization of collective 
action in Turkey, based on the organizational structures and repertoires of actions 
employed. These two processes are accepted as the main ones that occur hand to 
hand through the end of a cycle of protest, as explained in detail in Chapter 8. 
Based on the empirical analysis, the chapter traces these processes in Turkey in 
order to test if the Turkish case fits in this general assumption.  
Chapter 9 provides information on the most apparent aspect of the 
interaction between state and social movements, repression. Presenting empirical 
data on the issue, the chapter traces the dynamics of repression in Turkey in 1970s 
by focusing on the different forms of repression employed and its effects on two 
dimensions: 1) the level of mobilization in Turkey during the 15-years period, and 
2) the repertoire of action used. 
 Finally, Chapter 10 concludes the present study by summarizing the main 
results. In line with the structure of this introduction, the results are presented 
chapter by chapter. In addition, broader questions and concerns about the political 
use of streets and social movements in Turkey are discussed with respect to the 
relationship between state and social movements and historical ruptures and 
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continuities. Chapter 10 suggests that future research should even more 
systematically study the mechanisms that contributed to the continuity and 
diffusion process since the reasons caused rupture are more clear-cut.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Theory, Operationalization & Hypotheses   
 
Starting with the definitions of social movements and protests, this chapter aims at 
laying the theoretical ground for this study by focusing on the theoretical 
approaches and concepts within the social movements literature.  
 
2.1. Defining Protests and Social Movements 
 
Protest events are of significant importance for social movements as they are 
“perhaps the fundamental feature that distinguishes social movements from 
routine political actors” (Taylor and Van Dyke, 2004: 263). Various definitions 
are provided for protests in the social movements and collective action literature. 
Taylor and Van Dyke (2004: 263), for example, define a protest narrowly as “the 
collective use of unconventional methods of political participation to try to 
persuade or coerce authorities to support a challenging group’s aims”. Goodwin 
and Jasper (2003:3), on the other hand, provide a broader definition which covers 
both conventional and unconventional methods inferring that a protest should not 
solely be collective. According to them a protest is “the act of challenging, 
resisting, or making demands upon authorities, powerholders, and/or cultural 
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beliefs and practices by some individual or group” (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003:3). 
Instead of focusing on some particular forms of protests, the current study focuses 
on collective protests, carried out by more than one person, in which both 
conventional and unconventional forms of actions are used.   
 There are also different definitions of social movements provided in the 
literature. This is mainly caused by different theoretical approaches of scholars 
working on the issue. As the representatives of the resource mobilization theory, 
which will be explained in detail below, McCarthy and Zald (1977), for example, 
defines a social movement as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which 
represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or 
reward distribution of a society”. According to Tilly (1984: 306), on the other 
hand, a social movement is a “sustained series of interactions between power 
holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency 
lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly 
visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back 
those demands with public demonstrations of support”. In a similar manner 
Tarrow (1998: 4) defines social movements “as collective challenges, based on 
common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, 
opponents, and authorities”. Another definition is provided by Snow et al. (2004: 
11): “social movements can be thought of as collectivities acting with some 
degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational 
channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it 
is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or 
world order of which they are a part”.  Despite different focuses of these 
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definitions, and many others in the literature
6
, it is possible to claim that most 
definitions include the following elements: collective action, some degree of 
organization, change-oriented goals or claims, some degree of temporal continuity 
and some extra or non-institutional collective action (Snow and Oliver, 1995: 571; 
Snow et al., 2004: 6). 
Besides various definitions of social movements, the literature consists of 
various different explanations on why and how of social movements. Before 
explaining the approach, concepts and hypotheses that are employed for the 
current study, in the following, I give a brief discussion of the literature on 
theories of social movements. 
 
2.2. Theoretical Approaches in Social Movements Literature
7
 
2.2.1. Classical Approaches to Social Movements 
Why and how of social movement emergence and development, besides the 
reasons lying behind individual participation to social movements have long been 
a question to be answered by scholars working on the issue. Mass society theory, 
relative deprivation, and collective behavior theories are among the 
traditional/classical approaches in social movements literature. These approaches 
depart from the same point that physiological dispositions produced by some 
structural constrains such as unemployment, industrialization, etc. cause people 
to engage in extreme behaviors (McAdam 1982). Based on individual behaviors, 
these approaches tend to see social movements “as the manifestation of feelings 
                                                     
6
 For a detailed analysis of various definitions in the social movements and collective action 
literature see Opp (2009).  
7
 In this part of the dissertation, I focus on classical and contemporary approaches, however social 
constructivist approaches (focusing on the concepts of framing, identity, emotions) are not covered, 
since providing and summarizing the whole literature on each approach on social movements is 
beyond the limits and aims of this study. This is why my focus is on political process approach 
which also constitutes the base for this study, and other theoretical approaches preceding it.  
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of deprivation experienced by individuals in relation to other social subjects, and 
of feelings of aggression resulting from a wide range of frustrated expectations” 
(della Porta and Diani, 2006:7). According to classical approaches, those 
individuals affected by economic crises, an unfair distribution of welfare, social 
rights, and normative breakdown, engages in spontaneous, irrational, expressive 
and often violent outbursts of collective action in reaction to felt grievances, 
discontent and anomie (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2009: 22). Rare 
movement participation, irrational participants, transitory discontents and sharp 
distinctions between movements and institutionalized actions are listed as some 
of the shared assumptions of these classical approaches by Jenkins (1983:528).  
 
2.2.2. Structural Approaches 
With the escalating social movement activity in 1960s both in United States (US) 
and in Europe, the classical approaches became increasingly inadequate in 
explaining social movements. These approaches based on deprivation, constraints 
and grievances fell short in explaining the mobilizations of that period as the 
period was preceded by steady growth in economy and in welfare departing from 
their major concepts as. In this regard, new explanations sought to explain social 
movement activity. As a result, the 1970s saw the emergence of structural 
approaches in the US which  “shifted attention from deprivation to the 
availability of resources, political opportunities and mobilizing structures to 
explain the rise of social movements” (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2009: 
23). Scholars following these approaches took issue with the idea of irrational 
and reactive collective action emphasized by the theorists such as Smelser (1962) 
and Gurr (1970). Instead, the stress was put on the processes and the resources 
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which may facilitate mobilization, and social movements are considered as part 
of “normal” political life. These scholars share the assumptions that “collective 
movements constitute an extension of the conventional forms of political action; 
the actors engage in this act in a rational way, following their interests; 
organizations and movement ‘entrepreneurs’ have an essential role on the 
mobilization of collective resources on which action is founded” (Della Porta and 
Diani, 2006: 14). In this regard, they were successful in drawing attention away 
from state and breakdown theories as the main source of social movements’ 
emergence by emphasizing the role of activists’ success in movement activity 
(Gamson and Meyer, 1996: 277).  
 “Resource mobilization”, emphasizing the “distribution of resources and 
the organizational characteristics of social movements”, and “political process” 
focusing on “contextual factors such as the political and institutional environment” 
are two main paradigms in the structural approach (van Stekelenburg and 
Klandermans, 2009: 23-24).  In the following, I will elaborate these approaches 
and the concepts central to them.  
 
2.2.2.1. Resource Mobilization Theory  
The resource mobilization approach distinguished itself sharply from the classical 
approaches by accepting social movements as “normal” ways of participation and 
the individuals involved as “rational”. This approach also made a contribution to 
the literature by putting the grievances in the second place and emphasizing the 
importance of resources available for mobilization. What is examined by the 
resource mobilization approach is “the variety of resources that must be 
mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of 
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movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities 
to control or incorporate movements” (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1212). These 
resources that the approach is based on can vary from “material resources – jobs, 
income, savings and the right to specific goods and services – to non-tangible 
resources, such as authority, leadership, moral commitment, trust, friendship, 
skills and habits of industry” (van Sketelenburg and Klandermans, 2009: 24). 
Some arguments are central to the resource mobilization perspective. First of all, 
according to this approach the combination of resources such as money and labor 
are essential for understanding the social movement activity. Another distinctive 
feature of this perspective is its direct focus on the social movement 
organizations. Thirdly, this perspective accounts for the involvement of 
individuals and organizations outside the collectivity, represented by a social 
movement as an indicator of a movement’s success. They also apply supply and 
demand model for the flow of the resources to a social movement, and uses costs 
and benefits to explain individual or organizational involvement to a social 
movement (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1216).  
The resource mobilization approach received criticisms based on several 
points:  the language that it borrowed from economists (using concepts such as 
costs and benefits, movement entrepreneurs, supply and demand), for 
marginalizing ideology, inability to explain grassroots mobilization, etc. 
(Buechler 1993; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2009), and the weakness of 
its explanatory power (Opp, 2009: 159).  
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2.2.2.2. Political Process Approach and Political Opportunities 
A major advance in the relevant research area came in the 1980s “when researchers 
found that social movements develop and succeed not because they emerge to 
address new grievances” (Della Porta, 2008: 223). The result was the emergence of 
the “political process approach” which became the key instrument to explain the 
transformation of structure into action (Tarrow, 1988: 428), to an extent that some 
scholars claimed that it became “the hegemonic paradigm among social movement 
analysts” (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999: 28). While this approach shares the 
“rationality” view on collective action with the resource mobilization theory, it 
differentiates itself from it by focusing on the external factors such as the political 
and institutional environment in which the social movements operate (Della Porta 
and Diani, 2006: 16) instead of focusing on the internal resources of social 
movements and social movement organizations.   
The main emphasis of this approach is on a broadly defined concept of 
political context that sets the grievances and conditions which activists mobilize 
around, emphasizing that activists do not make decisions in a vacuum (Meyer, 
1999: 82: Meyer, 2004: 127). Accordingly, it is suggested that it is not the 
existence of new grievances that help social movements to develop and succeed, 
but some developments “in the larger political context that allows existing 
grievances to be heard” (della Porta, 2008: 223). The timing and fate of social 
movements depend on the opportunities provided by shifting institutional 
structures and the structure of power (McAdam, 1996: 23). In the words of 
Armstrong (2005:165), “political process models are intended to analyze how 
actors respond to political environments in flux”. It can be stated that there are 
three ideas that are central to this approach: “first, a social movement is a political 
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rather than a psychological phenomenon; second, a social movement represents a 
continuous process from its creation to its decline rather than a discrete series of 
developmental stages; and third, different forms of action (‘repertoires of 
contentions’) are associated with different spatial and temporal locations” (Tilly in 
van Sketelenburg and Klandermans, 2009: 26).  
The proponents of the approach mention the fact that it “provides a 
framework for the study of social movements, that is, a general conceptual toolkit 
that helps analysts to generate the questions that need to be addressed in studying 
social movements and to delimit the field of research” (Kriesi, 2004: 69). Despite 
these advantages of the approach, it also received several criticisms. Goodwin and 
Jasper (1999), for example, made one of the major criticisms to the political 
process approach claiming that the major strands within it are “tautological, trivial, 
inadequate, or just plain wrong”. The disagreement on the definition of political 
opportunity structure, bias towards some specific kinds of movements, flattening of 
culture are among the main concerns of the scholars with regards to the political 
process tradition and the political opportunity structure approach. Tarrow (1999: 75) 
replied to this criticism by pointing out that the political process scholars “try to 
explain movements as the outcome of a combination of structural and cultural as 
well as long-term and contingent factors and of the interactive logics of the 
political struggle”. 
A summary of the classical and contemporary approaches to collective 
action with regards to the motives lying behind protests, actors of it, and forms of 
actions is provided in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1: Classical and contemporary approaches to collective action 
 
 Classical 
Approaches 
Contemporary Approaches 
 Mass society 
Coll. behavior 
Resource 
mobilization 
Political 
process 
approach 
Why people 
protest? 
Grievances, 
discontent, anomie 
Class conflict 
Resources, 
opportunities, 
social networks 
efficacy 
 
Political 
opportunities 
(Cognitive 
Liberation) 
Who protests? Alienated, 
frustrated, 
disintegrated, 
manipulated 
marginalized 
Well-organized, 
social networks, 
professional, 
resourceful 
Embeddedness 
Coalitions 
between 
challengers 
/political elites 
Embeddedness 
 
Forms of protest  Spontaneous, 
irrational, 
expressive, violent  
(Panics, fashions, 
mobs, crime) 
Rational, 
planned, 
instrumental 
(Institutional 
politics, 
lobbying, interest 
groups) 
Rational, 
instrumental, 
polity-oriented 
(Elite 
contention 
lobbying, 
Indigenous 
minority 
disruption i.e. 
sit in strikes) 
Source: van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2009: 20).  
 
In order to understand the mobilization process in Turkey during the period 
between 1971 and 1986, this study employs the political process approach and 
concepts central to it. “New” social movements did not exist in Turkey during 
those years and the main cleavage was the traditional class cleavage. Thus, the 
political process approach, among the contemporary ones, could be more useful to 
understand the clearly instable political environment of the years covered by this 
study, and the response of mobilizing groups to this changing political life. In 
other words, the political environment in which the social movements were 
operating changed several times over those years due to military interventions that 
took the forms of memorandums and coups; interventions that were followed by 
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changes in the constitution and several laws related to people’s participation and 
collective action, economic crises and changing political power relations within 
the dominant political parties and third parties. It is this changing political 
environment that provided some “space” to political organizations and social 
movements, for example as a result of the changes introduced by the 1961 
Constitution, and facilitated mobilization, by, for example, triggering people’s 
engagement due to relatively less costs of participation.  
According to Tarrow (1988: 428), with the development of the political 
process approach, “attention shifted from the heavily macrostructural explanations 
of the 1970s to more differentiated analyses” of social movements and thus, 
“European and American perspectives increasingly meet around a set of concepts 
(…) connecting collective action to politics”.  While the “political opportunity 
structure” is the core concept of the approach, repertoires of action and cycles of 
contention are also significant concepts used to understand movement activity. 
These three concepts that I shall also employ to analyze the social movement 
activity in Turkey from 1971 to 1986 are explained in detail in the following. 
 
2.2.2.2.1. Political Opportunity Structure 
As pointed out, rather than focusing on the internal factors, the political process 
scholars focus on the importance of external factors for mobilization. Defined as 
“the set of environmental opportunities and constrains available to social 
movements” (Della Porta, 1995: 10) “political opportunity structures” (POS) are 
central to the political process approach and have had the greatest success in 
defining the properties of the external environment relevant to the development of 
social movements (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 16). First introduced by Eisinger 
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(1973) in an article examining the role of political structure on protest events in 
American cities, the concept of POS is further developed by several prominent 
scholars of collective action such as Tilly (1978), McAdam (1982) and Tarrow 
(1983). The openness or the closure of the political system, determined by the 
strength of the opponents and the possibility for them to ally with third parties, 
constitutes the core of the concept. Comparative research, on the other hand, 
contributed to the study of POS by introducing other aspects of it.  Research of 
Kitschelt (1986) on anti-nuclear movements in France, Sweden, West Germany 
and the United States, for example, suggested that the capacity of policy 
implementation of a system and the openness or closure of it should be defined by 
the institutional variables such as the capacity of legislature, intermediation 
between executive branch and interest groups and the number of political parties 
or factions which can easily articulate different demands in electoral politics.  On 
the other hand, comparative research of Kriesi et al. (1992; 1995) showed that 
besides the institutional aspects there are also other factors affecting the structure 
of political opportunity. According to these researchers, for example, the informal 
strategies of national elites to deal with the challengers can also affect the social 
movements operating in a society. Tilly (2008: 12) also showed the different 
aspects of the POS which “consist of opportunities and threats posed for claim 
making on the part of one or many actors by changes in regime openness, 
coherence of the national elite, stability of political alignments, availability of 
allies for potential claimants, and regime repression or facilitation with respect to 
possible forms of claim making. Finally, sketches of strategic situations close in 
on the positions and relations of crucial actors as they approach the making of 
collective claims”.  
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Several dimensions of political opportunity structures can be conceptualized 
according to one’s study, case and research questions. By synthesizing various 
variables of the POS developed by above mentioned researchers and having in 
mind that the peculiarity of Turkish case comes from the Turkish state’s 
repressive strategies, the present study mainly focuses on two dimensions: (1) 
İnstitutional structures and prevailing strategies and, (2) presence or absence of 
elite allies. 
The political opportunity model has been criticized for disregarding the 
activists and more importantly for my research, to “fail to appreciate the complex 
and sometimes contradictory ways in which political structures influence 
movement mobilization” (Kriesi et al., 1995: 37). Thus, for dealing with this 
problem and trying to stay away from a “mechanistic” understating of the social 
movements, I will set my research in a motivational theory proposed by Kriesi et 
al. (1995), drawing from Tilly (1978). This approach is helpful to understand the 
relationship between political opportunity structures and mobilization.   
 
Institutional structures and prevailing strategies 
Being deeply embedded in the political heritage of a given political system (Kriesi 
et al., 1995: 26), institutional structures and prevailing strategies compose 
significant dimensions of POS. Among these two sets of elements of POS, 
institutional structures constitute a more formal dimension, while prevailing 
strategies are more informal. Based on the formal institutional structures of states, 
which “determine to a large extent the openness of access to the state, as well as 
its capacity to act”, Kriesi et al. (1995: 27) make a classification between strong 
and weak states: “strong states are at the same time autonomous with respect to 
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their environment and capable of getting things done, whereas weak states not 
only lack autonomy but also the capacity to act”. Being aware of the fact that 
states’ institutional structures might be domain or period specific, Kriesi et al. 
(1995: 27) mention that “the rough distinction on the macrolevel of analysis 
between strong and weak states is useful for conceptualizing the general outlines 
of the national political context in which social movements operate”. It is 
mentioned that “the strength of state is (…) a function of two general structural 
parameters (…): the degree of the state’s (territorial) centralization and the degree 
of its (functional) separation of state power” (Kriesi et al., 1995: 28). Accordingly, 
“the greater the degree of decentralization, the wider is the degree of formal 
access and the smaller the capacity of any one part of the state to act” (Kriesi et al., 
1995: 28). With regard to the first parameter, it can be claimed that Turkey has a 
“historical legacy of an extremely centralized and overpowering patrimonial state” 
(Öniş, 1992: 19). This fact contributed to the lack of multiplication of actors that 
have access to formal politics and decision making processes. In addition, thanks 
to this centralized structure of Turkey, the political context within the social 
movements are operating is confined mainly to the national governments, and 
military juntas in coup periods.  
 The second structural parameter determining the strength of state is 
separation of power, as mentioned above. It can be claimed that “the greater the 
separation of power between the different arenas- that is, between the legislature, 
the executive, and the judiciary- as well as within arenas, the greater the degree of 
formal access and the more limited the capacity of the state to act” (Kriesi et al., 
1995: 28).  As the principle of “separation of power” was introduced in the 1961 
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Constitution, it would not be wrong to categorize Turkey as a strong state in this 
regard.  
Following Kitschelt, Kriesi et al. (1995) also focus on the parliamentary 
arena and take number of parties, factions, and groups and the formation of viable 
policy coalitions as significant parameters. The number of parties is a function of 
the electoral system and the national conflict structures (Kriesi et al., 1995: 29). 
With its proportional electoral system introduced in 1961, in which the 
administrative provinces are the constituencies (Hale, 1980: 404), with a 10 
percent threshold designed to keep out minor challengers, the Turkish system does 
not allow smaller parties to be represented in the Parliament. This system 
contributes to the more general lack of access for challengers.  
With regard to the parliamentary arena, one might also consider the 
process of coalition formations, as it is also determined by the number of political 
parties (Kriesi et al., 1995: 30). Even though, only a number of parties were able 
to find themselves a place in the Parliament thanks to the 10 percent threshold, 
Turkey has been mostly governed by coalition governments since 1965. This was 
also the case for the covered period. On the other hand, “leader domination and 
the absence of effective intraparty democracy” (Öniş, 2007: 257) have been 
among the characteristics of Turkish political parties. In this case it is possible to 
claim that Turkey provides a case of multiparty governments with relatively 
disciplined parties.  
The amount of resources at the disposal of administration, the structure of 
interlocutors in the system of interest intermediation and the structural agreements 
between the interlocutors and the administration determine the formal access and 
the capacity to act within the administrative arena (Kriesi et al.,1995: 31). In this 
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regard, the central and highly bureaucratized structure of public administration in 
Turkey presents a example of strong administration, as the “centralist mentality 
covers all the fields of public policy formulation from very start to end without 
giving any substantial reference to other actors like local elected ones or non-
governmental organizations even if the policy is directly related to them” (Karkın 
and Çalhan, 2012: 108). Thus, it prevents challengers from having access to state. 
Turkey also failed to establish a structured interest groups system. As Heper and 
Keyman (1998: 262) write “in the making of policies, political responsiveness to, 
let alone regular consultations with, organized interests have remained alien to the 
Turkish scene”.  
To assess the institutional strength of the state, Kriesi et al. (1995: 32) also 
consider the direct-democratic arena, as “formal access is a function of the degree 
to which direct-democratic procedures are institutionalized”.  The lack of direct-
democratic access in decision making processes in Turkey allows the country to 
be called as a strong state in this regard.  
In sum, following the distinction of Kriesi et al. (1995) of strong and weak 
states, I identify Turkey as a strong state based on high degree of centralization, 
low degree of separation of power, centralized structure of public administration, 
electoral system that prevents challengers to enter the parliament and lack of 
direct-democratic procedures .  
 Besides the institutional structure, Kriesi et al. (1995) also consider the 
informal strategies as a part of the POS. Focusing on the “procedures that 
members of the political system employ when they are dealing with challengers” 
(Kriesi et al., 1995: 33), they differentiate exclusive and integrative prevailing 
strategies of the political elite. While the exclusive strategies are repressive, 
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confrontational, polarizing, the integrative strategies are facilitative, cooperative, 
assimilative (Kriesi et al., 1995: 34).  The state in Turkey has a long tradition of 
authoritarianism (see Heper 1985). According to Keyder (1997: 45), “the gap 
between the modernizing elites (…) and the voiceless masses gradually emerged 
as the axis around which the subsequent history of Turkish society was played 
out.” In this regard, “authoritarianism became the necessary corollary to reliance 
on collectivist nationalism as the legitimating principle of the state” (Keyder, 
1997: 46). The state in its early years repressed Islamists, especially Sufi groups 
(Cizre Sakallıoğlu, 1996: 235) and Kurds, a practice that lasted long while its 
scope was expanded.  Given this fact, it would not be wrong to claim that the 
prevailing strategies of political elites in Turkey have been exclusive and 
repressive since the early Republican era.  
In the light of the political process approach, my central argument is that 
certain political developments occurred in Turkey starting from the 1950s shaped 
the mobilization in late 1960s and in 1970s. Given its high degree of 
centralization, strong public administration, electoral system depending on 
D’Hondt method, with a 10 percent threshold and lack of institutionalized direct-
democratic procedures, Turkey can be considered as a strong state with exclusive 
prevailing strategies. However, certain moments of openings in the political 
system led the way to mobilization and radicalization processes. Tilly (1978: 100) 
used the terms repression and facilitation to explain the effect of other parties on 
mobilization: “repression is any action by another group which raises the 
contender’s cost of collective action. An action which lowers the group’s cost of 
collective action is a form of facilitation”. In the Turkish case, state and/or 
countermovement were the source of repression targeting the left-wing students, 
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who were the early risers of the cycle as explained in detail in Chapter 5. This 
repression was a reason for the escalation of violence in the course of the protest 
wave. On the other hand, certain groups’ activities were facilitated by their allies 
among the ruling parties. The dynamics of repression and facilitation might also 
influence the level of mobilization.  
Considering the level of mobilization and given the repressive character of 
military juntas, the number of protests can be expected to be lower under military 
regime when compared to “normal” periods of political life:  
H1: The level of mobilization will be lower under a military (repressive) 
regime than in a democratic regime. 
As mentioned earlier, prevailing strategies of political elites in Turkey is 
generally repressive and exclusive. However, these strategies may vary from time 
to time and from group to group. Thus, while the activities of a group which 
shares similar ideological features and goals with the political elite would be 
facilitated, an opposing group is likely to be repressed. Different branches of the 
state such as military, police, secret police etc. can play different roles with 
respect to the mobilization of protest. Even the attitudes of the same branch can 
differ from one movement to another. For example, it can be observed that in the 
pre-1980 period, the attitudes of the police who were members of left and right-
wing police organizations differed according to the context of protest or protesters. 
However, given the conservative structure of the security forces in Turkey and the 
fact that right-wing groups are closer to them with regards to the ideological terms, 
security forces are expected to be more repressive against left-wing groups. 
H2: Security forces in Turkey are much more repressive with respect to the 
left than with respect to the right. 
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Alliance structure and the presence or absence of elite allies 
The second dimension of the POS to be elaborated in this study is related to the 
certain aspects of the configuration of power of a political system. The presence 
or absence of elite allies, in this regard, is an aspect of the changing political 
context, thus a less stable aspect of the political opportunity structure. The 
presence of elite allies might facilitate mobilization, thus increase the level of it on 
the one hand, and might affect the choice of repertoire of a certain movement on 
the other. A political realignment or a split in the government might be accepted 
as examples of alliance structures (Kriesi et al., 1995: 211).  
 Ideological position of the ally and its role in the political arena are two 
significant features that would identify the nature of the alliance structure. The 
proximity in the ideological stance between a political organization and a social 
movement might allow an alliance between the two. While the influence of the 
ideological position on the alliance structure is obvious, the support of the ally 
“depends on whether it participates in government or not, and if it does so, on its 
position in government” (Kriesi et al., 1995: 59).  
 Based on the new social movements, that are generally left leaning, Kriesi 
et al. (1995) focused on the structure of the old and new left in Western Europe 
and claimed that movements can count on parties of the left especially when they 
are not in government. This is caused by the fact that while in government, 
political parties “operate under constraints of established policies and pressures 
from dominant societal forces (industry, finance, technocracy)” (Kriesi et al., 
1995: 59). In addition, they tend to act in a manner to be reelected and make 
concessions accordingly. On the other hand, the social movements with an ally in 
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the government are expected to have a lower level of mobilization, because of the 
expected chances of reform in the favor.  
 However, it might be argued that a strong ally in the government might be 
beneficial for a social movement. While the ally might provide the movement 
with more space for higher levels of mobilization, having an ally in the 
government might provide protection against legal and penal sanctions as the ally 
might have its cadres in relevant state apparatus. In the Turkish case, the strong 
relation between the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP) 
and the far-right movement in Turkey is evident. The Grey Wolves are mostly 
referred as the youth movement of the MHP. It is widely accepted that infiltration 
of the police and other security forces by the sympathizers of MHP, especially 
during the period between 1974 and 1977 when the MHP was a strong partner in 
the coalition government, provided protection for the Grey Wolves (Nell 2008).  
The presence of allies may also influence the repertoire of action of the 
group. It is generally expected that protest events of a group with strong allies are 
less violent than those of competing groups without allies since they have more 
access to formal politics. On the other hand, one might also expect the opposite, 
i.e. it might be expected that well connected groups use more radical and violent 
types of actions since their allies can provide them more room for the use of a 
more radical repertoire. In the period covered in this study, the right wing groups 
were more likely to find allies, as all the governing parties except one had 
nationalist-conservative tendencies. Two competing hypotheses are employed on 
this issue: 
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H3a: The radical right protesting groups are more likely to employ lower 
levels of political violence than the left-wing groups since they have stronger 
allies and more access to the political system. 
H3b: The radical right protesting groups are more likely to employ higher 
levels of political violence than the left-wing groups since their strong allies might 
overlook their radical activities. 
2.2.2.2.2. Cycle of protest 
Besides the political opportunity structure, “cycle of protest” 8  is another core 
concept that this study relies on. Defined as “a phase of heightened conflict and 
contention across the social system” (Tarrow, 1994: 153), the concept is 
employed to analyze the evolution of movement participation and levels of 
mobilization. Providing the opportunity to consider the role of time and space in 
contentious politics, this concept allows considering contention as a multi-actor 
process without focusing on one actor (Koopmans, 2004: 40). 
A cycle of a protest has some features that distinguish it from other periods 
of mobilization. These common, distinguishing features, according to Tarrow 
(1994: 153) are: “a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to 
less mobilized sectors; a quickened phase of innovation in the forms of contention; 
new or transformed collective action frames; a combination of organized and 
unorganized participation; and sequences of intensified interactions between 
challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes 
revolution”. 
                                                     
8
 Koopmans (2004: 21) proposes the concept of protest “waves” instead of “cycles”, mentioning 
that a “cycle” untenably refers to a “a periodically recurring sequence of phenomena”, while a 
“wave” “simply refers to the strong increase and subsequent decrease in the level of contention” 
without making an assumption about regularity. “Waves” and “cycles” of protests are used 
interchangeably in this study. 
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 Departing from the definition and common aspects of the concept, one of 
the main arguments of this study is the need to consider 1970s in Turkey as a 
cycle of protest. Figure 2.1 presents the monthly distribution of protest events in 
Turkey in the covered period. 
 
Figure 2.1: Numbers of protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986. 
 
 
Based on the data presented in Figure 2.1 it is possible to claim that Turkey 
witnessed a heightened phase of conflict that started in 1974 and lasted until the 
military coup in September 1980. While the analysis in this study starts from 1971, 
1968, referred as the year that rocked the world (Kurlansky 2004), has also been 
an important year for Turkey in terms of the emerging student movements. These 
students that started to mobilize in late 1960s were also the pioneers of the cycle 
of protest of 1970s in Turkey. As it is explained in detail in the following chapters, 
student mobilization led to the mobilization of other segments of society. Various 
forms of actions were used during the protest events organized by these groups, 
but violence came to the fore due to several reasons. As violence is frequently one 
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of the outcomes of a cycle of protest, analyzing the cycle of protests is also useful 
to study political violence (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 190; Della Porta, 2008: 
222), which also dominated the streets in Turkey in 1970s. It is also possible to 
trace intensified interactions, especially in the form of repression, between 
challengers and authorities.  
This cycle evolved in time and continued till the military coup d’état on 
1980, as mentioned above. However, the impacts of this cycle were witnessed 
after long years. For example, some radical organizations evolved into 
institutionalized organizations, and most of the actors continued their political life 
in these. Thus, analyzing this cycle of the protest is also significant to understand 
the contemporary dynamics of street politics in Turkey.  
During a cycle of protest, even new and institutional actors to take the 
streets to make their claims as collective action diffuses. In addition, “the growing 
polarization in the party and the corporatist systems expands the opportunities of 
new alliance and adversary structures between challengers and established actors” 
(Hutter and Giugni, 2009: 234). In this regard, we can expect to see higher 
participation of external allies such as labor unions and professional organizations 
as the cycle of protest takes off:  
H4: High participation of external allies is expected during heightened 
phases of conflict.  
 
2.2.2.2.3. Repertoires of Action 
Taylor and Dyke (2004: 263) write that protest is perhaps the main characteristic 
of social movements for distinguishing them from institutionalized and 
established political actors. Various kinds of actions ranging from conventional 
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forms (such as lobbying, voting, etc.) to unconventional forms which include 
demonstrations, confrontational actions and violent acts can be used in protests. 
The essential concept in social movements literature addressing these issues is 
“repertoire of contention”, a contribution of Charles Tilly (1978) to the literature. 
By using this concept, he identified historical variations in types of protest and the 
changes occurred in the forms of protest as a result of the emergence of modern 
capitalist societies and nation-state: parochial and patronage-dependent repertoire 
of the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century was replaced by a national, 
autonomous and modular repertoire with the French Revolution (Tilly 1984; 
Tarrow 1994). 
In order to analyze the repertoire of contention/action used in Turkey in 
1970s, we should first further elaborate the concept which is “(…) at once a 
structural and a cultural concept, involving not only what people do when they are 
engaged in conflict with others but what they know how to do and what others 
expect them to do” (Tarrow, 1994: 30). In Tilly’s own words (1995: 26), the 
concept identifies “a limited set of routines that are learnt, shared and acted out 
through a relatively deliberate process of choice”. According to Tilly (1995) 
repertoires are learnt cultural creations and they emerge from struggle. However, 
the repertoires are limited in a given time, so people “learn only a rather small 
number of alternative ways to act collectively” (Tilly, 1995: 26). Crossley (2002: 
48-9; 2005:270) points out five important points that can be detected from Tilly’s 
definition. These five points, that provide with a better understanding of what 
constitutes a repertoire of action, are: (1) a suggestion that repertoires constrain 
behavior and choice, (2) the know-how or acquired competence involved in 
specific forms of protest, (3) the emphasis upon the practical constitution of 
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repertoires, (4) a notion of deliberate but constrained choice, (5) the identification 
of repertoires with specific historical periods.  
As mentioned before, Turkey can be characterized as a strong state. Facing 
a closed institutional context and being a strong state are not facts that would 
contribute to the facilitation of social movements. In this regard, it can be inferred 
that the repertoire of action used in the 1970s would not be moderate, but radical 
since the opportunities provided do not allow for institutionalized actions:  
H5: The repertoire of action used in the 1970s will be rather radical than 
moderate. 
It is generally expected that the number of radical and violent actions 
would decline under military regimes because of the high costs of mobilization.  
However, regarding the effect of success chances, referring “to the likelihood that 
collective action will contribute to the realization of a movement’s goals” (Kriesi 
et al., 1995: 38), it can be assumed that “if the success chances are high, a 
movement will be able to reach a given level of goal attainment with less pressure 
on the authorities than is necessary in less favorable circumstances” (Kriesi et al., 
1995: 40). Thus, it can be asserted that since the possibility of moderate 
mobilizing is also low under military regimes, the mobilizing groups would resort 
to more radical actions to increase their success chances:  
H6: Violent acts are more likely under the military (repressive) regime. 
 
2.3. Summary 
This chapter of the dissertation elaborated on the theories of social movements. 
After providing brief explanations of the classical approaches in the literature, the 
chapter has claimed the significance of political process approach and political 
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opportunities model in studying the social movement mobilization in Turkey in 
the 1970s. Based on the motivational theory proposed by Kriesi et al. (1995), the 
chapter has suggested the use of concepts such as repression, facilitation, threats 
and success chances to understand the dynamics of the protest wave. 
 Furthermore, the chapter has elaborated on and operationalized the two 
dimensions of the POS in Turkey, namely the institutional structures and 
prevailing strategies and the alliance structure and the presence or absence of elite 
allies. In this regard, the chapter claimed Turkey to be a strong state with 
exclusive prevailing strategies based on its high degree of centralization, strong 
public administration, electoral system depending on D’Hondt method, with a 10 
percent threshold and lack of institutionalized direct-democratic procedures. In 
contrast to the suggestion of Kriesi et al. (1995) based on new social movements 
in Western Europe that movements would benefit more from allies when they are 
not in government, in this chapter it is suggested for the Turkish case in the 1970s 
movements would benefit more from strong allies when they are in government as 
it is expected from the allies to provide various forms of protection for the 
activities of movements.  
 In addition, cycles of protest and repertoires of action, two concepts that 
are also central to the political process model and the political opportunity 
structure approach are elaborated on in this chapter.  
 Six hypotheses are generated and presented in this chapter based on the 
theoretical model adopted and the conceptual tools used for this study.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Chapter 3  
 
Methodology- Protest Event Analysis 
 
The present study relies on protest event analysis (PEA) as an empirical basis for 
the analysis of protests in Turkey during the period between March 1971 and 
January 1986. In the following, I first provide some information about the method 
used and introduce the main features of this type of data, and then I provide 
information about the data generation process in this particular study.  
 
3.1. Protest Event Analysis 
In order to analyze the state of protests in Turkey in the 1970s, this study relies on 
PEA which is a quantitative content analysis method developed to analyze protest 
events. PEA is used to “systematically map, analyze and interpret the occurrence 
and properties of large numbers of protests by means of content analysis, using 
sources such as newspaper reports and police records” (Koopmans and Rucht, 
2002: 231). As Fillieule and Jiménez (2003: 258) wrote, with the increase in the 
use of this method, “it has almost become a sub-field within the sociology of 
social movements, with its own theoretical debates, epistemological issues, 
methods, and even vocabulary”. It is even called one of the most important trends 
in social movement research by Oliver et al. (2003).  
This significant method of social movement research has a long tradition 
in the study of social movements. Rucht et al. (1998:9) identify three generations 
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of PEA research from the 1960s to the mid-1990s, which can be respectively 
labeled as “initiators”, “expanding the field” and “broadening sources and 
controlling for selectivity”. While the first generation of researchers (Tilly et al. 
1975 among others) used PEA to handle various numbers of variables for large 
numbers of countries or for social and political change processes, the second 
generation (Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1982 among others) tended to use the 
protest data more extensively for case-studies in carefully designed cross-national 
studies. They paid more attention to source selection and coding procedures, but 
did not work much on qualifying the bias of newspaper sources used. In order to 
fill this gap, the third generation (Francisco 1996; Imig and Tarrow 2001 among 
others) invested more time on systematizing newspaper data and used electronic 
approaches for selecting and coding protest related articles. As Hutter (2011) 
writes, today we can talk about the fourth generation that is unpacking single 
protest events on the one hand and broadening unit of analysis on the other, as 
illustrated by the studies of McPhail and Schweingruber (1998) and Tilly (2008). 
 
3.1.1. Sources Used for Protest Event Analysis and Source Selection 
Koopmans (1995a: 254) claims that newspapers are clearly the best choice among 
the possible sources of quantitative data on protests, as official records of social 
movement activities are usually absent, and even if they exist, their criteria of 
selection and categorization are often unclear and subject to changes over time. 
Police archives are usually considered as the most powerful alternative to 
newspapers. However, newspapers are still the main source due to some 
comparative advantages such as ease of access, reliability, continuity and ease of 
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coding (Rucht and Neidhardt, 1998: 71). As Koopmans (1995a: 253) writes “it is 
the poverty of the alternatives that makes newspapers so attractive”.  
For the specific case of Turkey, it was hard to rely on other sources. While 
the number of biographical works, or works relying on memories are increasing, 
this kind of sources are written by the members or militants of the most prevalent 
and mass movements/social movement organizations and the existing written 
material of the period such as leaflets, etc. are limited to the organizations that 
have bureaucratic structures (Ergüden, 2012: 82); a fact that makes these 
documents biased. Thus, newspaper archives emerge as one of the most useful 
“documents” for the Turkish case. Relying on theoretical reasons mentioned 
above and the difficulty to access other sources, such as police or social 
movement organization archives, this study is based on data collected from 
newspapers.  
The data used for this study relies on one national daily newspaper 
published in Turkey. The objectives of quality and quantity are combined in 
choosing the newspaper to be coded. The criteria provided by Koopmans (1995a: 
255) that are applicable to the Turkish case, namely continuity, quality, national 
scope and political color are employed in order to determine the newspaper. The 
four main national newspapers published during the taken period are Cumhuriyet, 
Milliyet, Hürriyet and Tercüman. Among these newspapers Milliyet, published 
since May 3, 1950, seemed to be the best source for this study. Compared to the 
other newspapers, it can be regarded as being at the center of the political 
spectrum.  During the 1970s, the circulation of this daily was between 182000 and 
189000, and it was the fifth among the newspapers with high circulation. 
Moreover, it was the daily with the largest number of pages (about 13-14 pages 
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during the analyzed years). The main topics of the daily were the domestic events 
and sports (Kejanlıoğlu, 1995: 241), which makes it an important resource for 
protests in Turkey.  
 
3.1.2. Sampling and Data Collection  
In order to collect newspaper based data on protests and apply PEA, one should 
have an operational and clear understanding of what “protest” is. Instead of 
adapting one definition provided in the literature (see Chapter 2), the present 
study covers a broad and detailed list of action forms including both 
“conventional” and “unconventional” forms ranging from demonstrative (mass 
demonstrations, gatherings, etc.) and confrontational (boycotts, hunger strikes, 
occupations, etc.) forms to violence (clashes, threatening, bombing, etc.).   
In order to represent the diversity of the protests carried out during the 
covered period, this study does not rely on a specific motivation (i.e. political) 
behind the protests, but also covers culturally, economically, etc. motivated events.  
Considering the previous studies using PEA, sampling procedures are used 
in order to restrict the costs of data collection. A very common way of sampling 
used for the newspapers published in Europe is to code Monday issues only, since 
these newspapers are not published on Sunday (see for example Kriesi et al. 1995). 
However, this is not the case in Turkey; newspapers are published seven days a 
week. Thus, in order to determine the sampling procedure that can be applied to 
this study and to estimate the number of protest events that will be coded, a pilot 
test covering a three months period (the first three months of 1977) was carried 
out. A total of 401 events were coded for these three months, which already shows 
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the intensity of the events in Turkey during this period. Based on the pilot test, 
Figure 3.1 shows the number of events according to the days. 
 
Figure 3.1: Number of events according to the days (first three months of 1977). 
 
As can be observed from Figure 3.1, weekdays Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday 
are the ones with higher numbers of events, in addition to Sunday. This fact shows 
that both weekdays and weekends are important with regards to mobilization in 
Turkey. Thus, it has been hard to decide whether to choose weekdays or 
weekends for reviewing and coding. Due to this reason and to be able to represent 
the variety and diversity of the protests in Turkey, every issue of the daily Milliyet 
are reviewed for the fifteen years period starting from March 13, 1971, Saturday 
until the end of 1985 using the daily’s digital archive that is covering the period 
from 1953 to 2004.  
I made an additional test in order to determine the keyword string for the 
selection of the articles. In this test, the original newspaper archive was used as 
the starting point. One issue of Milliyet was reviewed per week for the first three 
months of 1977, again, in order to determine the articles containing information 
about any protest. After identifying the articles, a pre-test was done with the 
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internet based digital archive of the newspaper. First of all, a keyword string 
including the verbs and nouns used commonly for protest research such as 
“protest”, “strike”, “rally”, “demonstration”, “march”, etc. is created and run to 
see whether the articles found by search engine of the digital archive match with 
the ones identified in the original archive or not. The result showed that there 
were some articles missing, in other words the search engine could not find some 
of the articles that were detected in the original archive. As a next step, a few new 
keywords (e.g. anarchy) from the articles that the engine could not find were 
added to the string. The digital archive was searched again this time using the new 
key string and this time all the articles matched. The last version of the keyword 
string is: “strike, rally, demonstration, march, protest, eylem (action in Turkish), 
conflict, boycott, riot, attack, leaflet, struggle, meeting, manifestation, congress, 
banner, campaign, anarchy”. Using this key string, 3521 articles are collected for 
the entire period.
9
 Figure 3.2 shows the yearly distribution of articles collected.  
 
Figure 3.2: Number of articles collected according to years. 
 
                                                     
9
 48 newspaper issues were missing in total. 
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Newspaper articles reporting on any collective action with any purpose (might it 
be political, cultural, etc.) carried out anywhere (streets, closed places, etc.) were 
collected. However, articles giving information about a planned event were not 
collected since some of these events tend to be delayed or do not take place at all.  
 
3.2. Coding Procedure 
The amount of information that can be derived from the systematic reviewing and 
coding of newspapers is limited. Kriesi et al. (1995: 266) give two main reasons 
for this: “First, (…) newspapers can only be used for relatively ‘hard’10 features of 
protest. Second, even in regard to these aspects, newspaper reports tend to be 
highly disparate in the amount of information and detail they contain: some 
actions are extensively covered, but many are dealt with in a few lines providing 
only basic information”. Because of this reason, one should be very precise and 
careful about the variables to be coded. In order to make the most benefit out of 
the collected articles, the coding scheme used for this study is focusing on a 
number of variables, which are identified as common and available for most of the 
events based on the result of the pilot test. The variable list of Kriesi et al. (1995) 
is modified to formulate the coding scheme of this study. The final list is 
composed of 30 variables: Number, day, month, year, front page, frame of 
reference, region, city, actor, political organization of actors, political orientation 
of actors, goal, summary of form of action, form of action, number of participants, 
repression, source of repression, type of repression, number of custody, number of 
                                                     
10
 The authors borrow the distinction of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ news from Tuchman (1973, in Kriesi et al. 
1995). Hard features of protests are the factual aspects, such as the timing and locality of protest 
events, the number of participants, the stated goal of the protest, the forms of action and the 
numbers of wounded and arrested people, etc. (Kriesi et al., 1995: 254).  
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arrested, other reactions, who reacts?, goal of reaction, form of reaction, number 
of injured, number of death, material damage to, target of action, political 
organization of target, political orientation of target.  
Data generation from the newspaper articles is done by manual article 
coding, according to the codebook prepared for this study. While no sampling 
methods were applied during the archive reviewing process, due to the intensity of 
the events in the period covered and the fact that most of the articles report more 
than two events, a sampling method to code every other article is employed. As a 
result, a total of 1761 articles have been coded with the help of the Filemaker 
database software. Overall, the design resulted in a data set of 5361 protest events 
in Turkey in 15 years period, from 1971 to 1986.  
In order to provide detailed information about the data set of this study, 
some rules that have been applied during the coding procedure will be provided in 
the following in order to make the data collection and coding procedure more 
comprehensible for the reader. 
As mentioned above, some of the collected articles contained information 
on several protest events. As a result, not all the events are reported in the same 
detailed way. For example, some articles included statements such as: “one person 
is dead and two are wounded in other events that happened in Ankara” or “two are 
arrested as a result of the events that happened in the State Academy of 
Engineering and Architecture”. This kind of information has not been coded, 
since the information provided on the actor, type, goal, etc. of the event are not 
provided. 
Some other articles reported that some people, students, etc. were “caught”, 
but no further information about these arrestments was provided. In such cases, 
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the people mentioned are coded as taken under custody since being “caught” 
generally refers to that. On the other hand, both custody and arrests are coded as 
repression whatever the form of action is, in order to not to avoid any information 
provided. Investigations conducted by security forces are also coded as repression 
because of the same reason. 
 In the late 1970s in Turkey, bombings have happened to be one of the 
most frequent forms of action. In articles in which bombings of cars or houses of 
teachers, judge, factory managers, etc. are reported, the target of the action is 
coded as teacher, judge, factory manager, etc. and car or house as the element 
referring to the material damage. Thus, I coded the people as the target of the 
action if relevant information was provided, since these are not random cars left 
on the streets or random houses targeted by a random bombing action. In addition, 
if the political orientation of the teacher, factory manager, etc. is given, this 
information is also coded because it provides information also about the political 
orientation of the perpetrator. This rule is applied to coffeehouse bombings as 
well; if the political orientation of the owner or the general clients of the 
coffeehouse is given.  
Boycotts, especially those organized by students, are another one of the 
frequent forms of action. The targets of the boycotts or the boycotted objects are 
important since they provide us with the information on the reason for the action. 
However, in most of the articles about student boycotts, no information about the 
target of the action was given. Such kinds of boycotts were coded as boycotts of 
classes, since it is reasonable to think that the main aim of the students actions are 
school system and/or education related.  
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It is well known to the wider public that some of the organizations active 
in those years used burglaries as well, in order to provide some financial resources 
for their activities. However, since it would have been extremely difficult to 
differentiate an ordinary crime from a politically motivated event based on the 
newspaper articles, information reporting on burglaries where no ideological 
stance was mentioned has not been coded.   
The actors of the cycle of protest in Turkey were much diversified. More 
than 600 organizations and about 200 groups were listed. In order to make a 
meaningful analysis, these organizations are classified into significant groups. 
Doing this was much easier with organizations since they can be grouped under 
institutionalized units such as associations, political parties, unions, chambers etc. 
It was more difficult to place some student organizations, some revolutionary or 
far-right organization that employed violence, or some groups organized around 
some journals. In this regard, I differentiated illegal organizations which were not 
framed within existing laws and mainly adopted guerilla tactics and violence and 
legal SMOs founded according to the law and employing various forms of legal 
protest actions.  
However, on the other hand, it was far more difficult to group categories 
of individuals since they included a very broad variety from parents of students, 
visitors of prisons, shoemakers, academicians to civil servants, wrestlers, referees, 
etc. Finally, people are classified into six categories: students, workers, elites, 
terrorists, general public and groups with opposing views. Among these, 
“terrorists” and “groups with opposing views” are coded as given in the 
newspaper articles, since it was highly difficult to gather detailed information 
about them from the articles. However, we can still make some inferences that, for 
51 
 
example, the terrorists as labeled by the journalists or newspaper refer to left-wing 
and/or Kurdish guerilla. On the other hand, such an inference is harder to make 
with respect to “groups with opposing views”: while this category generally refers 
to two groups with rival ideologies, i.e. socialists and fascists (idealists in Turkish 
case), it might also be used for rival groups within the left, i.e. Sovietists or 
Maoists. “General public”, on the other hand, includes people/groups who came 
together to protest an issue, such as teachers, parents of students, but cannot be 
grouped under other categories.  
Strikes have been one of the most frequent forms of actions employed by 
workers. For the current study they also played a role as a means of describing the 
selection bias of newspapers. A comparison between the data collected from 
newspaper and official statistics on strikes demonstrates the difference between 
these two sources: as shown by Table 3.1 only 171 strikes were reported in 
Milliyet for the covered period, while official statistics count 982 strikes between 
1971 and 1986.  
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Table 3.1: Number of strikes in Turkey according to different sources, 1971-1986. 
 
Year Official 
Data 
Newspaper 
Data 
1971 78 6 
1972 48 11 
1973 55 4 
1974 110 11 
1975 116 39 
1976 58 25 
1977 59 20 
1978 87 19 
1979 126 15 
1980 220 19 
1981 0 0 
1982 0 0 
1983 0 0 
1984 4 1 
1985 21 1 
TOTAL 982 171 
 
Given the fact that workers, in addition to students, were one of the groups most 
frequently involved in protest events, and considering the high number of protest 
events (n=5361), the significant difference between the official data and data 
gathered from the newspaper, Milliyet clearly underreported strikes. Especially 
from mid-1960s, strikes have been relatively routine acts in Turkey. Therefore it 
is clear that the newspaper tended to report only bigger strikes with more 
participants. Information on numbers of strikes and participants according to 
different sources is presented in Table 3.2. The selection bias of the newspaper 
used for gathering data towards “crowded” strikes is evident according to the data 
presented in Table 3.2. While the average number of participants of strikes in 
Turkey between 1971 and 1986 is 2.334 according to the official data, the average 
number of participants according to newspaper data is 29.720. The difference 
between these two sources reveals the selection bias of Milliyet very clearly; it is 
for this reason official data about strikes is used in the rest of the current study.  
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Table 3.2: Number of strikes, participants and average number of participants in 
Turkey according to official and newspaper data, 1971-1985. 
 
 
Official Data Newspaper Data 
Year 
No. of 
strikes 
No. of 
participants 
Average 
no. of 
participants 
No. of 
strikes
11
 
No. of 
participants 
Average  
no. of 
participants 
1971 78 10.916 140 5 2123 425 
1972 48 14.879 310 7 59826 8547 
1973 55 12.286 223 4 853 213 
1974 110 25.546 232 8 12264 1533 
1975 116 13.708 118 28 44300 1582 
1976 58 7.240 125 11 104480 9498 
1977 59 15.682 266 11 14666 1333 
1978 87 9748 112 13 35307 2716 
1979 126 21011 167 9 16935 1882 
1980 220 84.832 386 8 14151 1769 
1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1982 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1983 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1984 4 561 140 1 223 223 
1985 21 2.410 115 1 . . 
TOTAL 982 218.819 2.334 106 305.128 29.721 
 
 
3.3. Summary  
This chapter of the dissertation has presented the method and data used to analyze 
mobilization in Turkey in the 1979s, i.e. PEA. This method is seen as a major 
advance in social movement research (Oliver et al. 2003), while it also has 
received criticisms and triggered lively methodological debates. After providing 
brief information on the development of this methodological tool, I explained the 
sampling method used for this study and the choice of resources. The study is 
based on the archive of a Turkish daily newspaper, Milliyet. While there are 
                                                     
11
 Number of strikes here are different from ones provided in Table 3.1. In this table I provided 
information on the numbers of strikes of which the number of participants was reported. The 
average number of participants is significantly higher than the official data even if it is calculated 
according to the total number of strikes reported by Milliyet.  
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different ways of sampling for PEA, as a result of a pre-test I made, I decided not 
to choose particular days of a week to code, but used a keyword chain to detect 
the articles providing information on protest events and code every other article. 
This process allowed me to have a dataset of 5361 protest events. 
In the second part of this chapter, I elaborated on the coding procedures 
that used in the data generation process. The most striking thing was the bias of 
Milliyet towards “crowded” strikes, thus official data is consulted for analyzing 
strikes.  
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Part II 
 
Political Opportunity Structure: Turkey in the 
1960s and 1970s 
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Chapter 4 
 
Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s: Political and Socio-
Economic Developments  
 
It is generally accepted that political opportunity structures have an impact on 
social movement mobilization (see Chapter 2). It can be claimed that the political, 
economic and social changes that Turkey has been undergone since its foundation 
as an independent republic in 1923, and especially the socio-political and 
economic developments of 1970s, shaped the ebb and flow of the examined cycle. 
Starting from the early 1970s, Turkey faced severe political and economic crises. 
In the following, I provide information on several political developments of the 
decade, the role of military in Turkey’s political life, economic crises witnessed in 
those years which are also accepted as the reasons of polarization of society and 
finally, I provide a brief background information on the state of street politics.  
 
4.1. Political Developments: Elections, Governments and Coalitions 
Transition to multi-party politics in Turkey happened in 1946
12
, after a 23 year-
old single-party regime, with the foundation of the Democratic Party (Demokrat 
                                                     
12
 Although there have been earlier attempts for this transition, they all failed. The first attempt 
was the foundation of Progressive Republican Party in 1924. However, this party was closed down 
in 1925 after the Sheikh Said rebellion the same year. The second attempt was in 1930 with 
foundation of Free Republican Party. However, this party survived only for a couple of months 
from August to November 1930 (Emrence 2000; 2002). Founded in 1946 Democratic Party was 
not the first party that was established, but it was the most stable one among others (see Karpat 
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Parti – DP). The DP was founded by dissidents within the ruling Republican 
People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP)13  that was headed by İsmet 
İnönü, successor of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, at the time. Unlike the ruling CHP, 
the DP adopted a liberal economic point of view and “became the spokesman for 
private enterprise and individual initiative and that won them the support of the 
businessman as well as the liberal intelligentsia” (Ahmad, 1993: 105). While the 
DP was able to compete in the elections held in 1946, which are not accepted as 
free and fair (see for example Kalaycıoğlu, 2005:74), the party could not succeed 
at this. Turkey’s first genuinely competitive and free election held in 1950 
resulted in the overthrow of the one-party rule of the CHP, as the DP gained 53 
percent of the votes and 86 percent of the seats (415 seats out of 487) in the 
Parliament. The DP rule under the leadership of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes 
had three main goals: weakening the CHP by undermining the influence of its 
supporters coming from different state apparatus, replacing the statist economy 
with a liberal one depending on private enterprises and increasing the size of the 
entrepreneurial middle classes (Karpat, 2004: 16). The following elections, held in 
1954, also resulted with the victory of the DP, this time with 57 percent of the 
total votes and 93 percent of the seats in the Parliament.
14
 However, in the 
aftermath of the elections, the DP abandoned its liberal policies and under the 
Menderes leadership developed into a more authoritarian force (Karpat, 2004: 17). 
                                                                                                                                                 
1959 for s detailed account and dynamics of transition to multi-party politics in Turkey). Turkish 
party system basically remained as a two-party system until 1960.  
13
 The party was founded under the leadership of Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü and 
Refik Koraltan who were all deputies of the CHP.  
14
 The majoritarian electoral system used in 1950s caused disproportional distribution of seats in 
the Parliament. For example in the 1954 elections, the DP received 57.6 percent of the votes and 
gained 92.8 percent of the seats in the Parliament, while the CHP only had 5.7 percent of the seats 
by a vote share of 35.4 percent.   
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The first military coup of the Republican era, held on May 27, 1960
15
, ended the 
ten-years DP rule. The coup was carried out against the anti-democratic policies 
of the DP leadership and its excessive use of power as well as against the rise of a 
new middle class, as Karpat (2004: 17) puts it. In this regard, it was backed by the 
CHP, a secular, bureaucratic state party, and the state-centered intellectuals (Cizre 
Sakallıoğlu, 1997: 154). The military junta ruled the country through the National 
Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi - MBK) until October 15, 1961, when the 
first national elections after the coup were held.  
During the military regime, a new constitution was introduced and 
accepted as a result of the referendum held on July 9, 1961 with a 61.5 percent of 
the votes. Based on the discontent caused by the disproportional outcome of the 
1954 national elections, this new constitution introduced a change in the electoral 
system: a proportional representation system was accepted. Gunter (1989: 64) 
argues that this change in the electoral system led to a rampant multiparty system; 
a fact that is argued to be one of the reasons behind political instability in Turkey 
in the 1970s. Besides introducing a new electoral system, this new constitution 
adopted a more liberal approach and guaranteed basic rights and freedoms 
including associational rights, and thus provided the ground for the establishment 
of ideology based organizations. In addition, in order to prevent the monopoly of 
a single party, the legislative branch was divided into two separate bodies: the 
House of Representatives and the Senate. All legislation would have to pass both 
chambers (Zürcher, 2004: 245). More significantly, a full bill of civil liberties has 
been attached to the constitution that opened the ground for mass mobilizations 
                                                     
15
 The Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and the 
Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan were executed after the coup, in 1961. On the other hand, 
“587 people were tried on charges ranging from corruption to murder and violating the 
constitution” (Jenkins, 2007: 351). 
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following the abolishment of the ban on political activity on January 13, 1961. 
The rights provided and protected by the 1961 Constitution also opened the 
ground for political activities of all ideologies. With this ground provided, in the 
1960s Turkish politics moved towards ideological debates, along the left versus 
right division. Meanwhile, industrialization was taking root in the country, which 
triggered the emergence of class politics (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 25). Benefiting 
from this more liberal period of Turkish politics, several political parties were 
formed. One among these, the Turkish Workers’ Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi- TİP), 
is the first socialist party that ran in an election (general elections held in 1965) in 
Turkey and it “(…) contributed to the ideological aspect of politics (…) by 
forcing other parties to define themselves more clearly in ideological terms” 
(Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 36). By the mid-1960s, the CHP took a left-of-center 
(ortanın solu) position that resembled the social democratic movement in Europe 
at the time (Çarkoğlu, 2007: 257) by emphasizing concepts such as social justice, 
social inequality and increased social welfare for labor (Ayata and Güneş-Ayata, 
2007: 213).  
By the end of 1960s, Turkey was in a polarized situation in ideological 
terms with rising social movements. As I will explain more in detail in Chapter 5, 
the students were the “initiator” movement according to McAdam’s (1995) 
classification. However, movements of the leftist university youth, affected by the 
global movements of 1968, were accompanied by right-wing movements and 
organizations such as the Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar)
16
 and Associations for 
Struggle with Communism (Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri - KMD). As 
                                                     
16
 Grey Wolves was a youth group that had unofficial ties with the Nationalist Action Party of 
Turkey active in the streets especially against the leftists since 1968. They are also known as 
“commandos” because of their training, including arms instructions, in special summer camps 
(Landau, 1982: 594), known as “commando camps”.   
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Altunışık and Tür (2005: 36) point out, the struggles between these right and left-
wing movements subsequently almost led to a civil war.  
Ideologically based intra-party debates led to splits of the major political 
parties and the formation of new ones, which was another significant feature that 
marked the second half of 1960s in Turkey. The Justice Party (Adalet Partisi – AP) 
was established in 1961 as the successor of the DP, which had been closed after 
the military coup in 1960. In 1964 Süleyman Demirel, seen as the symbol of 
modern capitalism at the time in Turkey, became the leader of the party. His 
economic policies designed to transform Turkey into a modern capitalist society 
caused some problems within the party which was mainly supported by small-
holder peasants (Sherwood, 1967: 55). Being sensitive with regards to Islam, 
representatives of the lower middle class within the party, such as small 
merchants and farmers, began to criticize Demirel for caring about the interests of 
capitalists to the detriment of the people and for pursuing pro-industrialist and 
state-centric policies. Those critics got organized around Professor Necmettin 
Erbakan to found a new political party to raise their voice (Yavuz, 1997: 66). 
Encouraged by the results of the national elections held in 1969 (a total decline of 
6.4 percent in the votes of the AP), Erbakan formed the National Order Party 
(Milli Nizam Partisi –MNP) in January 1970 with an Islamist and anti-western 
stance. In December 1970, another faction in the AP split and formed the 
Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti). Still headed by İsmet İnönü, the CHP also 
witnessed a split after adopting a left-of-center position. The right wing within the 
party got disturbed with this mild social democratic trend rejecting socialism and 
communism. The following disputes resulted in the split of this right-wing group 
from the party which then founded the Republican Reliance Party (Cumhuriyetçi 
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Güven Partisi - CGP) in May 1967. All these internal developments within the 
political parties contributed to the instability of Turkish politics in the coming 
years.  
The Turkish Workers’ Party gained 14 seats in the Parliament in the 1965 
elections, thanks to the “national remainder system”.17 While the political parties 
were splitting into new ones, the then government led by Demirel was making 
plans to change the electoral law and abolish the existing electoral system. In 
March 1968, the Parliament changed the electoral law in accordance with the 
proposal of the government; this change “provided for altering allocation of 
remainders so as to offer seats to the larger parties at the expense of the smaller” 
ones (Landau, 1982: 591). This amendment introduced the d’Hondt system18 with 
a threshold. However, the parliamentary group of the TİP appealed to the 
Constitutional Court for annulment of the new law claiming that it contradicted 
the democratic principles of the 1961 Constitution (Hale, 1980: 407). As a result, 
the Court abolished the regulations of the amendment concerning the application 
of an electoral threshold, but the d’Hondt formula was kept. In this regard, the 
1969 elections were “conducted on the basis of the majority-proportional system 
and not proportional representation, so that votes cast for small parties in all 
electoral districts, which previously had been calculated, were discounted in 1969” 
                                                     
17
 This is a small-party friendly electoral system applied in Turkey only in the 1965 elections. The 
system works as follows: The seats are allocated according to the district threshold, where the 
votes cast in a district are divided by the quota of the seats for that district, first. Then, each party's  
vote  is  divided by  the quotient,  and  the parties  are given  the number of seats  equal  to the next  
lower  whole  number. As a result, there is a ‘remainder’ of votes, which is then divided by the 
number of the seats that were unfilled in the first place. Then, the result is divided by each party’s 
remainder votes in order to distribute the unfilled seats (Hale, 1980: 406; Cop, 2011: 10). 
18
 “The d’Hondt formula, or “highest average,” is a proportional representation (PR) formula used 
for allocating parliamentary seats according to the votes received by parties in the elections. The 
number of votes for each party is divided successively by a series of divisors (such as 1, 2, 3, and 
so forth) and seats are allocated to parties that secure the highest resulting quotient, up to the total 
number of seats available. The d’Hondt formula systematically favors the largest parties” (Sayarı, 
2007: 209). 
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(Lipovsky, 1992: 67). The amendment resulted in the defeat of the TİP in the 
1969 national elections: while the number of the cities where the party was able to 
compete increased to 67 from 54 in 1965 elections, its vote share decreased to 2.7 
percent compared to 3 percent in 1965 elections. While the loss in the vote share 
seems insignificant, the party’s seats in the Parliament decreased sharply from 14 
in 1965 to two in 1969, due to the changes made in the electoral law. However, 
the amendment was not the sole cause of the defeat of the TİP in 1969 elections; 
factionalism and rifts in the party also led to this defeat (Lipovsky 1992; Ulus 
2011).
 19
 The main divide in the Turkish left in the 1960s was the one between the 
supporters of a socialist revolution and a national democratic revolution (Milli 
Demokratik Devrim- MDD). According to the MDD line, in an underdeveloped 
country like Turkey, the main contradiction was not class based, rather it was 
between the oppressed nation and the imperialist powers and their domestic 
collaborators (Ulus, 2011: 92), and thus the main struggle would be against 
imperialism and feudalism (Doğan, 2010: 315). Since the proletariat, as a class, 
was too weak and politically immature, the strategy of the MDD was focused on 
establishing a national front composed of all the exploited social classes and 
groups, including intellectuals, military officers and the national bourgeoisie, thus 
the military-civil intelligentsia (Doğan, 2010: 315; Samim, 1987: 159). This 
general divide in the Turkish left also constituted the first serious dispute within 
the TİP: while the party defended a parliamentary transition, the MDD movement, 
which “was a reaction (…) to the TLP [TİP] leaders’ attachment to 
parliamentarism” (Lipovsky, 1992: 110), supported a military coup in order to 
                                                     
19
 Belge claims that the party’s votes increased almost to 6 percent, but then decreased again 
during the election due to the disagreements and factions within the party (Belge in Ulus, 2011: 
227).  
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gain power in the country.
20
 The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union 
in 1968 helped further deepening of the factions within the TİP: while the 
leadership cadres of the party, even the Soviet sympathizers, condemned the 
invasion, the “humanitarian socialism” rhetoric of Mehmet Ali Aybar, leader of 
the party, got reactions from the cadres. These reacting cadres claimed that such 
kind of rhetoric would mean that the TİP had defended “non- humanitarian 
socialism” before (Ulus, 2011: 81). They also blamed Aybar for adopting non-
scientific theories on socialism (Doğan, 2010: 316).  With the resentment of the 
trade unionists within the party towards Aybar,  on the eve of the 1969 elections 
there were four groups within the party, who held their own election campaigns 
(Ulus, 2011: 86). As mentioned above, the TİP was defeated in 1969 elections due 
to this deepening factionalism within the party as well as the changes made in the 
electoral law in 1968. 
Besides changing the electoral law in favor of larger parties, the AP 
government also passed an amendment law on unionism in 1970 in order to take 
the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları 
Federasyonu-DİSK) out of the game and empower the pro-government 
Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu 
- Türk-İş). However, workers responded to the call made by DİSK to protest the 
law with a vast and largely spontaneous demonstration held on June 15 and 16, 
1970, in the İstanbul-Kocaeli region. During these two days, protestors succeeded 
to paralyze the city with the participation of around 100.000 workers (Koç 1999). 
Four people died as a result of the clashes between the workers and the security 
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 Departing from this point, Ulus (2011: 192) claims that the main difference between the socialist 
revolution and national democratic revolution lines was on the issues of “(…) revolutionary 
agency and the role of military in politics. In other words, the difference was in the methods of 
achieving power, or the strategy, and in the actual conduct of socialist policy rather than in the 
substance of the socialist movement”.  
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forces. The government cut off all physical communications to the city in order to 
give an end to the events; an attempt that ended with declaration of a martial law, 
and the government declaring the demonstrations as “the rehearsal for revolution” 
(Ahmad, 1993: 146).      
The military intervened in politics for the second time on March 12, 1971, 
this time in the form of a memorandum sent to the AP government. The 
memorandum, claimed to be the result of above mentioned political developments, 
polarization and protests, was asking for a strong and credible government that is 
capable of ending anarchy and implementing reforms envisaged by the 
constitution in “Kemalist spirit” (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 37; Ahmad, 1993: 147). 
It is claimed that “ (…) the  military commanders  now  apparently wished  to  
keep  the  regime  intact  with  only  moderate  changes  designed  to shore  up  its 
authority  against challenges,  particularly  from the  political  left” (Tachau and 
Heper, 1983 :23). In other words, they were reluctant to exercise power directly. 
However, Demirel’s government resigned after the memorandum and a cabinet of 
technocrats was appointed as the new government of the country.  Strictly dealing 
with political violence (with the help of martial law), developing constitutional 
amendments to strengthen the executive, and carrying out the social reforms 
(particularly land reform) provided by the 1961 constitution were among the prior 
expectations from the new government (Özbudun, 1999: 34). The main reason 
provided for the intervention was “restoration of law and order”. One 
consequence of this was the closure of the TİP by the public prosecutor. The 
party’s leaders were blamed of violating the constitution by carrying out 
communist propaganda and supporting Kurdish separatism. On the other hand, the 
Islamist oriented MNP was also dissolved. While the army refrained from using 
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the power directly in the form of a coup or by dissolving the Parliament, it 
“permitted a succession of non-partisan cabinets to impose martial law, suppress 
the press, outlaw strikes, arrest hundreds of leftist activists” (Narlı, 2000: 113). 
Actually, martial law was declared in eleven provinces in April.  
One of the first steps taken by the technocratic “above-party” government 
was to make amendments in the 1960 constitution which was seen as the main 
“cause” of the conflictious environment in relation to the political rights and 
freedoms provided by it. With two amendments made in 1971 and 1973, 35 
articles of the 1961 constitution were changed and nine new provisional ones were 
added. The amendments were related to almost all institutions of the state: the 
unions, the universities, the press, the Constitutional Court, radio and television, 
etc. Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009: 18) categorizes the amendments into three 
types: “(1) curtailing certain civil liberties in conjunction with restrictions of the 
review power of the courts; (2) strengthening the executive, particularly by 
allowing the legislature to grant it law-making powers; and (3) increasing the 
institutional autonomy of the military by excluding it from review by civilian 
administrative courts and the Court of Account”.  
In the meantime, in 1972 İsmet İnönü, the leader of the CHP, was replaced 
by Bülent Ecevit, who acted as the secretary general of the party. This change was 
a result of ongoing ideological debates within the party. Under the leadership of 
Ecevit the party adopted a social democratic stance dedicated to economic and 
social welfare (Güneş-Ayata, 2002: 104; Ahmad, 2008: 205), as explained above.  
The military rule was replaced with the civilian rule following the first 
national elections held after the memorandum in 1973. According to Adamson 
(2001: 284), in the elections “the country had overwhelmingly voted to the Right, 
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if the vote for the various right-leaning parties were added together. However, the 
political Right was internally divided and was not able to form a coalition 
government”. Thanks to Ecevit’s left-leaning position, the CHP received votes 
mainly from organized or marginal workers in urban regions (Keyder, 1987: 71), 
and won the elections with 33.3 percent of total votes. However, lacking 226 seats 
for parliamentary majority, the party was not powerful enough to establish a 
majoritarian government. As a result, the center left CHP had to form a coalition 
government with the Islamist National Salvation Party
21
 (Milli Selamet Partisi – 
MSP) of Necmettin Erbakan. Zürcher (2004: 261) defines this coalition as “a 
marriage of convenience that nevertheless had some common basis in a distrust of 
European and American influence and of big business”. The coalition of these 
parties with different ideological backgrounds was based on political opportunism 
(Ahmad, 1993: 162): “(…) both Ecevit and Erbakan wanted to establish the 
legitimacy of their respective parties and there was no better way of doing so than 
by becoming the government”. Their moderate program was “designed to appease 
industry by leaving the profitable light consumer industries in private hands while 
the state assumed responsibility for the infrastructure” (Ahmad, 1993: 163). One 
of the significant steps taken by the coalition government was to announce a 
general amnesty in May 1974, only four months after coming to power. This 
amnesty led to the release of people who were accused of terrorist activities and 
imprisoned after the 1971 intervention; a significant event for analyzing the wave 
of protests in Turkey in 1970s, as the wave started to rise this year. However, this 
“marriage of convenience” between different ideologies did not last long. Ecevit 
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 The National Salvation Party, founded in October 1972, is the successor of the National Order 
Party that is closed as a result of the military intervention held in May 1971. Erbakan, who went to 
Germany and Switzerland due to his health problems after the dissolution of the National Order 
Party, became the leader of the party when he officially joined in 1973.  
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gained a significant popularity as a result of Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 
1974, and became a hero so to speak. It was this popularity that made Ecevit think 
that the CHP would win a landslide victory if early elections were held; as a result 
he resigned. His resignation brought the country on the edge of a political crisis 
since no one was able to form a government in the 241 days following Ecevit’s 
resignation.  
Instead of having an early election, the right-leaning political parties chose 
to form a coalition government, the first of the so-called “Nationalist Front” 
governments. The coalition formed on March 31, 1975, was composed of the 
center-right AP, the Islamist MSP, the far-right MHP of Alpaslan Türkeş and the 
CGP of Turhan Feyzioğlu. Demirel was leading the government, while Erbakan 
and Türkeş acted as deputy premiers. On the other hand, the formation of this 
government including the MHP as one of the major partners in the coalition 
helped legitimizing its far-right ideology, as the party was able to have two 
members in the cabinet out of its three members in the Parliament (Ahmad, 2008: 
252).  The first Nationalist Front government stayed in power from March 1975 
until the next national elections held in 1977. According to Keyder (1987: 71), 
this period of the Nationalist Front government can be labeled as a period when 
satisfying rewards were provided to the conflicting factions within the bourgeoisie. 
The formation of the first Nationalist Front government helped preventing a 
possible early election; however the coalition partners were not eager to cooperate. 
Having both Erbakan and Türkeş as deputy premiers also contributed to the 
difficulties in decision making process (Gunter, 1989: 64).  By the end of 1976, 
while the smaller parties of the coalition were suffering from a fear of national 
elections in which they could be swept away, Demirel was willing to hold an 
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election at a point where his party seemed as the most powerful. In June 1977, the 
two major parties voted together to hold early elections in June instead of October, 
when they should be normally held (Ahmad, 1993: 169).  
1977 national elections resulted in the victory of the CHP. However, 213 
seats gained out of 450 were not enough to establish a single party government, as 
in the 1973 elections. The first minority government in Turkish history formed by 
Ecevit after the 1977 elections failed to win a vote of confidence in the Parliament. 
The result was the formation of the second Nationalist Front government, again 
under the leadership of Demirel. This second term of Nationalist Front 
government didn’t last long, however. Ecevit was successful in enticing 11 
members of parliament (MP) of the AP by promising ministerial positions to them.  
Demirel’s government fell when these MPs became members of the CHP. With 
the support of the independents in the Parliament, Ecevit was able to establish a 
single party government in early 1978. However, some political and economic 
developments such as rising inflation, shortages in some major consumer items 
and an escalating tide of conflicts and violence, especially the events in 
Kahramanmaraş 22 , resulted in a loss of trust among people for the Ecevit 
government. The Kahramanmaraş events also led Ecevit, who had been trying to 
avoid martial law while the opposition had been demanding it, to announce 
martial law. However, even the martial law was not enough to decrease the 
tension. Ecevit’s attempts to apply “martial law with a human face” (Ahmad, 
1993: 173) caused blames by the opposition. The by-elections held in October 
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 Around 150 people, according to official records, were killed as a result of sectarian violent 
events that last for seven days, targeting mainly the leftists and Alevi people living in the 
southeastern city of Kahramanmaraş in late December 1978. The events are considered one of the 
milestones of the way to the military coup.  
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1979
23
 resulted in the victory of Demirel with a rise to 54 percent of votes and the 
resignation of Ecevit whose party’s vote share declined to 29 percent.  As a result 
of the by-elections, Demirel formed a minority government that lasted until the 
military coup held in September 1980. Vote shares and parliamentary seats gained 
by political parties both in 1973, 1977 and 1983 national elections are shown in 
Table 4.1. 
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 This by-election was held to replace the five seats in Parliament which were emptied due to 
various reasons.  
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Table 4.1: General election results: 1973, 1977 and 1983. 
 
1973 1977 1983 
Political Party 
Vote 
Share 
(in %) 
Number 
of Seats 
Vote 
Share 
(in %) 
Number 
of Seats 
Vote 
Share 
(in %) 
Number 
of Seats 
Republican 
Peoples’ Party 
(CHP) 
33.3 185 41.4 213 - - 
Justice Party 
(AP) 
29.8 149 36.9 189 - - 
Democratic 
Party (DP) 
11.9 45 1.8 1   
National 
Salvation Party 
(MSP) 
11.8 48 8.6 24 - - 
Republican 
Reliance Party 
(CGP) 
5.3 13 1.9 3 - - 
Nationalist 
Action Party 
(MHP) 
3.4 3 6.4 16 - - 
Unity Party 
(TBP) 
1.1 1 .4 0   
Nation Party 
(MP) 
.6 0 - - - - 
Turkish Labor 
Party (TİP) 
- - .1 0 - - 
Motherland 
Party (ANAP) 
- - - - 45.1 211 
Populist Party 
(HP) 
- - - - 30.5 117 
Nationalist 
Democracy 
Party (MDP) 
- - - - 23.3 71 
Independents 2.8 6 2.5 4 1.1 0  
TOTAL 100 450 100 450 100 399 
Source: Altunışık and Tür (2005: 39, 46) and http://www.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul 
(accessed March 21, 2012).  
71 
 
Post-1980 Period 
As a result of the coup, Turkey was ruled, again, by the military from September 
1980 to November 1983. The ban on establishing political parties was abolished 
in 1983, but only three parties among all that were established in this year were 
allowed by the military to run in the elections. The “admitted” parties were the 
Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi- MDP) which was led 
by a former general, the Populist Party (Halkçı Parti – HP) and the Motherland 
Party (Anavatan Partisi – ANAP). While the military favored the MDP, the 
ANAP of Turgut Özal won the elections with 45.1 percent of the votes and gained 
211 seats in the Parliament. The ANAP, tried to incorporate four different 
tendencies (the liberal right, traditionalist right, nationalist right and the 
democratic left) under its umbrella (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 46), and as a result 
of “the need for a synthesis liberal economic rationality and social unity based on 
religious-moral values” (Heper, 2002: 143), ruled the country until 1991. Thus, 
Turkey was ruled by the ANAP during the last two years of the period covered by 
this study. In line with the party’s economic views, in the post-1983 period 
Turkey witnessed decentralization of the government, privatization of state 
economic enterprises and adoption of free-market economic policies.  
In sum, it can be claimed that Turkish politics in the 1970s was marked by 
an extreme political instability and the formation of coalition governments.
24
 The 
role of military was an important part of politics, as the military made its presence 
felt via the interventions made. How and when did the Turkish military start to 
involve in politics? What kind of effects did it have in the 1970s? In the following 
I elaborate the answers to these questions.  
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 See Appendix 1 for details on the Turkish governments from 1970 to 1986. 
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4.2. Military in Politics: Role of Military and Interventions 
The military has always been an important actor in Turkish politics, a heritage 
based on the Ottoman tradition of close military-state ties (Narlı 2000). As Karpat 
(1970: 1656) mentions, “the army is the oldest social institution in Turkey, and, in 
fact, it is the only organization surviving from the traditionalist era”. It always had 
a privileged and preeminent role in the political life. In the Ottoman era, this was 
caused by the warrior aspect of the state and the empire’s political organization 
which was largely based on conquests (Vaner, 1987: 237). However, this 
privileged role of the army in the Ottoman era, based on the economic and 
political structure of the empire, strengthened especially in the nineteenth century 
with the modernization process, in which the military was both an object and an 
agent (Demirel, 2003: 255). This important role of the military is consolidated in 
the Republican era, as it became the first institution of the emerging Republic 
“(c)rowned by its success in the War of Independence (1919-23), and unified by 
the new ideology of Turkish nationalism” (Vaner, 1987: 237). It should also be 
noted that the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was himself a 
former soldier and heavily relied on the army to achieve his goals and to realize 
the reforms. Under this new Republic, the military came to see itself as the 
ultimate guardian of the republican regime based on secularism. As Narlı (2000: 
108) states, “the army has played a prominent role in Turkey's political 
modernization leading the country "along a Western path," by endorsing the 
dynamic transformation of the Turkish state and society, in line with Atatürk's 
ideological commitment to the West”. In line with this understanding of the 
military as the “guardian” of the regime and transformation, “(…) the Turkish 
military felt authorized to intervene in civilian politics (issuing threats or 
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memorandums, blackmailing or replacing the government through pressure, or 
coup d’état) when acts or decisions of the civilian authorities seemed to threaten 
what they interpreted as the national interest” (Demirel, 2003: 255). 
As we have seen, within the period covered in this study, the Turkish 
military intervened in politics two times: once in 1971 with a military 
memorandum
25
 and once in September 12, 1980 in the form of a coup. The 
intervention on March 12, 1971, the second intervention after the first military 
coup held in May 1960, forced the government to resign since it was seen as 
incapable of dealing with increasing violence. The 1971 intervention “was the 
culmination of deteriorating political situation marked by a rising tide of violence, 
fragmentation of political parties, and weak and ineffective government” (Tachau 
and Heper, 1983: 23). As mentioned above, the then government led by Demirel 
resigned and a “non-partisan” government was formed since “(…) the military 
chose to govern from behind the scenes instead of taking over directly” (Özbudun, 
1999: 35). On the same day with the memorandum, as mentioned above, the 
public prosecutor opened a case against the Turkish Workers’ Party, whose 
leaders were accused of promoting communism and autonomy for the Kurds. The 
result was the prohibition of the party. As mentioned before, along with the TİP, 
the Islamist MNP was also closed down by the constitutional court “claiming that 
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 The memorandum read as follows: “1. The Parliament and the Government, through their 
sustained policies, views and actions, have driven our country into anarchy, fratricidal strife, and 
social and economic unrest. They have caused the public to lose all hope of rising to the level of 
contemporary civilization which was set for us by Atatürk as a goal, and have failed to realize the 
reforms stipulated by the Constitution. The future of the Turkish Republic is therefore seriously 
threatened. 2. The assessment by the Parliament, in a spirit above partisan considerations, of the 
solutions needed to eliminate the concern and disillusionment of the Turkish Armed Forces, which 
have sprung from the bosom of the Turkish nation, over this grave situation; and the formation, 
within the context of democratic principles, of a strong and credible government, which will 
neutralize the current anarchical situation and which, inspired by Atatürk’s views, will implement 
the reformist laws envisaged by the Constitution, are considered essential. 3. Unless this is done 
quickly, the Turkish Armed Forces are determined to take over the administration of the State in 
accordance with the powers vested in them by the laws to protect and preserve the Turkish 
Republic. Please be informed” (Özbudun, 1999: 34).  
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the party wanted to alter the secular principles of the state and institute an Islamic 
order” (Yavuz, 1997: 66).  
To consider the actions of leftist organizations, mainly the People’s 
Liberation Army of Turkey (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu – THKO), martial law 
was declared in 11 of Turkey’s 67 provinces. 26  In the days following the 
declaration of martial law, youth and student organizations were banned, meetings 
were prohibited, freedom of press was curtailed, people with leftist political 
engagement and some well-known authors such as Yaşar Kemal and Fakir 
Baykurt were taken under custody or arrested. One of the severest measures taken 
by the regime established by the military memorandum was the execution by 
hanging of three leaders of the THKO, Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnan and Yusuf 
Aslan.
 27
 While the left-wing movements were repressed harshly, the right-wing 
movements, especially those that were associated with the MHP were left alone to 
act against their rivals (Zürcher, 2004: 260; Ahmad, 2008: 250).  
One of the main aims of the 1971 intervention was the prevention of 
violence, a goal that was achieved to some extent in the following years. However, 
political violence gained a momentum, again, in the mid-1970s; a fact that is 
claimed to be the reason lying behind the military coup held in September 12, 
1980. Thus, it is possible to say that, in a sense, the reasons that had led to the 
1971 intervention were almost the same in 1980, although they were more severe 
this time. The country was in a chaotic environment, struggling both with violence 
and insufficient governments and polarized society. Under these circumstances, as 
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 These 11 provinces are Adana, Ankara, Diyarbakır, Eskişehir, Hatay, İstanbul, İzmir, Kocaeli, 
Sakarya, Siirt and Zonguldak.  
27
 18 of the THKO militants out of 25 who were judged in a military court in 1971 received death 
penalty; however the court approved execution of only the mentioned names, whose death penalty 
was also approved by the Parliament as required in the constitution. According to Sayarı (2010: 
201) hanging of these three leaders of the THKO didn’t make the effect that it was desired by the 
military and further contributed to the reemergence of political violence in the following years by 
creating ‘heroes’ and ‘martyrs’ for the left-wing militants.  
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Demirel (2003: 259) notes “(…) in their well-entrenched role as the ultimate 
guardian of the state, Turkish officers regarded the idea of staging a coup, not as 
unlawful and unethical, but as a special duty which they were trained to carry out 
when certain conditions occurred”. Kenan Evren, Chief of the General Staff while 
staging the coup, included the reasons lying behind the intervention according to 
the military in his very first communiqué issued on the morning of 12 September: 
 
“The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity of the country, to 
provide for national unity and fraternity, to prevent the existence and the 
possibility of civil war and internecine struggle, to re-establish the 
existence and the authority of the state, and to eliminate the factors that 
hinder the smooth working of the democratic order” (Tachau and Heper, 
1983: 26). 
 
However, it has always been argued that if the reasons lying behind the coup were 
solely increasing violence and terrorism, the intervention should have come 
earlier. For example, Ahmad (1993: 174; 2008: 254) argues that one of the 
reasons behind the military coup was the strategic importance of Turkey during 
the developments in the region such as the revolution in Iran and the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan and also the onset of globalization. Whatever the 
reasons behind the coup, unlike the intervention in 1971, this time the military 
regime was decisive to stay in power for the time needed to establish the desired 
rule.  On the other hand, it would not be wrong to say that the coup in 1980, 
legally justified according to the article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal 
Service Law (Law No. 211)
 28
, was welcomed by the majority of the Turkish 
people since they saw it as a way out of political violence and deaths that became 
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 Article 35 of the Law No. 211 is as follows: ‘The duty of the Turkish Armed Forces is to protect 
and preserve the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as it is deﬁned by the constitution.’ 
http://mevzuat.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=1.4.211&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceX
mlSearch= 
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a part of the daily routine. This time the military was more warranted to hold 
power, not only with the strong-arm military methods, but also with political 
measures taken to restructure the politics in Turkey: the martial law was extended 
to all 67 cities, Demirel, Ecevit and Erbakan were placed under house arrest and 
Alparslan Türkeş, leader of the Nationalist Action Party, was put under custody, 
1700 elected mayors and the members of the city councils were also dismissed 
(Dodd, 1990: 51), two major trade union federations namely the DİSK and the 
Nationalist Workers’ Union Federation (Milliyetçi İşçi Sendikaları 
Konfederasyonu - MİSK) were closed down, and May Day celebrations were 
banned. Mass arrests and trials opened against trade unions, political parties and 
some organizations such as the MHP, the DİSK, the Peace Association (Barış 
Derneği - BD) and the Association of All Teachers Unity and Solidarity (Tüm 
Öğretmenler Birleşme ve Dayanışma Derneği - TÖB-DER) (Ahmad, 1993: 185). 
As Zürcher (2004: 280) points out, this wave of arrests was achieved at human 
and social cost, as it targeted notable people such as university professors, teacher, 
journalists, trade unionists and lawyers. However, all these measures taken were 
not seen as adequate by the military to achieve the above mentioned goals: a new 
framework to shape the society was initiated, mainly aiming to depoliticize the 
society, secure the continuation of the Kemalist legacy as understood by the 
military and curb the leftist movements that had been gaining power since the 
1960s. This new synthesis
29 , called “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” (Türk-İslam 
Sentezi – TİS) by some to mention the ideological position of the military for the 
1980-1983 period, was an attempt to “bring supposedly shared values to the 
surface, peel away the ‘false Western veneer’ which was seen as responsible for 
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 Despite its newness with regards to the usage by state officials, the roots of the Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis can be traced backed to the late 1860s and early 1870s according to Çetinsaya (1999). 
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the ills of the modern society and recognize a national synthesis of fundamental 
values under the labels of ‘Turk’ and ‘Islam’” (Poulton cited in Altunışık and Tür, 
2005: 42).  As a result of all these measures and repression, many political 
activists had to leave the country to live abroad as political refugees. More 
severely, many people died under torture in prisons and 50 people both from left 
and right wing ideologies were executed. 
  All the attempts to reshape the politics in Turkey were sought to be 
institutionalized in a new constitution prepared to replace the 1961 constitution, 
which was seen as one of the major problems since it had opened the ground for 
ideological debates. The 1982 Constitution, aiming to give the state its power 
back, was ratified by 92.5 percent of the votes in a referendum.
 30
 As mentioned 
above, the 1982 Constitution aimed at serving to re-shape the society, this is why 
“(…) state forces were given more power at the expense of decreasing rights for 
freedom of organization, strike and protest” (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 44).  Kenan 
Evren was elected as the President of the state as a result of the above mentioned 
referendum.  
At the end of the 1980-1983 period, which is defined as a “‘military 
rule/civilian influence’ phase” by Narlı (2000:114), the military delegated the 
power back to the civilians with the elections held in 1983, after three years of 
interregnum (Heper and Keyman, 1998: 265).  
Besides the political developments and the interventions by the military, 
the 1970s in Turkey were also marked by severe economic problems and crises. 
What were the main economic policies adopted by the then governments? How 
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Thinking about the vote share that the constitution prepared by the military, it should be kept in 
mind that alternative propaganda for the referendum was not allowed and people had a fear if that 
the military regime would continue, if they voted against the constitution (Demirel, 2005: 252) and, 
as mentioned in the text, people were so tired of political murders and attacks being a part of 
ordinary life.   
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was the labor movement affected by them? What were main causes of the 
economic crises? The following part is dedicated to these questions.  
 
4.3. Economic Developments: Import Substitution, Urbanization and Crises  
With regards to economic developments, it should first be mentioned that the 
1960s in Turkey were characterized by the five-year development plans which 
were taken as a measure against the economic crisis of the late 1950s. The first 
five-year development plan, issued in 1963, labeled the Turkish economy as a 
mixed economy, i.e. a system where both the private sector and the state direct the 
economy with a certain degree of private economic freedom and state regulation. 
On the other hand, this first plan introduced Import Substitution Industrialization 
(ithal ikameci sanayileşme) policy. This policy pursues as the main strategy of 
industrialization the production of previously imported goods by the domestic 
industry under the supervision of the state. Industrialization was understood as 
equal to development. In the short term, these policies had positive results: from 
1950 to 1973 gross domestic product (GDP) per capita increased by more than 3 
percent annually, while the overall average income increased by more than 100 
percent (Pamuk cited in Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 74). However, the increased 
income was not equally distributed and income inequality was increasing day by 
day. As a result of the measures taken by the regime established after the 1971 
memorandum, i.e the banning of strikes and limiting of the freedom of 
organization, real wages declined by 5 percent between 1970 and 1973 (Keyder, 
1987: 69; Keyder, 1979: 33).  Consumption was restricted to an affluent minority 
(Ahmad, 1993: 144) and poverty had been a major concern with a rate of 38 
percent households living in extreme poverty in 1973 (Özbudun and Ulusan cited 
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in Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 74). On the other hand, “the labor force grew but 
never in proportion to the demand for jobs so that unemployment was always 
rising, though mitigated by emigration to Europe” (Ahmad, 1993: 144). Figure 4.1 
gives information about the unemployment tendencies in Turkey from 1970 to 
1985.  
 
Figure 4.1: Unemployment in Turkey, 1970-1986 (in %). 
Source: Bulutay, 1995: 261-262.  
     
Internal migration from rural regions to urban regions has been one of the most 
significant features of the 1970s in Turkey. Turkey’s rapid population growth, 
lack of opportunities in the agricultural sector and attraction of new industries can 
be listed among the main reasons for this migration (Zürcher, 2004: 269). Table 
4.2 shows the changes in total and urban population from 1970 to 1985. The result 
of increasing internal migration was an economy incapable of absorbing the 
growing pool of labor and unemployment. It is argued that this incapacity was one 
of the main reasons for the political violence of the 1970s, as unemployment 
increased and shantytowns (gecekondu) were formed as a result of internal 
6.3 6.6 6.3 6.6 
7.1 7.4 
8.7 
9.8 9.8 
8.6 
8.1 
7.1 7 
7.7 7.6 
7.1 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Year 
80 
 
migration from where most of the militants were recruited (Sayarı and Hoffman, 
1994). 
 
Table 4.2: Increase in urban population, 1970-1985. 
Year Total population 
 
Urban 
Population* 
 
Proportion 
of Urban 
Population (in %) 
1970 35.605.176 10.221.530 28.7 
1975 40.347.719 13.271.801 32.9 
1980 44.736.957 16064.681 35.9 
1985 50.664.458 23.238030 45.9 
Source: Turkish Republic Ministry of Development, http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ekonomi/ (accessed 
on March 19, 2012). 
*Urban refers to areas with population of 2000 or more. 
 
Coming to the mid-1970s, the Turkish economy was struggling with the oil crisis 
of 1973-1974, problems emerged as a result of the Cyprus intervention, such as 
the US army embargo of February 1975 and subsidies to the Turkish-Cypriot 
government, and a series of weak and indecisive governments. Steadily rising 
inflation rates and a rising import bill were the results of these developments 
(Zürcher, 2004: 267), which led to “a further foreign exchange crisis and a 
production crisis” (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 75). The government would intended 
to overcome the foreign exchange crisis with the workers’ remittances, which 
were a very important source of revenue for the state at the beginning of 1970s; 
however, these also began to fall after 1973 and the international reputation of 
Turkey was strongly damaged by the intervention in Cyprus, thus the state could 
not borrow from other governments. As a result, the Nationalist Front 
governments took short-term loans from private banks with very high interest 
rates, and thus opened bigger holes in the economy (Ahmad, 1993: 177). The 
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result was the listing of Turkey among the countries that were in moratorium 
regarding their payments by the World Bank in 1975 (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 
75). The inflation rate increased to more than 50 percent in 1976, which also 
eroded the value of salaries. People started to get poorer and poorer day by day as 
their income did not increase in line with the increases in prices. The current 
account deficit, which corresponded to 660 million dollars in 1973, reached 3.1 
billion dollars in 1977 (Temel et al., 2002: 54). The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) was called in as a result of all these economic developments in 1978. 
However, the first two attempts to sign a stand-by agreement failed and a 
stabilization program was only applied in June 1979. Turkey was struggling with 
the most severe economic crises that it had ever experienced. Under these 
circumstances, “(...) capitalists started calling openly for a change in the system, 
control of the workers’ unions and syndicates and calling on the government to 
create ‘secure’ conditions for capital and investment” (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 
76). In the meantime, Ecevit’s government was replaced by Demirel’s on 
November 1979. A series of new policies to remedy the economic problems of the 
country were announced by this new government on January 24, 1980, which then 
were called the “24 January Decisions”. These policies marked the rendition to a 
liberal market economy by decreasing the role of state initiative and enterprise in 
heavy industry and primary goods and replacing Import Substitution 
Industrialization policy with an export-oriented growth policy. Besides, some 
structural and institutional arrangements including diversification of financial 
intermediaries through the establishment of a capital market, liberalization of 
foreign exchange market, opening of the banking sector to competition and 
implementing positive real interest rate were made (Köse, 2002: 119). After the 
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coup of 1980, the Turkish economy was reshaped according to this program. 
While the military regime aimed at restructuring the politics in Turkey, the 
economic stabilization program of January 24, 1980 remained untouched by the 
military junta. Basic economic indicators of the relevant years are provided in 
Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.3: Economic and financial indicators, 1970-1985. 
Year Inflation, 
consumer 
prices 
(annual %) 
GDP per 
capita 
(current 
US$) 
GDP 
growth 
(annual 
%) 
Urban 
population 
(% of total) 
Current 
account 
balance (% 
of GDP) 
1970 6.9 38.2 3.2 38.2 - 
1971 15.7 38.9 5.6 38.9 - 
1972 11.7 39.6 7.4 39.6 - 
1973 15.4 40.2 3.3 40.2 - 
1974 15.8 40.9 5.6 40.9 -1.6 
1975 19.2 41.6 7.2 41.6 -3.7 
1976 17.4 420 10.5 420 -3.9 
1977 27.1 42.5 3.4 42.5 -5.3 
1978 45.3 42.9 1.5 42.9 -1.9 
1979 58.7 43.4 -0.6 43.4 -1.5 
1980 110.2 43.8 -2.4 43.8 -4.9 
1981 36.6 45.5 4.9 45.5 -2.7 
1982 30.8 47.2 3.6 47.2 -1.4 
1983 31.4 49.0 50 490 -3.1 
1984 48.4 50.7 6.7 50.7 -2.3 
1985 450 52.4 4.2 52.4 -1.5 
Source: Compiled by author from Worldbank Databank, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx   (accessed April 24, 2012). 
 
As explained, during the 1970s, Turkey was dealing with incapable governments, 
military interventions and severe economic problems. However, institutional 
politics and the economy were not the only areas of dispute in Turkey. People 
with different ideological orientations started to take to the streets and street 
protests became a way of raising their voices, and of confronting their rivals 
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especially after the mid-1970s. The following lines aim at giving a short 
introduction and background to the street politics in Turkey, as the dynamics of 
the protests will be analyzed in detail in the following chapters.  
 
4.4. Ideology Involved: Street Politics in Turkey in the 1970s 
It would not be wrong to claim that ideology was brought into Turkish political 
life with the 1961 Constitution. Just before the 1965 elections, the leadership of 
the CHP declared its position on the political spectrum as “left of the center” 
while the debates within the party started earlier. As Güneş-Ayata (1995: 82) 
mentions, this was a step taken to determine the party’s position on the political 
spectrum rather than to introduce a new program and, new policies. On the other 
hand, this move might be interpreted as a strategic step taken in reaction to the 
socialist TİP competing in the elections.  CHP’s “left of the center” position found 
a quick response within the AP as the party’s supporters adopted the slogan “left 
of center, road to Moscow” (ortanın solu, Moskova’nın yolu) against the CHP and 
started to emphasize that the “left” was the main threat to the unity of country and 
the “mother of all evil” so to speak.  
The left was developing itself not only with political parties, but also with 
the student organizations such as the Idea Clubs (Fikir Klüpleri)31 founded first in 
1956.  According to Ahmad (1993: 142) these “were the first serious attempts to 
create a civil society in a country where bureaucratic control had smothered all 
initiative”. The leftist student activism in Turkey started in the late 1960s, and was 
                                                     
31
 Idea Clubs are youth organization which were founded in 1956 in Ankara University and then 
spread to other universities among the country. In 1965, all these separate organizations formed 
the Federation of Idea Clubs (Fikir Klüpleri Federasyonu - FKF). At the time they were acting as 
the youth branch of the Workers’ Party, however in time, a faction within the Turkish left called 
MDD started to dominate the federation and its name was changed to The Federation of 
Revolutionary Youth Organizations (Devrimci Gençlik Dernekleri Federasyonu – Dev-Genç).   
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influenced by its international counterparts triggered by the 1968 movement. The 
university youth was organized around Dev-Genç, which had close relations with 
the TİP. However, the party’s political failure in the 1969 elections caused 
disappointment among the youth and some cadres lost their belief in a peaceful 
Marxist-Leninist revolution in Turkey (Yayla, 1989: 250). The consequence was 
the adoption of an urban-guerilla understanding of political conflict and the 
foundation of three organizations which marked the period before the 1980 coup: 
the People’s Liberation Front-Army of Turkey (Türkiye Halkın Kurtuluşu Parti-
Cephesi – THKP/C) led by Mahir Çayan, the Turkish People’s Liberation Army 
led by Deniz Gezmiş and the Workers Peasants Liberation Army of Turkey 
(Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu – TİKKO) led by İbrahim Kaypakkaya. 
These organizations, among others, had a broad repertoire of action including 
bank robberies, kidnappings, etc.   
In contrast to this factionalism within the left- wing, the right was united 
against the left and the perceived threat of communism. Actually, Islamic oriented 
right-wing organizations such as the Associations for Struggle with Communism 
were formed as early as 1962. However, the most effective organization on the 
right was the Idealist Hearths (Ülkü Ocakları), which acted unofficially as the 
youth organization of the MHP. Landau (1974: 216) claims that far-right militants 
were demonstrating peacefully until their first violent act on December 31, 1968 
when they attacked the leftist students of the Faculty of Political Science of 
Ankara University, an event that was followed by many others. The period before 
the coup in September 1980 was marked by the clashes between several different 
factions within the left and the right, mainly represented by the Idealist Hearths.  
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While students were the main actors on the streets in those years, the 
1970s in Turkey also witnessed rising militantism among the workers due to the 
economic problems that the country was facing. The right to strike and collective 
bargaining was provided to the labor movement by the 1961 Constitution. Some 
leftist workers’ unions broke away from the pro-government Türk-İş in 1967 over 
the refusal of the federation to support a strike in İstanbul (Zürcher, 2004: 273) 
and formed DİSK. Workers, as can be guessed, were mainly involved in strikes 
but also in other forms of protest events.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter provided background information on the state of politics, economics 
and social life in Turkey in the 1970s. Turkish politics were marked by deep 
political and economic crises in the 1970s, as traced in this chapter. Political 
instability and incapable politicians caused very often changes of governments. 
Turkey was ruled by ten different governments from 1971 until the coup in 
September 1980, even though there were only two national elections took place in 
those years.  
The political crisis was accompanied with economic ones, thanks to the oil 
crisis of 1973-1974, Cyprus intervention and a series of indecisive governments. 
In addition, internal migration and urbanization caused challenges for the youth. 
Thus, it is claimed that social and economic changes in the society fostered 
political mobilization.  
Talking about the political life in the 1970s in Turkey, as well as in general, 
it is not possible to avoid the role of military, who came to consider itself as the 
guarantee of the Republic and the founding principles of Turkey. The military 
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made two significant interventions to the political life in Turkey during covered 
period of this study. While the first one, in the form of a memorandum in 1971, 
emptied the streets for a relatively short time, the coup held in 1980 reshaped 
political life in Turkey.  
The 1970s in Turkey is also characterized by political violence, which 
became an aspect of everyday life especially from the mid-1970s; a fact that 
helped the welcoming of the September 1980 military coup by the general public. 
While it is generally accepted that there has been an increase in the violent acts in 
the late 1970s, scholars of Turkish politics do not have a consensus on the exact 
point of radicalization: for example, while Yayla (1989) argues that the second 
wave of terrorist movements started in 1973, Sayarı (2010) gives the turning point 
as 1976 and Ahmad (1993) gives it as 1977. It is this instability and crises 
environment that will provide the background to the reconstructing and analysis 
of the cycle of protest of 1970s in Turkey.  
Further accounts on the actors, repertoires of action and issues raised by 
the protestors are provided in the following part of the study, Part III, where the 
development of the cycle of contention is analyzed in details.  
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Part III 
 
1970s As a Wave of Protest: Actors, Repertoires of Action 
and Issues 
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Chapter 5 
 
Actors and Organizations 
 
As already mentioned in Chapter 2, a cycle of protest is defined as a “phase of 
heightened conflict across the social system” (Tarrow, 1994: 153). Before moving 
towards the components of the cycle of protest in Turkey in 1970s, namely the 
actors, repertoire of action and issues, I would like to present an overview of the 
cycle itself.  
 
Figure 5.1: Overall development of protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986.  
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By showing the absolute numbers of protest events, based on the newspaper data, 
during the covered period in Turkey, Figure 5.1 demonstrates the protest wave 
very clearly. The hypothesis on the level of mobilization, that it would be lower 
under military regimes (see Chapter 2, hypothesis 1) is supported by the data 
presented in this figure. In the periods between 1971 and 1973 and after 1980, the 
number of protests is insignificant. It increases only after transition to civilian rule. 
The increase in the number of events in 1974 and the sharp decline in late 1980 is 
evident. On the other hand the protest wave reached a peak in 1978.
 
The reasons 
lying behind these dynamics of the wave, such as the general amnesty announced 
in 1974 and the military coup held in September 1980, were mentioned before in 
Chapter 4.  
This chapter is aimed at revealing the dynamics of the protest wave, and to 
answer the question how this overall evolution presented in Figure 5.1 has been 
coming about, based on the analysis of actors who contributed to the emergence 
and development of the wave. Some of the questions to be answered in this 
chapter are: Who were the initiators of the wave of protest among these various 
people/groups using the streets for expressing their demands?  How did the 
mobilization of these various movements evolved in time? As mentioned before, 
this chapter is focusing on the actors of the cycle, trying to provide background 
information on their development in relation to the political opportunity structures 
and information on the organizational dimension. In this regard, it should be 
mentioned that making separate and comprehensive analysis of each of these 
movements is beyond the limits of this chapter; rather this chapter is an attempt to 
provide a background to what will be discussed in the following chapters.  
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Table 5.1 presents some basic data about the actors of the cycle. At this 
point, it has to be mentioned that the distinctions presented in Table 5.1 and below 
during explaining the development of different movements are aiming at an 
analytical understanding of the movements; thus, it is not claimed that all these 
movements are separate and unrelated to each other. On the contrary, for example, 
it is impossible to disregard the students or the Kurdish movement while talking 
about the left-wing movement in Turkey, as the Kurds engaged in the left-wing 
movement and were represented in this movement although disproportionally, due 
to the illegality of explicit Kurdish societies (Gunter, 1988: 393). In addition, the 
far-right ülkücü movement was also composed of students and workers among 
others. Thus, except for the ideological divide (left vs. right), the distinctions 
proposed do not claim that all these movements are mutually exclusive of 
eachother; instead they constitute a complex structure.  
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Table 5.1: Involvement of various actors in protests events in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Year  
Actors  1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Total 
                 
Students 31.8 5.9 25.0 62.2 58.9 67.0 72.1 60.8 40.3 27.2 9.1 20 0 0 0 57.9 
Workers 18.2 76.5 5.0 16.2 22.3 11.6 6.7 6.8 13.3 16.9 0 0 0 11.1 7.7 12.2 
Elites 9.1 17.7 18.8 6.8 2.7 4.1 5.6 20 3.1 3.7 0 80 0 22.2 15.4 4.5 
Terrorists 4.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 .3 0 11.0 81.8 0 100 66.7 73.1 2.5 
General Public 31.8 0 6.3 14.9 9.2 60 8.9 8.5 8.2 14.0 9.1 0 0 0 3.9 8.8 
Groups with opposed views 4.6 0 0 0 6.9 11.4 6.7 21.6 35.2 27.2 0 0 0 0 0 140 
                 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Number of total events 41 28 22 86 357 496 1079 1.147 1053 980 21 8 2 14 27 5361 
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As mentioned earlier, with the impact and as a result of the developments 
mentioned in Chapter 4, several groups of actors mobilized in Turkey in the 1970s. 
While their demands and repertoire of action diversified, it can be claimed that the 
wave of mobilization of each group presents similar patterns, as it is explained 
below. Who were the “early risers” (Tarrow 1994) of the wave? The answer to 
this question is the students, as it can be observed from Table 5.1. However, due 
to the state repression witnessed during the early years of the 1970s, as a result of 
the military memorandum, the leading student cadres “left” the streets, at least for 
a while. As Şafak (2013: 123) writes the labor movement was also repressed after 
the memorandum but not as harshly as the socialist left. This is why the workers 
are dominant in 1972 and 1973. Nevertheless, as the wave starts to increase in 
1974, as a result of the general amnesty issued in this year, students return to the 
streets and  remained as the main actor of the cycle until the coup held in 
September 1980. On the other hand, from 1974 to 1977, workers accompany 
students. The right-wing movement also made its presence felt throughout the 
cycle, especially in the mid-1970s. However, after the coup “terrorists” emerge as 
the dominant groups taking on the streets.  
5.1. The “Early Risers”: Student Movement  
Students, as in the cases of Italy and Germany (della Porta, 1995: 47), were the 
“early risers” of the wave of the 1970s in Turkey.  However, student interest in 
politics in Turkey did not start only in the 1970s; rather it can be traced backed to 
the Ottoman era (Szyliowicz 1970; Kabacalı 2007). In this era, students were 
acquainted with political thought in Darülfunun, especially of Turkism. Under the 
Ottoman rule, until the end of the World War I, students organized protest events 
mainly around the issues of constitutionalism, education and the territorial 
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integrity of the empire in the form of demonstrations and class boycotts (Kabacalı 
2007). They also played an important role during the demonstrations against the 
occupation of some regions of Anatolia during World War I.  
During the Republican era, the first big demonstrations in which the 
students were involved was carried out in 1924 when the Belgian company 
running the one-stop subway in İstanbul refused to give a discount to the students 
as the previous company had done (Szyliowicz 1970; Kabacalı 2007). Four years 
after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal, founder of the 
Republic, gave an important role to the youth at the end of his famous “The 
Speech” (Nutuk) (1927), by proclaiming “Turkish youth! Your primary duty is to 
preserve and to defend the Turkish Independence and the Turkish Republic 
forever. This is the very foundation of your existence and your future”. Despite 
this role devoted to the youth, Szyliowicz (1970: 152) claims that student 
activities were limited during the first years of the Republican era, while Mustafa 
Kemal was trying to implement his reforms. Some issues that students protested 
about in those years included the activities of some other foreign companies, 
claimed attacks to Turkish people’s craves in Bulgaria and the Hatay issue 
emerged with Syria (Kabacalı 2007). The 1940s in Turkey were the years of the 
“National Chief” (Milli Şef) İsmet İnönü, and rising Fascism-Turanism 
movements. Thus, the student demonstrations organized in those years were 
closely related to this current. On the other hand, the left was also organizing 
among the university youth and getting involved in protests such as hanging a 
banner between the minarets of famous Süleymaniye Mosque in İstanbul which 
read as “Saraçoğlu [Prime Minister of the time] is a fascist” (Kabacalı 2007). One 
of the well-known events of the 1940s is known as Tan event (Tan olayı). This 
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was a politically led event staged on December 4, 1945 when some university 
students in İstanbul attacked offices of various leftist publications and the Tan 
newspaper, which was an opposition circle, during a government-sponsored 
demonstration (Szyliowicz, 1970: 152). Kabacalı (2007) observes that, between 
1946 and 1950, from the establishment of a multi-party system in Turkey to the 
first multi-party elections, there were several demonstrations organized in order to 
“combat” communism.   
The 1950 national elections play an important role in Turkish politics since 
the single-party rule of the CHP was overthrown with the victory of the DP, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4. Although the DP emerged as a political party in favor of 
economic liberalism and political freedom, in time, it “reverted to authoritarian 
policies and repression of opposition” (Türsan, 2004: 62); a process that 
introduced new press laws and new control mechanisms over universities. 
Subsequently, intellectuals and other modernist segments of the society, including 
the university youth, alienated from the administration of the time (Szyliowicz, 
1970: 152), a fact that helped politicization of students starting from mid-1950s.  
Student involvement in politics in the late 1950s gained momentum in the 
first months of 1960 and opened the way to the military coup held on May 27, 
1960. Starting on April 28, 1960, students engaged in mass protest events 
targeting the DP government as a reaction to its repressive policies, mainly police 
repression targeting the students and the establishment and activities of 
Investigation Committees (Tahkikat Komisyonları). These committees functioned 
as a control apparatus of the CHP’s political activities, which was in opposition at 
the time. The demonstrations started in İstanbul, but soon spread to Ankara: On 
May 5, 1960 students opposing the DP government organized a demonstration in 
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Kızılay square in Ankara32; a protest event that is described as the students’ “most 
dramatic involvement (and) was an important stimulus to the 1960 revolution” 
(Roos,Jr. et al., 1969: 257).  The last straw on the way to the military coup was the 
demonstration organized by Military Academy (Harbiye) students on May 21, 
1960 in Ankara (Alper, 2009: 194). 
While the students are said to have opened the path to the military coup of 
May 27, 1960, the coup itself had important effects on students. With the the coup, 
students were presented as heroes in the press and among the intelligentsia 
(Szyliowicz, 1970: 152) and as saviors of the country by the military itself (Alper, 
2009: 173). This helped students to gain a high-degree of self-confidence which 
provided them with legitimacy for their acts when needed (Szyliowicz, 1970: 152; 
Alper, 2009: 173). Changing the patterns of students mobilization, this situation 
caused student statements to be more “dynamic, requesting quick action [and] 
containing warnings, …sometimes even threats” compared to previous statements 
of students which were more informative (Roos,Jr. et al., 1969: 258) 
However, this was not the only effect of the military coup: the 1961 
Constitution, accepted under the military regime, provided the ground for the 
emergence of an organized student movement, as explained in Chapter 4.  The 
students’ major concerns also changed after the military coup: in the period  
between the transition to multiparty politics in 1946 and the military coup in 1960, 
“students had been preoccupied with three major issues, anti-communism, which 
declined rapidly in importance, the protection of the Atatürk reforms and the fight 
against reaction, and the Cyprus question” (Szyliowicz, 1970: 160). However, 
from 1960 onwards, they started to get engaged in protests for improvements in 
                                                     
32
 This event is also known as “555 K”, a code giving organizational details about the event: “fifth 
of fifth month at five o’clock at Kızılay square”. 
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the conditions of universities (Neyzi, 2001: 418), and against unpopular teachers, 
shortages of books, and poor food in university canteens (Roos,Jr.,et al., 1969: 
258). They also held politically-led protests by wrecking two newspaper offices in 
İstanbul and the Justice Party headquarters (Roos,Jr. et al., 1969: 258). 
International developments such as the Vietnam issue in 1965, the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution in 1966, and Che Guevara’s example in Bolivia in 1967, the 
Arab-Israeli war, and the existence of U.S. military bases in Turkey also started to 
attract the attention of students (Samim, 1987: 156-7; Alper, 2009: 325). These 
developments also had an impact on their rhetoric:  from the mid-1960s on “(…) 
words like Congo, Vietnam, neutralism, colonialism, and imperialism (were) 
frequently encountered in their statements, reflecting the ideological orientation of 
the majority who can be classified as leftist and anti-American” (Szyliowicz, 1970: 
160). 
 Influenced by the 1968 movement in Europe as well as national 
developments, the student movement took a different path in June 1968, when 
university occupations were held all over the country. While press statements, 
meetings and demonstrations were the main forms of actions adopted by students 
until 1968 (Roos,Jr. et al., 1969: 258), they started to adopt an unconventional 
repertoire from 1968 on; boycotts and occupations became the main forms of 
action. Relational and non-relational means of diffusion (Tarrow 2005)
33
 
contributed to the diffusion of the European 1968 movement to Turkey: the 
establishment of several publishing houses that published translations of several 
publications concerning the philosophical foundations of socialism, under-
development, imperialism, etc. helped cultural improvements of the left-wing 
                                                     
33
 While relational channels refer to interpersonal well-connected trust-based networks, non-
relational channels mainly refer to media-like sources including the internet. 
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students (Uysal 2009) and helped them to get familiar with various revolutionary 
guerilla movements. In support of this argument Alper (2009: 433) mentions that 
“(…) such books became bestsellers among the socialist circles” and Marx, 
Engels, Lenin and Mao were among the favored authors (Alper, 2009: 433). 
Besides non-relational means of diffusion, witnesses of Turkish students studying 
abroad also facilitated the diffusion of the movement to Turkey (Uysal 2009).
 
Student actions in these years helped to further politicization of students and 
recruitment of new militants to the socialist students’ movement (Alper, 2009: 
352). The left-wing student movement was getting more powerful, a fact that 
alarmed the political right and right-wing students. The right-wing students were 
gathering around student organizations, such as the National Turkish Students’ 
Union (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği, MTTB), which were the meeting point of the 
nationalist, conservative youth. Especially from 1965 on, MTTB took a more 
nationalist stance and started to organize demonstrations against communism. On 
the other hand, the commando camps, mentioned in Chapter 4, helped increasing 
militancy among the right-wing students. Clashes between the students coming 
from these conflicting ideological backgrounds led to a fast radicalization of the 
student movement in late 1960s.  
This new phase of clashes between right and left-wing groups turned to 
violence. The then government led by Demirel, in early 1971, “was powerless to 
act to curb the violence on campuses and in the streets” (Zürcher, 2004: 262). It 
was under these circumstances that the military intervened in politics through the 
memorandum issued in March 1971. Following the announcement of martial law 
in 11 provinces in April 1971, mass arrests targeting the leading cadres started: 
“About 5000 people were arrested, among them many leading intellectuals 
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(writers, journalists and professors), all the leading members of WPT [TİP] and 
many prominent trade unionists” (Zürcher, 2004: 259). 
The first urban guerilla organizations also emerged out of the left-wing 
student movement. Thus, in the following I focus more on the Turkish left rather 
than students in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the actors who 
took part in the wave of protest of 1970s.  
 The majority of the leftists who were imprisoned after the 1971 
memorandum were released with the general amnesty announced in 1974, after 
the transition to a normal regime in 1973. Some new organizations, movements, 
groups and circles were established following the general amnesty. However, the 
roots of all these organizations of post-1974 period should/can be traced back to 
the 1960s (Aydınoğlu, 2007: 277), as their strategies are shaped by familiar issues 
such as the working class mobilization, the increasing assaults of the ultra-
nationalists, state repression, and the general revolutionary divisions (Bozkurt, 
2008: 51). They were also based on the same, shared cadres. Compared to the 
1960s, factionalism within the left became more diverse and complex in the 1970s, 
due to several factors including the debates regarding the use of violence (Samim, 
1981: 73), and the strategies of revolution. In line with revolutionary divisions and 
differences in political strategies, Samim (1981; 1987: 160) categorizes the left in 
Turkey in the 1970s into three factions: Sovietists, Maoists and those who 
preferred to stay out of these two international centers (independents). Socialists 
were coming from the TİP background and consisted of political parties such as 
the Socialist Workers’ Party of Turkey (Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi – TSİP), the 
Socialist Revolution Party (Sosyalist Devrim Partisi – SDP) and the Turkish 
Labor Party (Türkiye Emek Partisi - TEP). The main Maoist organization was the 
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Aydınlık group led by Doğu Perinçek. Groups such as the People’s Liberation 
(Halkın Kurtuluşu) and the People’s Path (Halkın Yolu) were also from this 
branch of Turkish left. The independents, on the other hand, remained the biggest 
group in numbers. These were people coming from the THKP/C tradition. The 
Revolutionary Path (Devrimci Yol – Dev-Yol) and the Revolutionary left 
(Devrimci Sol – Dev-Sol) and the Liberation (Kurtuluş) were the main groups that 
can be labeled as independents. This picture of the left in Turkey renders a very 
significant feature of it: division.
 34
 This division is explained by the features of 
Turkish politics in general: “(…) the variegated divisions of the Turkish left found 
a parallel in the traditional instability of parliamentary alliances and succession of 
governments in Ankara: division is a general feature of Turkish society” (Samim, 
1981: 61). In addition to this analysis, we can add the lack of a strong socialist 
organization after the weakening of TİP as a reason for the division of the left in 
Turkey. Within groups disputes also existed: “(…), there were more intense and 
though disputes within the groups who are on the same par, rather than the 
disputes between Soviet and Chinese lines” (Belge, 2007:40). 
Continuity in the left-wing movement in Turkey in the 1960s and the 
1970s is inevitable, as mentioned above. However, the left of the 1970s has its 
peculiarities as Aydınoğlu (2007:330) points out: “dominance of the international 
communist movement, emergence of the ‘Kurdish left’, shortage of intellectuals, 
anti-fascist struggle as a new form of political struggle and shortage of 
organizations”. On the other hand, according to some scholars it is possible to 
make comparisons between two generations based on the “terrorist” organizations 
(Sayarı 1987; Yayla 1989): according to this comparison, the first generation 
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 Belge (2009: 17) claims that “(…) there has never been a united, coherent left [in Turkey], even 
in the heyday of its history”. 
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refers to the people involved in political violence in the late 1960s, especially with 
the fuelling effect of the 1968 movement. But this period was interrupted by the 
military memorandum held in 1971, when most of the militants/activists were 
imprisoned. The second generation, refers to the people who got engaged in 
political violence that started after the general amnesty announced in 1974 and 
lasted until the coup d’état held in September 1980. 35 In terms of education and 
social bases, it is claimed that while the first generation was mainly composed of 
university students who became politicized in the late 1960s (Sayarı 1987), the 
second generation leaders were no longer students: “[E]ither they had finished or 
left the university after wasting their time in the necessary “capitalist” education 
process” (Yayla, 1989: 260), thus they were less educated than the former. Sayarı 
(1987) points out two other differences among the two waves with regards to the 
leadership cadres; while the first generation was more interested in ideology and 
theory, the second generation was more into action than into ideology and theory. 
Secondly, unlike the first generation, the second generation lacked cult figures 
such as Deniz Gezmiş although some activists gained publicity. Despite these 
differences between the leadership cadres of the organizations involved in 
political violence during both waves of violence, Sayarı (1987: 27) argues that the 
most significant difference between the two periods was related to the “followers”, 
rather than the “leaders”. While most of the followers in the first period were 
coming from the same subculture, and had a student background, in the second 
wave the followers were coming from different backgrounds including workers, 
teachers, free professionals as well as unemployed and they were less educated. 
Moreover, while the number of female activists was very limited in the first 
                                                     
35
 Sayarı (1987) gives the two periods as 1970-1972 and 1975-190.  
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period, there was a significant increase in the number of women involved during 
the second wave. These changes in two generations claimed by scholars give us 
also a clue on the development of the wave of protests, as one feature of it is 
accepted as the participation of actors new to conflictual behavior, thus the 
expansion of conflict to different parts of society (della Porta and Tarrow, 1986: 
610; Tarrow, 1995: 92) .  
Over a wave of protest, participation of different groups might 
differentiate as the wave itself increases and decreases. How did the student 
mobilization evolved in time? As Figure 5.2 clearly demonstrates, student 
mobilization within the handled period started to increase by late-1973, increased 
gradually from 1974 until 1977, and then started to decline. 
 
Figure 5.2: Development of protests organized by students in Turkey, 1971-1986.
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Lack of protests in the period from (March) 1971 to 1973 can be explained by the 
results of military intervention in March 1971, where most of the protestors were 
imprisoned and martial law was declared; a fact that brought along a lack in 
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human resources and increased the costs of mobilization. With the transition to 
civilian rule with the elections held in 1973 and the general amnesty issued in 
1974, it is possible to observe an increasing trend in the number of protests 
organized by students. Student mobilization reached a peak in 1977 when the 
whole wave of protests also peaked, and started to decline from that point on. This 
is not surprising considering the ebb and flow of the total numbers of protests in 
Turkey in the period covered (see Figure 2.1), since the wave started to decline in 
1977 although not as sharply as the student mobilization. In addition, it has to be 
kept in mind that the radicalization of the student movement in late 1970s brought 
along the labeling of students as terrorists and reporting of the student actions as 
terrorist activities. The effects of the military regimes, on the other hand, can be 
clearly observed from the graph: student mobilization could not exist after the 
military coup held in September 1980.  
 
5.2. The Followers: Labor Movement  
Workers, next to the students, were one of the main groups protesting on the 
streets in the 1970s.
36
 The Turkish labor movement developed late compared to 
the “Western” world, since the founders of the new Republic of Turkey aimed at 
establishing a new state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, an attempt that 
was seen to require a certain amount of authoritarianism. The Kemalist vision of 
state was envisaging a classless, solidaristic society
37
, thus the establishment of 
                                                     
36
 While there is no direct link between the labor movement and the student movement, it is 
generally accepted that they both supported each other’s actions and the repertoire of action used 
by students, such as occupations, diffused through the workers (Koç 1999). 
37
 In a speech made before the Izmir Economic Congress of 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
provided an overview of the Kemalist conception of populism: “In my opinion, our nation does not 
possess various social classes that will pursue interests that are very different from one another and 
that will, accordingly, come into a state of struggle with each other. The existing classes are 
necessary and indispensable to one another” (quoted in Bianchi, 1984: 101). 
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trade unions and workers organizations was banned by law
38
 (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 
1992:712). Parallel to this vision, in the 1930s and 1940s, the Turkish state 
intended at maintaining a domicile labor force (Kahveci cited in Mello, 2007: 
212).   
Several developments including increasing urbanization, industrialization 
and the transition to multi-party politics helped the development of labor in 
Turkey, and the first nation-wide labor unions’ federation, Türk-İş, was founded 
in 1952. However, despite the regime change in 1946 and the change of 
government in 1950, the Turkish state’s attitude against the labor movement did 
not change until the military coup held in 1960. Despite their differences, CHP 
and DP, the two parties that marked the pre-1960 period, “adopted a broadly 
similar approach to economic development, state intervention and policies 
towards labour and capital” (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 726), and thus “tacitly 
agreed not to make any concessions to the workers” (Ahmad, 1994:142). As a 
result, workers failed to win any significant rights (essentially the right to strike 
and to bargain collectively) in the 1950s. On the other hand, the working class 
was not strong enough to put pressure on the governments’ policies.  
The new constitution issued in 1961, after the military coup of 1960, can 
be considered as a milestone for the Turkish labor movement with regards to the 
rights it provided. Besides accepting the principle of the “social state”, the 1961 
Constitution granted several social and economic rights for labor, including the 
right to work, fair wages, the right to establish unions, the right to bargain 
collectively and to strike, social security.
39
 
                                                     
38
 The Labor Code of 1936 and the Law of Associations of 1938. 
39
 There are two articles in the 1961 Constitution, guaranteeing these rights, Article 10 and Article 
11. Article 10 read as follows: “Every individual is entitled, in virtue of his existence as a human 
being to fundamental rights and freedoms, which cannot be usurped, transferred or relinquished. 
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Besides the 1961 Constitution, the Trade Union Act (Law Number 274) 
provided freedom of organization to workers and employers. Accepted and 
coming into force in 1963, this law gave those organizations opportunity to freely 
operate according to the international norms of freedom of unionism and it 
provided the necessary legal foundation to strengthen unions in a short time (İleri, 
2009: 280). The boundaries of the term “worker” was also changed with this act: 
not only those working according to a contract of service, but also those making a 
living with their labor, such as freelance writers, were accepted as workers; a fact 
that also shaped the union membership. A broad area of activities became 
available for unions such as deciding strikes or lock-outs, signing collective 
contracts, establishing cooperatives and training, while the list of banned activities 
was kept short. Another important feature of the Act is that it allowed unions to 
support political parties in elections. On the other hand, the check-off application, 
which helped unions to gain strength in economic terms, was introduced in this 
act for the first time. According to Cizre-Sakallıoğlu (1992: 717) both the 1961 
Constitution and the law issued in 1963 “aimed at adding new groups to the social 
bases of politics, that is, setting up pluralist power centers in the form of interest 
associations over a broad range of ideological, economic and social orientations 
juxtaposed to the state”.  
                                                                                                                                                 
The State shall remove all political, economic and social obstacles that restrict the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the individual in such a way as to be irreconcilable with the principles 
embodied in the rule of law, individual well-being and social justice.  The State prepares the 
conditions required for the development of the individual’s material and spiritual existence”. 
Article 11 read as follows: “The fundamental rights and freedoms shall be restricted by law only in 
conformity with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. The law shall not infringe upon the 
essence of any right or liberty not even when it is applied for the purpose of upholding public 
interest, morals and order, social justice as well as national security”.  
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In the meantime, through its bylaws Türk-İş adopted an “non-partisan” 
position in 1964
40
, probably as a reaction to increasing politicization of workers.
 41
 
The second blow to the organizational and ideological hegemony of Türk-İş, after 
the foundation of TİP, came in 1967 with the foundation of DİSK. This new 
confederation was founded as a result of initiatives of some unions
42
 which were 
previously affiliated to Türk-İş.43 The foundation of a socialist confederation “was 
the expression of a reaction against the old-line corporatist inducements offered to 
Türk-İş, in return for accepting a subordinate role under the government” (Cizre-
Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 721). On the other hand, according to Mello (2007: 222) it “(…) 
illustrated the extent to which a more radical political identity had taken hold 
within the Turkish working class”. DİSK was not the only confederation that split 
from Türk-İş: following the far-right nationalist party MHP, MİSK was founded 
in 1970, while a religiously oriented confederation related to the Nationalist 
Salvation Party, Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (Hak İşçi 
Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - Hak-İş), was founded in 1976. Şafak (2013: 122) 
also claims that from 1976 on the labor movement in Turkey entered a quickened 
phase of dissolution and disruption. Considering this fact, it can be claimed that 
the fragmentation and polarization among political parties in Turkey led to a split 
in trade unions, too. This fact can be read from the names of main confederations’: 
                                                     
40
 Cizre-Sakallıoğlu (1992: 715) claims that “above-party politics” policy of Türk-İş actually dates 
back to 1950s, the period of DP rule.  
41
 TİP was founded in 1961 by 12 union leaders who were once members of Türk-İş.  
42
 These five unions are Mineworkers’ Union of Turkey (Türkiye Maden İşçileri Sendikası -
Türkiye Maden-iş), the Petroleum, Chemical and Rubber Industry Workers’ Union of Turkey 
(Türkiye Petrol, Kimya ve Lastik Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası - Lastik-İş), Press, Media, Graphic 
Design and Packaging Industry Workers' Union of Turkey (Türkiye Basın, Yayın, Grafiker ve 
Ambalaj Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası - Basın-İş), Union of Food Industry Workers of Turkey 
(Türkiye Gıda Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası -Türkiye Gıda-İş) and Union of Mineworkers of Turkey 
(Türkiye Maden İşçileri Sendikası - Türk Maden-İş).  
43
 Some of these founding unions were expelled temporarily from Türk-İş as a result of a strike in 
Paşabahçe Crystal Factory in 1966 which was not approved by the confederation itself (Kaleağası 
Blind, 2007: 294).  
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instead of naming their organization in accordance with their economic views, 
they preferred names based on their ideologically led positions, as revolutionary 
or nationalist, etc. In this regard, it is impossible to read the history of labor 
movement in Turkey within the handled time period with focusing solely on 
economic developments. While the general issues leading to workers’ 
mobilization were economic, such as demanding wage increases, rights for 
collective bargaining, standing against firings and increasing costs of living, 
workers also mobilized around political issues such as standing up against fascism 
and fascist repression and against State Security Courts (Devlet Güvenlik 
Mahkemesi- DGM). As Ahmad (1994:156) writes, “(t)he struggle was seen as 
both economic and political and was waged on both fronts”. Departing from this 
point, it can be claimed that increasing militancy, fragmentation and radicalization 
of the labor movement marked the mid and late 1970s in Turkey (Cizre-
Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 718). 
Especially after the 1960 military coup and the introduction of the new 
constitution and new laws regarding the labor, labor activities spread in the 1960s. 
Several developments such as rapid industrialization and social change in those 
years (Ahmad 1993), weak coalition governments (Karpat 1973), formation of the 
TİP in 1961, as well as a growing working-class awareness (Mello 2007) created 
favorable conditions for this spread. On the other hand, the shift in the political 
orientation of the center left CHP to a “left of the center” position starting from 
mid-1960s, the emphasis on “democratic left” from 1972 onwards, and the CHP’s 
major coalition partnership, along with the MSP, in the coalition government 
107 
 
founded in 1974 can also be considered as triggering effects for Turkish labor 
movement.
 44
  
One of the most significant protest events of the early 1960s was the 
workers’ meeting at Saraçhane square in İstanbul on the last day of 1961, 
organized in order to demand official recognition of the right to strike and 
collective bargaining. This Saraçhane meeting is accepted as a milestone with 
regards to the workers’ demands. On May 3, 1962, “just a few days after a Justice 
Party minister declared that Turkey had no problem of unemployment” (Karpat, 
1973: 273), around 5000 unemployed construction workers gathered in Ankara 
and walked to the Parliamentary building.
45
 Another important event of the early 
1960s was the strike of Kavel factory workers in 1963 that lasted for 36 days. The 
Kavel strike is claimed to have opened the way to the legally granting of labor’s 
right to strike and to engage in collective bargaining (Koç 2003). The events that 
took place on the 15-16 June 1970 are referred to as “two long days that shook 
Turkey” (Ahmad, 1994: 154). As explained in Chapter 4, they constitute the peak 
of the increasing workers’ activity in early 1970s: “it was the first time that the 
working class had acted for an essentially political reason, though declining wages 
since 1967 were an important factor in their anger and militancy” (Ahmad, 1994: 
154).  
The 1971 memorandum had a negative effect on the labor movement in 
Turkey, as it replaced the 1963 Unions Law by a new one. This new law, issued in 
1971, outlawed the foundation of union federations, brought in the requirement 
for workers to be active in their field for at least three years to be qualified to 
establish a union, and the obligation for unions to represent at least one-third of 
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 Mello (2010) observes a correlation electoral support for the CHP and the rise of support 
provided by the labor movement throughout the 1970s.  
45
 This event is also known as the “march of the hungry” (Koç, 2003: 178). 
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the workforce in a given sector to become a national federation (Kaleağası Blind, 
2007: 294). Besides, the 1961 constitution was amended “so as to deny the right 
of unionization to public employees” (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1992: 723). However, 
the military regime was not capable of preventing the continuing politicization of 
workers: although the workers’ mobilization remained limited in early 1970s, they 
remained as the dominant group on the streets in 1972 and 1973 (see Table 5.1 
above) and their activity increased again in 1974-1975, after the end of the interim 
regime. One major event of the late 1970s is the 1977 May Day demonstrations 
that ended with the death of 37 people as a result of gunshots and mass panic, 
causing the event to be called as “Bloody May 1st”.46 By gathering around half a 
million people in Istanbul’s Taksim Square, this demonstration “signified the 
resurgence of the Turkish left following the martial law repression of the early 
1970s” (Benhabib, 1979: 17). In this regard, this event might be accepted as a 
milestone for the labor movement in Turkey. The labor movement increasingly 
politicized after May Day 1977, and especially in the period 1979-1980 (Şafak 
2013). The last turning point for the workers’ mobilization before the military 
coup in 1980 was the austerity program announced on January 24, 1980 (see 
Chapter 4); the result was mass strikes by the workers in early and mid-1980 that 
took place until the military coup held in September 1980. The major set-back to 
the labor movement in Turkey came with the military coup in 1980: activities of 
DİSK, Hak-İş and MİSK were suspended, strikes and other forms of actions 
interrupting the industrial activity were banned, and collective negotiations were 
replaced by compulsory arbitration (Koç 1999). The movement also suffered in 
human terms as around two thousand members of DİSK were arrested (Mello 
                                                     
46
 See Baykan and Hatuka (2010) for a detailed account of diverse groups’ planned entrances to 
the Taksim Square and the organization of the square.  
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2010). On the other hand, new legislation, such as the new law on collective 
bargaining, strikes and lock-outs (Law Number 2822), was also used as tools for 
repressing the labor movement as “strikes were forbidden, social rights abolished, 
the right to seniority compensation eliminated, collective agreements suspended, 
and job security, social security, health coverage, and periods of vacation and 
leave of absence were curtailed” (Kaleağası Blind, 2007: 295). As a result of the 
repression of the labor movement and the restructuring of industrial relations, the 
first mass protests after the coup in 1980 were only witnessed nine years later, in 
1989, when around 600.000 workers of state enterprises participated in these 
protests that are also known as “Spring Protests” (Bahar Eylemleri) (Dogan 2010). 
Such mass protests were not witnessed until the protests of TEKEL workers in 
2009 and 2010. Thus it is possible to say that Turkey witnessed only two waves of 
mass workers’ mobilization after the coup d’état of 1980: a fact that illustrates the 
“traumatic” effect of the military coup held in September 12, 1980 on social and 
political movements in Turkey.  
How did the activities of the workers evolve throughout the period covered? 
Figure 5.3 presents the evolution of the labor movement with regards to the 
number of strikes. The figure is based on official data, as explained in detail in 
Chapter 3.  
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of workers’ strikes in Turkey, 1971-1986. 
 
 
 
The figure clearly demonstrates the ebb and flow of labor mobilization with 
regards to workers’ strikes organized in Turkey from 1971 to 1986. As mentioned 
before, as the repressive atmosphere after the military memorandum initially 
targeted students, the number of strikes remained relatively high in 1971 
compared to the two years following it. The effects of repression however become 
clear in 1972 and 1973 when the number of strikes remained more limited.  The 
level of mobilization starts to increase again in 1974. Several reasons including 
the economic crisis that erupted in this year, the CHP’s dominance in the coalition 
government and the general amnesty issued the same year can explain this. 
Starting in 1977, the workers’ mobilization increased again and reached a peak in 
1980, as a result of the attempts to restructure the economy of Turkey with the 24 
January Decisions, as explained earlier. The repressive impact of the military 
regime established in September 1980 is clear cut as shown in Figure 5.1. As of 
1984, after returning back to civilian politics, workers started to strike again.  
The data on official numbers of strikes, from 1968 to 2006, presented in 
Table 5.2, provides a basis to understand the exceptional quality of the period 
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covered for studying social and political mobilization in Turkey, especially with 
regards to the labor. 1974, 1975, 1979 and 1980 are the years with the highest 
numbers of strikes within the time period covered by this study. However, another 
wave of strikes started by the end of 1986, when the labor movement began to be 
active again with the strikes in Netaş, Derby and Dora factories (Dogan 2010). 
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Table 5.2: Official data on numbers of strikes in Turkey, 1963-2005. 
 
Years Numbers of Strikes Years Numbers of Strikes 
1968 54 1987 307 
1969 74 1988 156 
1970 72 1989 171 
1971 78 1990 458 
1972 48 1991 368 
1973 55 1992 98 
1974 110 1993 49 
1975 116 1994 36 
1976 58 1995 120 
1977 59 1996 38 
1978 87 1997 37 
1979 126 1998 44 
1980 220 1999 34 
1981 0 2000 52 
1982 0 2001 35 
1983 0 2002 27 
1984 4 2003 23 
1985 21 2004 30 
1986 21 2005 34 
Source: Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı in Millioğulları (2007: 65, 133).
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5.3. Counter Movement: The Idealists (Ülkücüler) 
The 1970s in Turkey witnessed a mass left-wing movement composed mainly of 
university youth and workers, as described above. As Koopmans (2004: 27) wrote 
“(…) successful mobilization by one group may affect, or threaten to affect the 
interests of another group in such a way that it provokes counter-mobilization or 
competitive mobilization among the members of that group”. Belge (2009:13) 
claimed in a recent article that “(l)eftist politics cannot exist without a ‘rightist’ 
alternative”. In this regard, the alternative to the left in Turkey in the 1970s came 
from the ülkücü (idealist) movement, also known as “Grey Wolves”, as mentioned 
before. This movement is composed of far-right militants with strong ties with the 
MHP. Due to the strong relationship between the MHP and the idealist movement, 
in the following I shall first provide some background information on MHP and 
its ideology before giving detailed information about the activities of the Grey 
Wolves.  
MHP is founded in 1969, as the first extreme right-wing party in Turkey 
that had been founded in 1948 by General Fevzi Çakmak, Republican Peasants’ 
Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi - CKMP), changed its name, 
after four years of rule by former colonel Alparslan Türkeş. The ideological stance 
of the party was shaped by the “Nine Lights Doctrine” (Dokuz Işık Doktrini)47, 
                                                     
47
 “The nine 'lights' or principles are as follows: (1) Nationalism (which not coincidentally comes 
first), defined as the sentiment feeding the Turkish nation with a desire to raise Turkey to the peak 
of civilization - safe, prosperous, happy and modernized. (2) Idealism, characterized as the wish to 
serve one's nation and secure its independence, liberty and well-being. (3) Morality, the basis of 
society, which ought to conform to local Turkish traditions and beliefs. (4) Social-mindedness, 
said to comprise the protection and encouragement of free enterprise; the provision of economic 
incentives to holders of small capital; and statewide organization of social welfare. (5) A Scientific 
Mentality, encouraging well-planned study and research. (6) Liberalism, guaranteeing all 
conceivable freedoms, political and otherwise, to every single Turk. (7) Peasant Care that is, 
according special significance to rural development in schooling, medicine and the modernization 
of agriculture. (8) Populism, intended to channel all progress and development for the benefit of 
the nation's overwhelming majority. (9) Industrialization, emphasizing technology and preparing 
for the nuclear and space era” (Landau, 1982: 601-602).    
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offered by Türkeş himself, who “embraced an ultranationalist ideology that relied 
on a combination of pan-Turkist, monoculturalist, authoritarian, anti-communist, 
and essentialist moralist elements” (Celep, 2010: 390). On the other hand, 
ülkücülük (idealism) is another principle identified with the movement. Having a 
different connotation than nationalism (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 26), ülkücülük 
“signifies the idea of serving one’s own state as opposed to a commitment to the 
prosperity and well-being of a particular ethnic community” (Öniş, 2010: 31). 
Another component of MHP’s ideology is Turkism (Türkçülük). Accordingly, 
power, warfare and militarism, which are seen as the important aspects of a being 
a Turk, constitute significant motives for the movement. Turkish nationalists 
usually accept the idea that “warfare is an inherent cultural and even a racial 
tendency of Turkish nation and that having superior military capability is one of 
the quintessential and defining characteristic of Turkish identity” (Saraçoğlu, 
2004: 23-4). According to this tradition Turkish nation is considered as an army-
nation, which is a special ability/capacity of the Turks; a fact that makes the 
Turkish nation superior to others.  
Guided by all these aspects of the Turkish nationalism, the ülkücü 
movement came into existence with the Idealist Hearths (Ülkü Ocakları), mainly 
student and youth organizations established in universities.
 48
 The foundation of 
first Ocak in 1966 at the Faculty of Law of Ankara University was followed by 
the Ocaks in the Faculty of Language, History and Geography and the Faculty of 
Agriculture of the same university. In 1968, they started to get organized in every 
                                                     
48
 However, the activities of ülkücüs cannot be limited with the Ülkü Ocakları since other parts of 
the society such as the policemen, teachers, and workers had their own ülkücü organizations 
respectively named as Police Union (Polis Birliği - Pol-Bir), Association of Idealist Academicians 
and Teachers (Ülkücü Öğretim Üyeleri ve Öğretmenler Derneği - Ülkü-Bir), and MİSK. As in the 
case of Ülkü Ocakları, these organizations also had unofficial ties with the MHP; a fact that can 
also be read from the title of the case opened against them after the military coup d’état held in 
1980: “MHP ve Ülkücü Kuruluşlar Davası” (Case of MHP and the Ülkücü Organizations). 
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university. In 1969, Dündar Taşer, the deputy chairman of the MHP, called the 
MHP youth to unite around the Idealist Hearths, which were unofficially founded 
in big cities by this time. On December 13, 1970 the Idealist Hearths of Turkey 
founded a union named the Union of the Idealist Hearths (Ülkü Ocakları Birliği - 
ÜOB). At this time, the number of the Ocaks was around two hundred.  
As mentioned above, the idealists had close ties with the MHP, which is 
one of the main characteristics of the movement (Sayarı, 2010: 203). While being 
more radical than the MHP (Bora and Can, 2004: 279), Ocaks served as the youth 
branch of the party. On the other hand, they operate as “schools” where the 
idealist/nationalist youth is shaped and the future leadership cadres of the party 
are recruited. Indeed, “(…) throughout the 1970s, Idealist Hearths became the 
most active party group to recruit new members, especially university students, 
and served as a school where future MHP leaders and activists acquired 
organizational and leadership skills” (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 26). They also 
provide the members with a sense of belonging and protection with the help of the 
nationwide organization and connection (Tepe, 2000:67-8). 
 Besides serving as a school, the Idealist Hearths also “set the tone of the 
party’s ideological basis” (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 26). One main aim of an 
ülkücü is to enlighten and coordinate the people according to idealists’ ideas and 
to get into power by the help of these people (Ülkü Ocakları Website, n.d.). Thus, 
it can be claimed that Idealist Hearths support the indoctrination of youth with the 
party's ideology (Tepe, 2000:67-8). 
On the other hand, the MHP also uses the Idealist Hearths to disseminate 
the party's ideas and ideology into neighborhoods throughout the country. The 
Idealist Hearths work in a communal setting and mobilize a wide range of people 
116 
 
for the movement and, as mentioned above, provide a sense of social solidarity 
among members (Tepe, 2000: 67-8). For example, being from an Ocak, or even 
knowing someone from the Ocaks means in daily life that one has a strong and 
powerful group behind oneself to protect or save one especially from street battles 
or personal fights. This provides important opportunities especially for the young 
people and university youth who are coming to big cities from small towns for 
education and who do not have adequate financial resources.     
The ülkücü youth or the members of the Idealist Hearths are also known as 
the “Grey Wolves”, as mentioned before. With the empowering of leftist students, 
the Grey Wolves started to make their presence felt in the streets starting from 
December 1968 (Zürcher, 2004: 257). As Landau (1982: 594) points out, they 
were demonstrating, clashing with the leftist youth and marching in the streets in 
their uniforms, which led them to be called “commandos”. They were trained in 
special camps, organized by the MHP and claimed to provide “a patriotic 
education” (Celep, 2010: 132) to the participants. 
 As mentioned above, the Grey Wolves made their existence felt especially 
from the end of 1968, but their activities and clashes with the left wing students 
peaked in 1969 and 1970. In those years “(…) the organization was mostly busy 
with both oral and written propaganda (in frequent seminars and various bulletins, 
respectively) and, according to their opponents, with anti-left violence” (Landau, 
1982: 594). The ülkücü movement also felt the negative effects of the military 
memorandum of March 12, 1971, though not as harshly as the left-wing. The 
ÜOB was closed down as a result. After transition to civilian rule, in search for 
new ways of organization, the idealists founded the Association of Idealist 
Hearths (Ülkü Ocakları Derneği, ÜOD) in December 1973. It can be claimed that 
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their militancy increased in time, especially during 1974-1977 period, a fact that 
can be explained by the strong alliance between the Grey Wolves and the MHP 
which was a member of Nationalist Front coalitions. As Ahmad (2008: 252) 
writes, “the pro-Front media popularised the slogan ‘Demirel in Parliament, 
Türkeş in the Street’ and the party’s militants (…) began to play an even more 
active role in the violence”. In addition to their alliances in the government, the 
police and the security forces, who became preservers of the MHP under the 
Nationalist Front governments, protected and shielded the Grey Wolves even 
under the CHP rule (Zürcher, 2004: 263). They got involved in violent acts; with 
an effort to legitimize these acts it was frequently indicated that the ülkücü youth 
was helping the state and the government in their struggle with so-called 
anarchism by using violence. According to the ülkücü movement, the country’s 
situation in those years was so serious that without a militaristic and violence-
oriented ülkücü reaction to communist forces between 1960s and 1980s, the 
Turkish state and nation could have vanished (Saraçoğlu, 2004: 25-6). This was in 
line with MHP’s concerns about “a communist takeover by either the Soviet 
Union or ‘collaborators’ inside” (Celep, 2010: 132). As Ağaoğulları (1998: 232) 
indicates, violent events helped the MHP and the ülkücü movement to reproduce 
their ideology which is, as mentioned above, based on violence, as in a vicious 
circle. 
How did their activities evolve in time? Figure 5.4 demonstrates the 
evolution of actions carried out by actors with a far-right ideological 
engagement
49
 over years, during the covered period. Thus, the graph shows the 
activities not only of students, but also far-right workers, civil servants, etc.   
                                                     
49
 The graph presents data about far-right militants, as it was not possible to track ülkücüs in the 
newspaper articles.  
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Figure 5.4: Development of protest events organized by far-right militants in 
Turkey, 1971-1986. 
 
 
 
It is worth noting that the figure is almost identical with the one demonstrating the 
actions carried out by actors with a rightist political orientation.  In support of the 
analysis above, we can observe an increase in the actions starting from 1975 to 
1977, when the MHP was a coalition partner of the first Nationalist Front 
government and in their longest time of rule. However, on the other hand, the 
level of mobilization decreased gradually starting from 1977, as in the student 
movement. The military coup in 1980 crushed the ülkücü movement as well; it 
was also repressed and sent to the courts and jails “for attempting to seize control 
of the state through anti-democratic means and establishing a dictatorship in the 
country” (Celep, 2010: 132).  
After providing information on the emergence and the development of the 
main actors of the cycle of protest, let me conclude by providing data on the 
organizational structures of these movements. What kind of organizations did 
these actors rely on? Table 5.3 provides information about the involvement of 
organizations in protests events in Turkey in the period covered. While the 
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number of observations related to organizations is low compared to the total 
observations on protest events (n=779), it can still give us some clues about 
participating organizations.  
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Table 5.3: Organizations involved in protests in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %). 
 Year 
Organizations 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
                
Illegal Organizations 10.0 5.0 0 0 0 1.0 3.7 5.2 25.0 24.6 60.0 50.0 0 0 0 
Associations 10.0 10.0 0 10.7 22.1 31.3 22.9 40.9 18.2 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 
Other SMOs 20.0 5.0 0 3.6 16.8 24.0 21.9 21.4 23.9 27.5 40.0 50.0 100 0 0 
Political Parties 10.0 5.0 18.2 21.4 12.6 11.5 33.9 13.6 8.0 10.1 0 0 0 66.7 50.0 
Unions 50.0 60.0 63.6 46.4 44.2 29.2 10.9 14.3 18.2 29.0 0 0 0 16.7 50.0 
Chambers/Benches 0 15.0 18.2 17.9 4.2 3.1 6.8 4.6 6.8 7.3 0 0 0 16.7 0 
                
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 10 20 11 28 95 96 192 154 88 69 5 2 1 6 2 
121 
 
The dominance of labor unions in the first five years of the wave is striking. 
Besides the fact that workers were active during the first years of the wave, we 
should also consider the ease of identifying involving labor unions for the 
newspaper reporters. After a decrease for a couple of years, union activity 
increases again in 1980, as the workers were involved in protests against the 24 
January decisions. Associations, on the other hand, take the role of the unions 
from 1977 to 1980. Student associations are the most frequent form of this 
category. Political parties become dominant in 1977, as a result of the elections 
held in this year. Since the political parties are organizations running for office, 
they are organizing meetings, demonstrations, and other protest events especially 
in the election years. Illegal organizations, on the other hand, are dominant during 
the last two years before the 1980 military coup and during 2-3 years following it, 
which reveals the extent of violence used during this period.  
 It is also possible to read the effects of the military coup of 1980 from the 
table. As is obvious, the coup closed the door for “legal” organizations and 
politics, and those who remained active under the military regime were the more 
radical ones. On the other hand, after transition to a non-military regime in 1984, 
we do observe the resurgence of political activities of conventional political actors 
such as political parties and unions, although their activity also remains very 
limited until the mid-1980s; a fact that can be explained by the repressive 
character of the military regime established after the coup.  
5.4. Conclusion 
The chapter elaborated on the emergence and development of various actors that 
were dominant on the streets during the 1970s in Turkey. It is claimed in the 
chapter that thanks to the 1961 Constitution various movements based on diverse 
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political ideologies in Turkey flourished, a fact that opened the ground for mass 
student mobilization including both the high-school and university youth. The 
students, who were presented as “heroes” after the military coup in 1960, were the 
“early risers” of the wave of protest as the chapter revealed. However, some 
organizations and groups among the students lost their belief in the parliamentary 
politics as a result of the defeat of TİP in 1969 elections and radicalized. Student 
mobilization gained momentum after the general amnesty in 1974, peaked in 1977 
and harshly declined after the coup in 1980.  
The student movement that started to use unconventional after 1968 also 
triggered the labor movement  that was underdeveloped compared to its Western 
counterparts at the beginning as a result of the classes society envisaging of the 
founders of the state. Both the 1961 Constitution and the Trade Union Act 
introduced in 1963 enabled labor to engage in politics in various forms. The labor 
remained as the main actor on the streets after the memorandum in 1971 and 
started to increasingly politicize after bloody May Day demonstration in 1977. 
The military coup also crushed the labor movement.  
The empowerment of these left leaning movements constitutes a reason for 
the emergence and development of the right-wing ülkücü movement, among other 
reasons such as the opportunities opened by the 1961 Constitution. On the other 
hand, the formation of the Nationalist Front governments starting in 1975 and the 
developments following it such as the setting up of their own cadres in the police 
force supplied strong alliances to the ülkücü movement, which facilitated the 
further strengthening and radicalization of the movement.  
 In sum, it can be claimed that certain developments in the political arena 
such as the rights introduced by the 1961 Constitution and relevant laws, defeat of 
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the socialist TİP in 1969 elections, general amnesty announced in 1974, alliance 
structures especially of the right-wing movement helped emergence and 
development of these movements in Turkey in the 1970s.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Repertoires of Action  
 
After explaining the actors of the cycle, this chapter is examining the repertoires 
of actions of these actors. Described as one of the two main characteristics of a 
cycle of protest (Tilly 1978), repertoires are of significant importance to analyze 
cycles of protest. Differentiation of types of protests used among time (evolution 
throughout the wave of protest) and actors (differentiation among the left and 
right-wing organizations/groups), correlation between changes in the repertoire 
used and political developments in Turkey in 1970s, radicalization of the wave 
and mass use of violent events are among the topics to be covered in this chapter. 
Before addressing these topics, however, the operationalization of the concept of 
repertoires of action for the current study and general overview of the set of forms 
of actions used in Turkey in 1970s will be elaborated.   
Tarrow (1995: 97) writes that “in each period of history some forms of 
collective action are sanctioned by habit, expectations, and even legality, while 
others are unfamiliar, unexpected, and are rejected as illegitimate by elites and the  
mass public alike”. During the 15-years period covered in this study, social 
movement organizations and participants in Turkey used a variety of forms of 
actions, ranging from petitions to demonstrations, strikes to bombings. These 
various forms of actions can be categorized in different ways. This study is based 
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on Kriesi et al.’s (1995) work with regards to the categorization of forms of 
actions.
 
Kriesi et al. (1995: 266-267) used a pre-structured list of forms including 
five categories of overarching strategies: conventional, direct-democratic, 
demonstrative, confrontational and violence. According to their categorization 
conventional strategies include juridical (administrative, civil and criminal 
lawsuits, etc.), political (lobbying, letters to politicians, voting advice, etc.) and 
media-directed (leaflets, press conferences, tribunals, etc.) forms of actions. 
Direct-democratic strategies include people’s initiatives and referendums, while 
demonstrative strategies cover petitions, rallies, demonstration/protest marches, 
and festivals. Confrontational strategies are grouped into two sub-categories: legal 
confrontational acts such as boycotts, hunger strikes, and burning in effigy and 
illegal confrontational acts such as illegal boycotts, and occupations. Finally, 
violent strategies are also distinguished into two groups: light and heavy violence. 
While light violent acts include limited property damage, theft, threats to people, 
heavy violence includes bombings, political murders and kidnappings. However, 
of course, the list of actions they used is modified for the Turkish case (i.e. by 
omitting the direct-democratic actions). 
 
6.1. Violent Protests 
Based on the Italian cycle of protest between 1965 and 1975, Tarrow (1989: 69) 
writes that “cycles of protest are made up of both disruptive mass movements and 
conventional repertoires of collective action, but most people’s actions are closer 
to conventional politics than to violence”.  The data presented in Table 6.1 
demonstrates that this is not the case in Turkey: around 71 percent of the events 
coded for this study employed violence, mostly in heavy forms. As it is generally 
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argued and accepted, the period covered is marked by mass violence.
 50
 This data 
support the hypothesis on the radicalness of the cycle with regard to the repertoire 
of action (see Chapter 2, hypothesis 5).  
 
Table 6.1. Frequency of the forms of actions used in Turkey, 1971-1986.  
 
 Forms of Action 
Used 
(in %) 
Conventional Media-directed 6.7 
Political 1.5 
Juridical .2 
Unconventional Demonstrative 8.7 
Confrontational .5 
Illegal 40 
Legal 3.9 
Strikes
51
 3.2 
Violence  
Heavy Violence 69.2 
Light Violence 2.1 
Total  100 
N  5.360 
 
Violence became a feature of daily life and politics in Turkey, especially from 
mid-1970s on, as already explained in Chapter 4. It is estimated that more than 
5000 people lost their lives as a result of violent acts from 1976 to 1980 (Sayarı 
2010). In fact, violence was said to be the cause of the military coup d’état in 
September 1980. Thus, in order to understand the development of the wave and 
the dynamics of institutionalization and radicalization, it is important to 
understand the use of violence in Turkey during the period covered. 
Understanding the social and political developments at the origin of the 
massive use of violence is essential. What were the reasons of the intense use of 
                                                     
50
 It should be noted that this is not a fact exclusive for Turkey: violence escalated during cycles of 
protest in Italy, Germany, Northern Ireland and in the Basque countries in late 1960s and in early 
1970s (Della Porta, 2008: 222). 
51
 The data used here is the one gathered by the review of the newspaper archive.  
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violence during the wave of protest? I will try to answer this question before 
elaborating the details of the violent events coded for this study.   
 
6.1.1. Reasons for the use of political violence in Turkey in the 1970s 
There are some scholars who explain the existence of violence
52
 in the wave of 
protest in Turkey in 1970s by referring to more cultural reasons, such as Mardin 
(1978) who explains the events started in 1968 (first wave of political violence) 
based on the university youth who were subjected to cultural dislocations and who 
were torn between the rural traditions and modern social behavior. Orlow (1982), 
in a similar approach, refers to the modernization process of Turkey and the 
Kemalist legacy as the main sources of political violence.  
 Besides cultural explanations, some scholars emphasize the importance of 
socio-economic developments that the state was witnessing, such as urbanization 
caused by large-scale migration to cities (Sayarı and Hoffman 1994; Keleş and 
Ünsal 1982). Gecekondu (shantytowns) districts emerged as a result of this 
migration. It is argued that they facilitated the escalation of political violence by 
causing alienation among young people (Orlow 1982), by providing anonymity 
(for example, establishment of “liberated zone”s) and hiding places for militants, 
and by providing human resources since these districts became main sources for 
recruitment (Sayarı 2010).  
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 In the current study, an operational definition of violence based on the forms of action is used; 
those protest events are considered to be violent in which at least one violent form of action is used. 
As mentioned above, the scheme used in the work of Kriesi et.al. (1995: 268) is adapted for the 
current study: accordingly the range of violent forms of action involves light violence including 
limited property damage, theft, burglary, threats to persons, violent demonstrations (if initiated by 
the movement), etc. and heavy violence includes physical violence against persons (including 
political murders and kidnappings), bombings, fire attacks and other severe property damage, 
sabotage. In order to adapt this scheme which is mainly used to analyze mobilization in Western 
Europe to the Turkish case, we should also include violent confrontations between members of 
opposing political groups adapting different or same political orientations into the violent forms of 
actions. 
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Adaptation of radical ideologies is also referred to as a source of escalating 
political violence. While most of the scholars supporting this argument refer to the 
Marxist ideologies (such as Sayarı 2010) which are claimed to channel the 
students into actions against the state, we should also mention the role of far-right 
ideologies: as we have seen the ideology of the idealist movement in Turkey was 
based on violence (Ağaoğulları, 1998: 232), and shaped by Turkism, in which the 
Turkish national character is described through power, warfare and militarism 
(Altınay and Bora 2002). However, the existence of ideologies justifying violence 
does not necessarily bring along use of political violence. As Della Porta (1995) 
shows based on the German and Italian cases of the 1970s, it is only with the 
triggering impact of political opportunities that extremist ideologies engender 
violent acts.  
Besides the ideological orientations, alliance structures of groups might 
also affect the choice of action repertoire. In this regard, it is generally expected 
that protest events of a group with strong allies would be less violent than groups 
without powerful allies, since they have more access to the system and would 
prefer non-violent actions to make their voice heard. However, if we think in a 
different way, these groups are able to use more radical and violent types of 
actions since their allies can provide them more space for using a radical 
repertoire to reach their goals. Considering the period covered, it can be stated that 
the right wing groups were more likely to find allies, at least all the governing 
parties of the period except one had nationalist-conservative tendencies. Therefore, 
it can be hypothesized that the radical right protesting groups are more likely to 
employ higher levels of political violence than the left-wing groups since their 
strong allies might overlook their radical activities (see Chapter 2, hypothesis 3b).  
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Table 6.2 presents data confirming the hypotheses: the majority of the 
violent events (52 percent) were carried out by right-wing groups, as was also the 
case for the Italian wave of protest of 1966-1973 (della Porta and Tarrow, 1986: 
622). Left-wing groups follow the right-wing ones with a share of almost 40 
percent. On the other hand, according to the data, Islamists and Kurdish groups
53
 
were involved at lower levels of violence compared to left and right wing groups. 
The low share of Kurdish groups involved in violence might seem surprising at 
first as Kurds did not refrain from using violence; the reason for this can be the 
fact that the Kurdish movement distinguished itself from the left-wing movement 
in late 1970s and was not very active until 1984.  
 
Table 6.2: Ideological orientations of actors involved in violent events in Turkey, 
1971-1986. 
 
Orientations of 
actors involved in 
violence 
(in %) 
  
Rightists 52.0 
Leftists 39.7 
Kurdish groups 4.5 
Islamists 3.8 
  
Total 100 
N 421 
 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 5, the Turkish left was highly factionalized. This 
factionalism deepened after the general amnesty issued in 1974. According to 
Sayarı (2010: 205) factionalism among the left-wing militants was also an 
important source of escalation of political violence: “Each new factional conflict 
                                                     
53
 While the Kurdish movement started to flourish in 1970s, especially in early 1970s it was 
considered as a part of the socialist left-wing movement. The actors are coded as “Kurdish groups” 
when there was an overt reference to their Kurdish identity.  
130 
 
pushed the militants toward greater activism in their efforts to receive more media 
attention than the other groups”. This fact can also be explained by collective 
identity building, since “violent action helps to strengthen collective identity by 
providing a context in which the group can – and in fact must – count” (della 
Porta and Tarrow, 1986: 628). This is also relevant given the fact that all these 
organizations that emerged after the 1974 general amnesty were claiming to be the 
successors of previous organizations. It should also be noted that some of the left-
wing groups, before the military memorandum in 1971, were hoping for a 
revolution with the support of some of the military officials (see Chapter 4). 
However, after the memorandum and repression following it, they lost their 
confidence in these military cadres. By contrast, the right-wing movement became 
more powerful in the arena left empty with the imprisonment of most of the 
leading left-wing cadres. Thus, the political arena after the release of these cadres 
in 1974 was far more different than early-1970s. It is generally accepted that an 
opening in the political system would lead to more moderate politics. In the case 
of Turkey, the 1974 general amnesty constituted such an opening, as the leading 
cadres of the movements were released. However, due to the reasons explained 
above this opening prepared the ground for radical politics and armed struggle. 
These points might be sufficient for explaining the use of political violence. 
However, they are inadequate in explaining the “timing” of political violence in 
Turkey in the 1970s. One major explanation for the use of political violence in 
Turkey in the late 1960s and in 1970s in fact is the defeat of the TİP in 1969 
elections. As mentioned before on Chapter 4, this defeat was a result of both the 
disputes within the party and the change in the electoral law made in favor of 
larger parties in 1968. This defeat in 1969 further deepened the factionalism 
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within the party in particular and the Turkish left in general: the party’s leading 
cadres were pursuing a parliamentary road to reach socialism, but the defeat 
created disappointment among the left-wing youth who were already influenced 
by the MDD line, that blamed the TİP leadership as being pacifists. As a result, 
the youth lost confidence in parliamentary politics. In this regard it can be claimed 
that the exclusive political system in Turkey created a favorable environment for 
radicalization and played a catalytic role for escalating violence among young 
people (Orlow 1982; Sayarı 1987; Yayla 1989). This first wave of political 
violence came to an end with the measures taken by the interregnum after the 
military intervention in March 1971. As Figure 6.1 demonstrates, the number of 
violent events started to increase in 1973, after the transition to civilian rule. 
However, a significant increase is observed in 1974, when the general amnesty 
that led to the release of most of the former militants was announced. Thus, again, 
it can be claimed that an opening in the political system helped the increase of 
overall mobilization and eventually to an increase of violence. On the other hand, 
the hypothesis about the level of violent events under the military regimes (see 
Chapter 2, hypothesis 6) is disconfirmed by this data, as the numbers of violent 
events are insignificant in these periods.  
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Figure 6.1: Numbers of violent protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986.  
 
 
Della Porta (2008: 224) points out that “(e)ncounters between the movements and 
the state apparatuses produced radicalization in a wide variety of movement 
cases”. It is also true for the encounters between conflicting movements, such as 
the left and right-wing groups in Turkey. In this regard, clashes between rival 
groups of both left and right wing groups contributed to the escalation of political 
violence in Turkey. In particular, the empowerment of the right-wing groups, 
which already started to employ violence against their opponents in the late 1960s, 
contributed to the use of violence. In line with hypothesis 3b, their empowerment 
was a result of their alliances with the political elite, an important feature of the 
POS and the political environment as explained in Chapter 2. Accordingly, the 
level of mobilization of a movement that has strong allies would increase. The 
existence of a powerful external ally, namely the MHP, helped the idealist 
movement in its motivation. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 5, the MHP became 
a strong coalition partner in 1975 with the establishment of the first Nationalist 
Front government. Among some other ministries, the MHP was controlling the 
ministry responsible for the activities of intelligence services (Sayarı, 2010: 203),  
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the Ministry of Education and the system of State Teacher Training Schools 
(Mardin, 1978: 234). As Sayarı (2010: 203) puts it, “many right-wing militants 
were implicated in numerous terrorist incidents during the period from 1976 to 
1980”. Accordingly, MHP’s major partnership in two Nationalist Front 
governments that ruled the country in two different terms between 1975 and 198 
can also be used as an explanation of the escalating political violence in mid-
1970s.  
 
6.1.2. Violence as a Political Means-Presentation of Data 
Analyzing cycles of protest is also useful for understanding the development of 
political violence, since it is one of the most frequent outcomes of a cycle (Della 
Porta, 2008: 222). The overall development of the wave of protest according to 
violence and other forms of actions used is shown in Figure 6.2; the data 
presented here give us clues about the outcome of the wave of protest. As can be 
traced from the figure, 1974 is the year when the use of all forms of actions 
increased. The significance of this year for Turkish politics in the period covered 
is explained above. On the other hand, 1977 emerges as the year when the use of 
non-violent forms of actions (conventional, confrontational and demonstrative) 
peaked. The escalation of violent events is parallel to the development of the wave 
of protest itself: the number of violent events starts to increase in 1974, peaks in 
1978, when the clashes between various groups with diverse ideological 
orientations intensified and declines sharply in 1980, with the effect of the 
military coup in September 1980. The dominance of violent events throughout the 
whole wave of protest is striking, as it contradicts the expectation that a cycle 
would radicalize towards its end. In the Italian case of the late 1960s and early 
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1970, for example, violence was the outcome of the cycle; the use of violence 
only increased towards the end of the cycle (della Porta and Tarrow, 1986: 616; 
Tarrow, 1989: 297). In the Turkish case, although use of more violent forms of 
actions increase towards the end as well (see Chapter 8), violence tends to appear 
from the beginning. This can be explained by the repressive character of the 
military regime after the 1971 memorandum, the increase in the number of 
organizations established after the general amnesty announced in 1974 which 
contributed to the increasing factionalism, and the loss of confidence in the 
parliamentary politics, especially among the left-wing youth. Figure 6.2 also 
clearly shows the sharp decrease in the use of all forms of actions after 1980, 
which is a result of the repressive regime established by the military coup in 
September 1980.  In sum, it can be maintained that the figure demonstrates the 
“radical” character of the wave of protest in Turkey in 1970s.  
 
Figure 6.2: Use of violence and other forms of actions in Turkey, 1971-1986. 
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shown in Table 6.1, heavy violence is dominant among the vast majority of 
violent events.  Table 6.3 shows us the distribution of different forms of violent 
events. According to the table, 33.7 percent of the violent events event took the 
form of shootings. Shootings were followed by clashes between groups with a 
28.7 percent share and by bombings which constituted 21.5 percent of the violent 
events.  
 
Table 6.3: Frequency of violent forms of actions used in Turkey, 1971-1986.  
 
Forms of violence (in %) 
  
Shooting 33.7 
Clash 28.7 
Bombing 21.5 
Attack 8.1 
Other violence targeting 
people 5.5 
Other violence targeting 
objects 2.6 
  
Total 100 
N 3.825 
 
Who was responsible for the violent events is another question to be answered in 
order to understand the wave of protest and use of mass violence. Table 6.4 
demonstrates the actors of the violent acts. According to the data presented in the 
table, almost 63 percent of the violent events are carried out by students, as was 
also the case in the Italian wave of protest from 1966 to 1973 (della Porta and 
Tarrow, 1986: 621). This shows that even though the students were the early-
risers of the cycle and somehow triggered the mobilization of the labor movement, 
the labor movement did not mobilize using violent forms of actions. The first 
explanation for this might be the alienation of the students, “impatient for 
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revolution, eager to retaliate against right-wing terror” (Benhabib, 1979: 17) as 
they are, from the workers. In addition, compared to students, workers were 
provided with more structural access to the decision making processes, at least 
within the industrial relations, through collective bargaining that became 
centralized in 1963 (Şafak, 2013: 136). The second highest share among the 
violent events can be attributed to the groups with opposed views, which makes 
sense since the newspaper articles refer to them when there is a violent encounter 
between diverse groups. The low share of “terrorists” among those using violent 
forms of actions is not surprising since militants engaging in social movements 
were referred as “terrorists” only after the military coup in September 1980. Thus, 
“terrorists” only existed from 1981 to 1986, a relatively short period of time when 
the whole cycle of protest is considered. 
 
 
Table 6.4: Actors involved in violent events in Turkey, 1971-1986. 
 
Actors (in %) 
  
Students 62.9 
Groups with 
opposed views 260 
Terrorists 4.3 
General public 3.8 
Workers 2.8 
Elites .2 
  
Total 100 
N 1094 
 
The ideological background of the people who started violence and/or were 
involved in violent events has long been a point of dispute in the literature on 
Turkey. While some claim that it was the left-wing students who started violent 
acts which were followed by the right-wing students, some other scholars claim 
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the opposite that it was the left-wing students who were defending themselves 
against the fascist attacks. In this regard, the ideological orientations of the people 
who were involved in violence is an important point to probe. On the other hand, 
considering the effects of alliance structures both on mobilization and the choice 
of repertoire of both left and right wing groups, the ideological orientations of the 
perpetrators of the violent events is also relevant for social movements. Thus, in 
order to have a more comprehensive understanding of the violence used in Turkey 
in 1970s and the actors of the cycle of protest, we should provide more detailed 
information on the relationship between the ideological background of protestors 
and the forms of violence used.   
The distribution of violent acts according to different ideological 
orientations of actors over time is shown in Figure 6.3. According to the figure, in 
the period following the military memorandum issued in March 1971, left-wing 
groups held a number of violent events, possibly in reaction to the repression 
caused by the intervention. However, from the end of 1973 to the end of 1978, 
violent events are mostly attributed to the right-wing groups. This provides further 
evidence for the hypothesis that the strong alliances in the government led the 
way to the radicalization of the right-wing groups, since it was the Nationalist 
Front governments, who ruled Turkey for almost 3.5 years of this period. On the 
other hand, the period from the late 1978 until the coup of 1980 is dominated by 
left-wing violence, which can also be explained by alliance structures since it was 
the CHP government who ruled the country from January 1978 to December 1979. 
However, increasing factionalism within the left and attacks by right-wing groups 
might also explain this situation. A militant of Dev-Yol, for example, narrates that 
especially after 1975/6 all left-wing groups started to arm themselves (Houston, 
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2013: 56). In this regard, it can be claimed that out of the two competing 
hypotheses on the use of violence by right-wing groups the latter (see Chapter 2, 
hypothesis 3b) is supported by this data, as right-wing groups are more likely to 
employ violence.  
 
Figure 6.3: Numbers of violent protest events according to ideological 
orientations of actors in Turkey, 1971-1986. 
 
 
As already mentioned, the scope and targets of violence and violent events vary. 
What kind of violence were these groups with different ideological backgrounds 
involved in? Table 6.5 shows the involvement of groups with different ideological 
stances in different kinds of violence. Accordingly, left-wing groups are more 
likely to get involved in clashes, bombings and violent acts targeting objects, 
while right-wing groups are more likely to use attacks and other kinds of violence 
targeting people.  
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Table 6.5: Forms of violence used according to the political orientations of actors 
in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %). 
 
 Ideological Orientations of Actors 
Forms of violence Leftists Rightists Islamists Kurdish 
groups 
Other violence object 10.6 4.2 6.3 0 
Other violence people 6.0 26.1 12.0 0 
Attack
54
          6.1 34.2 6.3 0 
Bombing         9.1 2.8 19.0 0 
Shooting 19.7 15.0 25.3 25.8 
Clash     48.4 17.8 31.0 73.7 
     
TOTAL 99.8 100 100 99.5 
N 168 219 16 19 
 
This fact that leftist actors are more involved in clashes is not surprising 
considering the factionalism within the left. This factionalism, explained in 
Chapter 5, caused left-wing groups to get involved in violent encounters with 
right-wing adversaries as well as with their counterparts within the left-wing. 
Bombings are another form of violent events mostly used by left-wing groups or 
actors. Mainly represented by the idealist movement, right-wing groups on the 
other hand employ more violence targeting people. The fact that the idealist 
organizations’ “explicit purpose” is “confronting and containing growing left-
wing militancy” (Benhabib, 1979: 16) might help explaining this situation. Since 
their ultimate goal was to protect the state against the threat of communism, they 
positioned themselves against the left-wing youth instead of raising claims. In this 
regard, Ağaoğulları (1987: 204) claims that the violence exercised by idealists 
followed several stages: “until 1974, it had been staged in universities and other 
institutions of higher education, and had targeted revolutionary youths. After the 
                                                     
54
 Attacks are coded as they were presented and used in the newspaper articles (i.e. when the 
wording used in the article was “attack”), when no further information was provided about the 
essence of the violent act.  
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RPP [CHP] rose to power (…) the attacks extended to its members, as well as 
such leftist professional organizations (…). Later still, the guns were turned 
toward prominent journalists (…), unionists (…), university faculty (…), party 
leaders (…), and others. (…) Finally, terrorism acquired mass proportions as 
religious-reactionary circles were instigated to violence against Alevis and “leftists” 
(including the RPP [CHP]) in Malatya, Sivas, and Kahraman Maraş in 1978 and 
in Çorum and some other locations in 1980”. 
What were the targets and goals of violent events? It is important to 
answer this question to elaborate the scope of violence used in Turkey in 1970s. 
Violent events most frequently target buildings and vehicles with around a 
42 percent share as Table 6.6 demonstrates. Among people, representatives of the 
state, including civil servants, security forces and some of the elites are the most 
prevalent targets of violent acts. The data presented here, however, contradicts the 
observation of Sayarı (2010:205) that “the violence against the representatives of 
the state was primarily directed at the security forces”. On the other hand, his 
distinction between the sources of violence against different branches of security 
forces in Turkey is important: accordingly, Kurdish separatist groups were 
targeting army and the gendarmerie, while left-wing groups were targeting 
policemen and their stations in cities (Sayarı, 2010: 205). This is not surprising 
when the organizational structure of Turkish security forces and the area of 
activity of different organizations are considered: Army and gendarmerie in 
Turkey are usually in charge of rural areas where Kurdish guerilla groups operate, 
whereas the police force is responsible for urban areas. 
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Table 6.6: Targets of violent events in Turkey, 1971-1986. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Besides the targets, the issues raised during violent events tell us about the 
motives lying behind these acts. As mentioned above, most frequent forms of 
violence in Turkey during the period covered are shootings and clashes, which 
accounts for the fact that we know very little about the issues involved in these 
acts, as they are generally exercised in reaction to a previous attack without 
making some explicit claims.  As a result, the number of violent events, in which 
it was possible to determine the goal or issue raised, is very low (n=108). Table 
6.7 shows that while students were involved in 63 percent of the total violent 
events, a relatively small amount of violent events (around 7 percent) were 
motivated by issues related to education. Violence is more likely to occur when 
there is a commemoration or death anniversary (20.4 percent). Goals that are 
related to daily politics, politics of governments are also expressed in a violent 
way (18.5 percent).  
 
 
Targets        (in %) 
  
Buildings and vehicles        41.9 
Elites         12.3 
Students          11.8 
Civil servants          9.4 
Workers         7.0 
Security forces          5.3 
Professionals          4.9 
General public         3.7 
Self employed           3.6 
Employer            0 
  
Total       100 
N 2.415 
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Table 6.7: Goals of actions involved violence in Turkey, 1971-1986. 
 
Goal of action (in %) 
  
Commemoration/anniversaries 20.4 
Political 18.5 
Murders/attacks 14.8 
Repression 14.8 
Social 13.0 
Educational 6.5 
Economy/labor policies 4.6 
International 4.6 
Ungrouped 2.8 
  
Total 100 
N 108 
 
The relationship between the use of different forms of violence and various issues 
raised during protests is presented in Table 6.8. The data presented demonstrates 
that bombings are most frequently used during commemoration events or 
anniversaries. The clashes between security forces and countermovements and 
first generation left-wing actors and the repressive military regime established 
after the memorandum issued in 1971 contributed to the creation of “martyrs” 
among the left-wing movement, such as prominent student leaders such as Deniz 
Gezmiş, Yusuf Arslan and Mahir Çayan. Thus, the left-wing movement organized 
commemoration events on the death anniversaries of these “martyrs”. While the 
right-wing movement had its own “martyrs”, organizing commemorations was a 
more frequent event for the left-wing. This fact would help us explain the frequent 
use of bombings by left-wing actors, as they were organizing commemorations 
more frequently.  
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Table 6.8: Forms of violence used according to goals of action in Turkey, 1971-
1986 (in %). 
 
 Forms of Violence 
Goal of Action Other 
violent act 
targeting  
object 
Other 
violent act 
targeting  
people 
Attack Bombing Shooting Clash 
       
Political 16.0 41.7 0 11.1 33.3 18.2 
Educational 8.0 8.3 9.1 0 0 9.1 
Economy/ 
Labor Policies 4.0 0 0 0 0 12.1 
International 12.0 0 0 5.6 11.1 0 
Murders/ 
Attacks 2.0 8.3 27.3 0 11.1 18.2 
Repression 8.0 25.0 9.1 5.6 33.3 18.2 
Commemoration/ 
Anniversaries 2.0 0 0 66.7 11.1 12.1 
Social 12.0 0 45.5 11.1 0 12.1 
Ungrouped 0 16.7 9.1 0 0 0 
       
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 25 12 11 18 9 33 
 
6.2. Other Unconventional Forms of Actions 
The cycle was not solely composed of violent events of course. While not as 
frequent as violent acts, conventional and other unconventional forms of actions 
(including demonstrative, confrontational actions and strikes) compose 28.7 
percent of the total events. In the following part, I focus more on these forms of 
actions starting from unconventional ones.   
Unconventional forms of actions consist of demonstrative, confrontational 
and violent acts as well as strikes. Table 6.1 showed that the violence has the 
highest share among the unconventional forms of action. Demonstrative and 
confrontational actions, on the other hand, follow violence with shares of 
respectively 9.5 percent and 9.1 percent. Strikes, according to the newspaper data, 
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turn out to be the least frequent actions among the unconventional ones; they only 
consist 3.5 percent of unconventional events and 3.2 percent of total events. 
However, it should be kept in mind that the newspaper data is biased towards 
strikes (see Chapter 3).  
Demonstrative forms of actions include marches, demonstrations, public 
assemblies/rallies, etc. according to the classification of Kriesi et al. (2005). Table 
6.9 presents the frequency of demonstrative acts: 30.8 percent of the 
demonstrative events are composed of marches, while demonstrations constitute 
17.5 percent and meetings 13.3 percent of the demonstrative events. Forums, 
which were organized mainly by students as a mechanism of collective decision 
making, are also significant with a share of 7.9 percent.  
 
Table 6.9: Frequency of demonstrative actions used in Turkey, 1971-1986. 
 
Demonstrative 
Forms of Actions 
(in %) 
  
March 30.8 
Demonstration 17.5 
Meeting 13.3 
Others 12.8 
Forum 7.9 
Pirate march 7.9 
Funerals 5.3 
Pirate demonstration 4.5 
  
Total 100 
N 468 
 
Confrontational forms of actions, on the other hand, compose 8.4 percent of total 
events.  As mentioned above, Kriesi et al. (1995) group confrontational strategies 
into two sub-categories: legal and illegal confrontational forms of actions.  In the 
Turkish case, boycotts, especially class boycotts organized by students, constitute 
the largest share of confrontational acts with almost 40 percent, as shown in Table 
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6.10. Raids, which might target a meeting, a workplace, or a dormitory of  a group 
with opposing views constitute the second highest share after boycotts with 
around 20 percent. 
 
Table 6.10: Frequency of confrontational actions used in Turkey, 1971-1986. 
 
Confrontational Forms of 
Actions 
(in %) 
  
Boycotting classes 36.4 
Others 21.4 
Raid  20.3 
Occupation 14.7 
Hunger strike 4.0 
Boycott 3.1 
  
Total 100 
N 448 
 
The overall development of demonstrative and confrontational events is shown in 
Figure 6.4. As can be traced from the figure, the demonstrative acts increased in 
the first phase of the protest wave. However, they presented a decreasing tendency 
after 1977, a year where the whole wave peaked. There are two similarities that 
this curve shares with the curve of demonstrative actions: one is the relatively low 
levels of numbers of events in the periods under the military rules (from 1971 to 
1974 and from 1981 to 1986), and the peak point at 1977. While the general 
tendency for conventional (see Figure 6.6 below) and demonstrative events were 
an increase from 1974 up until 1977 and a decline following the peak point until 
the military coup, the number of events in which confrontational forms of ations 
were used as the main forms presents an up and down trend.  
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Figure 6.4: Number of demonstrative and confrontational protest events in 
Turkey, 1971-1986.  
 
 
 
Strikes are another category of unconventional forms of actions, the most 
common and effective “tools” of workers. However, as shown in Table 6.1 the 
share of strikes, according to the newspaper data, in the wave of protest is not 
very important compared to other forms of actions. This is surprising given that 
the workers were accompanying students in the streets. Two reasons for this can 
be provided: the first one is the selection bias of Milliyet towards strikes – which 
is explained in detail in Chapter 3, the second reason refers to the expansion of the 
cycle of protests that led to the use of various forms of actions by various social 
groups. Thus workers were not exclusively involved in strikes but also in other 
forms of actions ranging from conventional to unconventional including violence 
although not as significant as strikes. Figure 6.5 presents the evolution of strikes 
over the years according to both the official data and the newspaper data.  
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Figure 6.5: Number of strikes in Turkey, 1971-1985. 
 
 
 
Considering the official data, as explained in Chapter 3, the evolution of strike 
events organized by labor do not resemble any of the curves presented above on 
demonstrative and confrontational forms of actions. Unlike other forms of actions, 
for example, the number of strikes did not peak in 1977, but in 1980 as a result of 
the reactions against “24 January Decisions”, the austerity package that is 
explained in detail in Chapter 4.  This difference supports the claim of Koç (1999) 
that there is no direct link between the student and labor movements. While the 
labor movement accompanied students on the streets and the repertoire of each 
movement diffused to the other, it is clear that the labor movement had its own 
agenda, which was shaped by the economic crises that ended in mass firings, and 
suppression of labor rights such as collective bargaining.   
Who were the actors involved in unconventional forms of actions? Table 
6.11 shows the actors’ use of different forms of unconventional action. According 
to these data, students are the actors responsible for most of the demonstrative and 
confrontational events, as was also the case for violent events. This is not 
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surprising given the large number of protests organized by students. The general 
public and workers follow students in using demonstrative forms of actions with 
shares of respectively 19.7 percent and 11.6 percent. These forms are, however, 
never used by radical actors such as “terrorists” and only 1.4 percent is carried out 
by groups with opposed views, which is in line with demonstrative actions being 
part of the moderate repertoire. On the other hand, not surprisingly, around 90 
percent of the strikes are carried out by workers.  
 
Table 6.11: Actors involved in unconventional protests (excluding violence) in 
Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).  
 
  Unconventional Repertoire 
Actors  Demonstrative Confrontational Strike 
    
Students 64.9 73.2 .6 
Workers 11.6 8.3 90.5 
Elites 2.5 5.3 3.0 
Terrorists 0 1.5 0 
General public 19.7 11.8 6.0 
Groups with 
opposed views 1.4 0 0 
    
Total 100 100 100 
N 285 339 168 
 
The data on the involvement of various organizations in protest events, on the 
other hand, provides us with more information for analyzing the patterns of the 
cycle. Among the organizations of actors who were involved in the protests, 
associations were the ones who used demonstrative forms of action most often, as 
shown in Table 6.12. Thus, it is possible to claim that moderate protests more 
often involved professional social movement organizations and external allies. 
Confrontational and violent forms of actions, on the other hand, are employed 
mostly by external allies and “other SMOs”. The high share of external allies 
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which are mainly composed of “conventional” organizations such as political 
parties, labor unions and professional chambers, etc., which normally involve in 
institutional politics, can be referred to as a sign of radicalization in Turkey during 
the taken period. Unsurprisingly, most of the strikes are carried out by union 
members.  
 
Table 6.12: Organizations involved in unconventional protests in Turkey, 1971-
1986 (in %).  
 
 Form of Action 
Organizations Demonstrative Confrontational Strike Violence 
     
Illegal 
organizations 
4.8 8.5 0 22.9 
Associations 34.7 17.0 0 8.8 
Other SMOs 21.8 35.6 0 41.5 
Political parties 23.4 17.0 .9 22.9 
Unions 15.3 17.0 98.3 3.4 
Chambers/Benches 0 5.1 .9 .5 
     
Total 100 100 100 100 
N 124 59 118 205 
 
Another important feature of the actors in relation to their choice of repertoire is 
their ideological orientations. Table 6.13 presents the data on the relationship 
between the use of unconventional forms of actions (except violence) and the 
ideological backgrounds of actors. Accordingly, 57 percent of confrontational are 
carried out by right-wing oriented actors. Left-wing actors are the followers of 
right-wing actors in these kinds of events. Majority of the demonstrative actions, 
on the other hand, are carried out by left-wing actors. 
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Table 6.13: Ideological orientations of actors involved in unconventional protests 
(excluding violence) in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).  
 
 Unconventional Repertoire 
Orientations  
of Actors 
Demonstrative Confrontational Strike 
    
Leftists 68.2 40.2 98.2 
Rightists 25.0 57.3 1.9 
Islamists 6.8 .9 0 
Kurdish 
groups 0 1.7 0 
 
   Total 100 100 100 
N 220 117 54 
 
The aim of the protest is an essential feature of it, as can be inferred from various 
definitions provided in the Chapter 2. What kinds of issues were raised in protests 
where unconventional forms of actions were used? In order to answer this 
question and have a further understanding on the repertoires of action used by the 
social movements in Turkey in 1970s, we should also have a look at the 
relationship between the issues that people organized around and the forms of 
actions used to represent their concerns.  
Table 6.14 presents the data related to this relationship. It is surprising to 
see high shares of protests in reaction to murders and attacks demonstrative acts 
since these can be classified as unconventional issues; we see the use of moderate 
actions for protesting on unconventional issues. On the other hand, as we 
understand from the table, confrontational forms are used mostly in protests 
framed by educational issues; a fact that can be considered as a feature of 
radicalization. Not surprisingly, a very high share of the strikes is used for 
protesting on economic issues and about labor policies.  However, almost 10 
percent of the strikes are resorted about political issues. Violence, on the other 
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hand, is mostly used about political matters. Protests organized on 
commemorating the former accidents or militants and on death anniversaries of 
former militants follow political issues with regards to the use of violence.  
 
Table 6.14: Goals of unconventional protests in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %). 
 
 Unconventional Repertoire 
Goal of Action Demonstrative Confrontational Strike Violence 
     
Political 16.8 7.1 9.6 18.5 
Educational 17.8 42.2 1.3 6.5 
Economy/Labor 
Policies 10.5 10.3 83.3 4.6 
International 4.6 2.5 0 4.6 
Murders/Attacks 24.2 17.0 1.9 14.8 
Repression 5.1 7.8 2.6 14.8 
Commemoration/ 
Anniversary 12.9 5.0 0 20.4 
Social 7.6 7.8 1.3 13.0 
Ungrouped .5 .4 0 2.8 
     
Total 100 100 100 100 
N 410 282 156 108 
 
 
6.3. Conventional Forms of Actions  
Besides unconventional forms of actions, use of conventional forms of actions 
should also be examined in order to analyze a cycle of protest. Use of 
conventional forms of actions in Turkey in the covered period is not very 
significant, as they constitute only 8.4percent of total events. Figure 6.6 
demonstrates the evolution of use of conventional forms of actions. Accordingly, 
the use of these forms of actions, including lobbying, sending letters to politicians, 
leafleting and mobilizing law, increased until 1977 with an exception in the period 
between 1972 and 1973. 1977 is the peak point for these kinds of events and the 
152 
 
number decreases continuously until 1981. The number of conventional actions 
from 1981 until the end of 1985, on the other hand, is insignificant.  
 
Figure 6.6: Numbers of conventional protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986. 
 
 
 
What kinds of conventional forms of actions were the protestors using? Table 
6.15 presents data on the use of different forms of conventional actions. As can be 
observed, media-directed forms of actions, with a 80 percent share, are dominant 
among the conventional forms of actions. The majority of the rest is composed of 
political forms of actions (almost 18 percent). Juridical forms
55
 on the other hand 
are not significant. The most frequent conventional forms are publishing notice 
(40.2 percent), press releases (22.3 percent) and placarding (13 percent).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
55
 The only juridical form of action that was found present in the newspaper articles was “applying 
to Council of State”.  
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
E
v
en
ts
 
Year 
153 
 
Table 6.15: Different forms of conventional protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986. 
 
Conventional Forms             (in %) 
  
Media-directed 80.1 
Political 17.9 
Juridical 2.0 
  
Total 100 
N 448 
 
Conventional forms of actions are mostly used by students, as it was the case for 
other forms of actions including violence, as Table 6.16 shows. While we don’t 
see active participation of elites, they were the main actors of 35.3 percent of the 
events in which conventional forms of actions were used. General public follows 
the elites in participation to these kinds of events with a share of 20 percent.  
 
Table 6.16: Actors of Conventional Protests in Turkey, 1971-1986. 
 
Actors  (in %) 
  
Students 40.5 
Elites 35.3 
General public 19.7 
Workers 4.6 
Terrorists 0 
Groups with 
opposed views 0 
  
Total 100 
N 173 
 
It is possible to observe a similar pattern with the involvement of organizations; 
most of the protest events where conventional forms of actions were used were 
organized by established and traditional organizations: as Table 6.17 shows 40.3 
percent of these events were organized by associations and associations are 
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followed by political parties with a share of 18.7 percent and chambers and 
benches with around a share of 16 percent. 
 
Table 6.17: Organizations involved in conventional protests in Turkey, 1971-
1986. 
 
Organizations (in %) 
  
Associations 40.3 
Political parties 18.7 
Chambers/Benches 16.1 
Unions 13.2 
Other SMOs 10.6 
Illegal 
organizations 1.1 
  
Total 100 
N 273 
 
Who were the actors of the conventional protest events with regards to the 
ideological backgrounds? Table 6.18 presents the relevant data. Accordingly, 
unlike violent and confrontational events, a vast majority of the conventional 
events (82.3 percent) are carried out by left-wing actors. In organizing these kinds 
of events right-wing actors follow left-wing actors with a share of 15.1 percent, 
while Islamists and Kurdish groups have no significance.  
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Table 6.18: Ideological orientations of actors involved in conventional protests in 
turkey, 1971-1986. 
 
Orientations 
of Actors 
(in %) 
  
Leftists 82.3 
Rightists 15.1 
Islamists 2.6 
Kurdish 
groups 0 
 
 Total 100 
N 265 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter dealt with one of most significant features of social movements, 
repertoires of action. It showed that people who took the streets in the 1970s in 
Turkey adopted a variety of forms of action. These included both conventional 
and unconventional forms ranging from press releases, demonstrations, boycotts, 
strikes, to shootings, clashes, attacks and bombings. However, a vast majority of 
the events involved political violence. While several other European democracies 
such as Italy and West Germany also encountered violent periods of mobilization 
in the 1970s, the Turkish case, in comparison to these European countries, 
claimed far more fatalities: the number of fatalities witnessed in Turkey in a week 
during early 1980 was higher than the number of fatalities in Italy during the 
entire year of 1980 and in Germany during the entire decade (Sayarı, 987: 21; 
2010: 198).  The peculiarity of the Turkish case is also based on the fact that the 
cycle of protest was violent from the start. In addition, as Table 6.7 showed half of 
the violence is essentially a reaction to violence. Thus, it can be claimed that there 
is a vicious circle going on, where violence triggers violence.  
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Apart from the mass use of violence, the data on the overall development 
of the wave of protest in Turkey during the 1970s contains other signs of 
radicalization, as, for example, the decrease in the number of demonstrative 
events after 1977 as shown in Figure 6.4. With regards to the conventional forms 
of actions, it is clear that collective actors mainly resorted to media-related forms 
of actions. The low share of political and judicial forms, on the other hand, can be 
interpreted as a sign of distrust in formal politics. 
 After examining the actors and the repertoires of actions mobilized by 
these actors, in the following chapter, the last one of Part III, I will elaborate the 
last component of the cycle of protest analyzed in this study: issues.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Issues 
 
The issues raised in protests events constitute another variable that should be 
considered in detecting and analyzing a wave of protest: as Tarrow (1994: 153) 
writes, new or transformed collective actions frames are an important feature of a 
wave. Studying the issues raised in protests will give us a general idea about the 
state of politics in the country at hand, as the issues raised will be related to the 
main conflict in the polity. The scope of the protests on the other hand, i.e. 
whether or not they are internationally oriented, can also be understood from the 
development of the issues during the wave of protest. 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the students and workers were the 
main groups taking to the streets to voice their demands, although they were not 
alone. Why were they in the streets? What were they shouting about? Did their 
demands and issues raised evolve over the curse of the wave of protest? If so, how? 
What kind of developments effected the change? This chapter is going to answer 
these questions based on the empirical data gathered for this study. However, 
unfortunately, the data on issues is very limited. Out of 5361 protest events coded 
for this study, it was only possible to infer the issues for 1326 protest events 
(around 25 percent of the total number of events), a fact that can be attributed to 
the radical character of the wave.  
158 
 
It is possible to claim that the major domains in the social movement 
sector in Turkey in the 1970s were ideological and industrial. Although the labor 
movement emerged in the 1960s, the class perspective crystallized only in the 
1970s (Turan 2013). Thus, the conflict was framed as class struggle, as it was in 
Italy (della Porta and Diani, 2006: 80), at least for the left-wing movements. On 
the other hand, adapting a “nationalistic discourse based on cultural-historical 
essentialism” (Bora, 2003: 445), the right-wing was concerned with “anti-
communism” in reaction to increasing left-wing activity. It is hard to talk about 
identity-based movements in Turkey which were developing in its Western 
counterparts in the 1970s. The Kurdish movement started to organize in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, especially with the “Eastern Meetings” (Doğu Mitingleri)56 in 
1967, and with the foundation of Revolutionary Cultural Hearths of the East in 
1969 (Şimşek, 2004: 131). However, despite its autonomy mainly starting in 1973 
(Bozarslan 2012), the Kurdish movement is regarded as a part of the class-based 
left-wing labor and student movement until 1980s. This is also the case for the 
women’s movement. While the feminist movement in its Western counterparts 
emerged in the 1970s, in Turkey it is not possible to talk about such a movement 
until the 1980s. This does not mean that women were out of the scene in the 
1970s: they were active in left-wing movement and founded an association called 
Progressive Women’s Association (İlerici Kadınlar Derneği - İKD) in 1975. 
                                                     
56
 Eastern Meetings are a series of 12 meetings that were held in the cities of East and Southeast 
Anatolia, as well as in Ankara, with the support of the local branches of TİP against 
“backwardness” of the region, with the participation of tens of thousands of people. (Elçik 2007; 
Dorronsoro and Watts, 2009; Gündoğan 2011), who “called for resources, development, 
democratization, and Kurdish-language rights” (Dorronsoro and Watts, 2009: 466). Gündoğan 
(2011: 392) puts the significance of these meetings as such: “(…) it was a moment for the Kurds to 
voice the problems and demands exclusive to the Kurdish region and population instead of the 
class-based politics of the Turkish left which remained indifferent to  the ethnic dimension of the 
Kurdish problem”. On the other hand, Bozarslan (2012) mentions that the meetings were “(…) a 
kind of autonomization vis-à-vis the Turkish Left that comes from the basis and wherein the 
Kurdish members of the TİP also play a very important role”.  
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However, the motivation underlying the mobilization of women was, again, the 
class struggle (Tekeli 2004). In addition, although there were some protests 
concerned with international events (such as the occupation of Czechoslovakia, 
shah regime in Iran, etc.), Turkey did not witness the emergence of a peace 
movement in those years.
 57
   
The lack of studies on this time period in Turkey, and more generally on 
social movements makes it harder to trace general themes that were raised during 
the protest wave. As it was pointed out before, the 1970s in Turkey constitute one 
of the “darkest” periods with regards to academic works covering the period 
(Turan, 2013: 3). And the existing literature is mainly interested in violence.   
In this context, it is hard to categorize the issues raised during the protests 
according to some specific movements. A general categorization according to the 
demands that were voiced during protests is used for this study: political, 
educational and social issues, issues concerning economy or labor policies, 
protests against murders and attacks, protests against repression, and protests 
organized for commemoration.  
Tarrow (1994: 202) writes that “cycles of contention are usually 
remembered for big, bold, and system threatening claims, but the early demands 
that trigger a cycle are often narrow and group-specific”. While it is not possible 
to talk about such big claims in Turkey due to the nature of the cycle, it is worth 
analyzing the development of various claims and demands within the cycle. How 
did the distribution of these issues evolved throughout the wave of protest? 
According to the data presented in Figure 7.1, economic issues dominated the 
wave in the first years. This period also coincides with the dominance of workers. 
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 The only event with regards to peace was carried out in 1976, on the international peace day.   
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Educational issues, on the other hand, are raised by students who were the early 
risers of the cycle. These issues follow the economic ones, and take the lead 
within the period from 1976 to 1978, as the students’ visibility on the scene 
increases. As mentioned before, the cycle of protest had been radical with regards 
to the repertoire of action employed, and this radical nature became dominant 
through the end of the 1970s. Accordingly, the number of protests against murders 
and attacks became more significant towards the end of the wave, as a result of 
increasing violence. This might also be a side effect of the decrease in protests 
related to political and educational issues.  
 
Figure 7.1: Overall distribution of issue domains used in protest events in Turkey, 
1971-1986 (over 10 percent). 
 
 
 
More detailed information about the categories mentioned above is provided in 
the following.  
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7.1. General Issues Raised in Protest Events 
How often were these categories raised in protest events?  According to the data 
presented at Table 7.1, educational, political and economically oriented issues are 
most frequently raised ones, along with the protests organized against murders 
and attacks. On the other hand, social issues and issues related to repression and 
commemorations follow political, educational and economic issues with shares 
around 8 percent. The relative insignificance of social issues and the non-
existence of identity-based issues are in line with the explanation given above. In 
the following lines, I will try to provide a better understanding of the issues that 
are more commonly raised (those with a share more than 10 percent), namely 
educational, economic and political issues and protests against murders and 
attacks.    
 
Table 7.1: Issues raised in protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986. 
 
Issue (in %) 
Educational 20.1 
Murders/attacks 19.1 
Economy/labor policies 18.4 
Political 14.6 
Repression 9.0 
Commemoration/anniversaries 7.9 
Social 7.2 
International 3.2 
Other .6 
  
Total 100 
N 1326 
 
7.1.1. Educational Issues 
As we have seen in Chapter 5, students were the early-risers of the wave of protest 
and one of the main actors who were on the streets. Even though the students were 
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involved in politics, educational issues were, of course, one of their main agenda. 
As Table 7.1 shows, educational issues were raised in 20 percent of all protest 
events. In addition to the structural problems that the universities were facing
58
, 
the changes in the higher education system constituted one of the reasons behind 
this. After the military memorandum in 1971, with the changes made in the 1961 
Constitution, the autonomy of the universities was limited. In this regard, an 
“autonomous” and democratic university became one of the demands of the 
students. They demanded rights to participate in the decision-making processes in 
the university and/or faculty administration, university reform, and more 
democratic by-laws and a democratic university. Increasing clashes between 
students coming from different political backgrounds helped the administrations 
to leave the security of the campuses to police forces with a regulation introduced 
in 1971 after the military intervention. Police control in universities was also one 
of the reasons that the university students protested. State control on the 
universities was not only implemented by locating police forces in the campuses: 
it was also made possible by appointing the presidents of Board of Trustees of 
universities, as it was in the case of Middle East Technical University, one of the 
leading universities based in Ankara. In 1976, the then Nationalist Front 
government appointed Ahmet Sonel, the president of the Ankara branch of 
Hearths of Intellectuals (Aydınlar Ocağı)59, as president of the Board of Trustees. 
In February 1977, Hasan Tan, a right-wing professor, was appointed by the Board 
of Trustees as the rector of the university. In the following months, demands for 
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 Roos et. al. (1969: 277) mentions that high student-faculty ratios, inadequate budgets and an 
archaic examination system also existed in the university system in late 1960s, and they helped the 
sparking of university occupations in 1968.  
59
 Founded in 1970, Aydınlar Ocağı served as an ideas club where conservative intellectuals unite. 
It “(…) has functioned as a sort of fountainhead for a new legitimizing ideology [Turkish-Islam 
Synthesis] for the Turkish Republic” (Akin and Karasapan, 1988).  
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his resignation became one of the major topics among the university youth in 
Ankara. Students also organized protests for re-arrangement of class hours 
according to prayer times, against the closure of a mosque in their campus and 
against the pictures of Atatürk in classrooms and against not-working heaters in 
the buildings. 
7.1.2. Murders/Attacks 
Political violence became a part of daily life in Turkey in 1970s, as discussed in 
Chapter 6. People reacted to these violent organizations: protests organized 
against murders and attacks on people constitute the second largest group of 
issues after educational issues with a share of 19 percent of all the protest events, 
as shown in Table 7.1. On January 24, 1975, for example, students of Istanbul 
University protested against the murder of their friends one day ago. According to 
a report on Milliyet on January 25, 1975, the “revolutionary” students in several 
universities organized occupations, boycotts and stood in silence in respect for 
their losses. Protests against murders ended in the politicization of the funerals. 
This issue plays a significant role in the protest activities of students, elites and 
general public.  On the other hand, the large share of this issue among the ones 
raised during protest events, I would argue, reveals the radical dynamics of the 
wave of protest.  
7.1.3. Economic Issues 
Economic issues are also among the most frequent issues raised during protest 
events in Turkey in the 1970s: they constitute the third largest group of issues 
with a share of 18.4 of all protest events. The international debt crisis of mid-
1970s and 1980s and the austerity measures taken afterwards caused protests in 
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developing countries (Walton and Ragin 1990) all over the world.
 60
 Economic 
instability and crises were also significant features of 1970s in Turkey. The 
country witnessed economic crises consecutively in 1974, 1978 and in 1979-1980 
due to several factors including the oil price, the foreign trade deficit and the 
scarcity in financial resources. The data presented in Figure 7.1, showing the 
shares of protest events organized with an economic aspect from 1971 to 1986, 
provides supporting evidence for this; the number of protests is larger in the 
period from 1975 to 1981. Thus, it can be claimed that economic situation had a 
triggering effect for mobilization.  
While general economic policies, crises, high costs of living and IMF 
practices constitute the first aspect of protests regarding the economy, the second 
is about industrial relations. The conflicting interests of labor and the employers 
caused several problems, especially with regards to the rights demanded by 
workers. All these ended up in unsolved collective bargaining processes, among 
others. These kinds of protests, that opened the way for workers’ dominance 
throughout the wave of protest along with the students, mainly addressed 
collective bargaining, the policies of the protesting workers’ unions, mass firings, 
having syndical rights, etc.  
7.1.4. Political Issues 
Political crisis, instability, polarization and deadlock were important features of 
1970s in Turkey (Gunter 1989; Zürcher 2004): from 1971 to the coup in 
September 1980, Turkey was ruled by ten different governments, even though 
there were only two national elections took place in those years. In this context, it 
is not surprising to see political issues among the most frequent issues raised 
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 According to Walton and Ragin (1990: 877) “(…) a wave of austerity protest has occurred in 26 
of the approximately 80 debtor countries”. 
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during protest events (see Table 7.1). It is possible to categorize political issues 
into two: the first groups consists of protests against politicians and governments, 
such as against Ecevit, leader of the CHP, and Demirel, leader of DP, and protests 
against the Nationalist Front governments, etc. The second group, on the other 
hand, consists of ideologically led protests. As it was mentioned in Chapter 4, 
ideological politics was introduced in Turkey with the 1961 Constitution. In 1970s 
ideological debates between right and left-wing groups and within such groups 
intensified, a fact that explains the protests carried out for an independent Turkey, 
and against fascism and communism, etc.   
 As in economic issues, the significance of political issues starts to rise in 
1975, as shown in Figure 7.1. This can be explained by the political developments 
in the state following the first national elections held in 1973 after the military 
memorandum in 1971. The year 1975 also marks the year when the first 
Nationalist Front government under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel was 
formed. Significance of political issues decreases in the last two years before the 
military coup, when the conflicts within groups with different ideologies increase.  
 
7.2. Actors and Issues 
While various issues were raised throughout the wave of protest, it is clear that 
certain groups were prone to highlight some particular issues. Thus, not all issues 
were equally salient to each group. Who were the ones rising these issues? Table 
7.2 presents the shares of actors raising specific kinds of issues. It can be observed 
from the table that students were the ones who raised educational issues mostly 
(86.1 percent), and workers were the ones rising economy related issues (84.5 
percent). Parallel to the fact that students were one of the most active groups in 
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Turkey in the 1970s, most of the international issues (50 percent) and issues 
related to murders and attacks, repression and commemorations were also voiced 
by students. On the other hand, while political issues were mainly raised by elites, 
it is possible to say that almost all actors, except groups with opposed views, 
raised political issues. Another striking point is that groups with opposed views 
are not significant for any of type of issues; a fact that can be explained by the 
very nature of this group of actors since they are more into clashing than a rising 
issues and organizing protest events about it. Social issues, on the other hand, are 
mainly covered by general public who is more directly subjected to the social 
problems in its daily life.  
The ideological stance of the actors is another important point in analyzing 
the wave of protest with regard to the issues. As Table 7.3 demonstrates the 
majority of the issues whatever they are related to are raised by leftists. Only in 
educational issues and issues related to the murders or attacks targeting people, 
the share of the right-wing protesters is relatively close to the left-wing protesters.  
The higher share of right-wing groups in organizing protest events with an 
international scope is related to the fact that they are concerned more about their 
compatriots living abroad, as the Turkish minority was claimed to be under attack 
or repression in some European countries.  
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Table 7.2:  Issues according to actors of protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).  
 
 Issue Domain 
Actors Political Education Economy International Murders/Attacks Repression Commemoration Social Ungrouped 
          
Students 25.3 86.1 1.6 5.0 63.4 61.9 91.9 16.4 33.3 
Workers 22.0 .8 84.5 0 1.5 6.4 0 11.5 0 
Elites 27.5 5.5 3.6 16.7 19.4 12.7 2.7 14.8 0 
General Public 23.1 7.2 10.4 33.3 13.4 17.5 2.7 57.4 66.7 
Group with 
opposed views 
2.2 .4 0 0 2.2 1.6 2.7 0 0 
          
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 91 237 193 18 134 63 37 61 3 
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Table 7.3: Issues according to ideological stance of actors of protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %). 
 
 Issue Domain 
Ideology Political Education Economy International Murders/Attacks Repression Commemoration Social Ungrouped 
          
Leftists 71.8 64.8 94.0 8.0 61.7 86.3 98.5 48.0 25.0 
Rightists 23.4 33.3 6.0 12.0 35.3 13.7 0 24.0 75.0 
Islamists 4.8 1.9 0 8.0 3.0 0 1.5 28.0 0 
          
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 124 54 83 25 133 51 67 25 4 
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7.3. Repertoires of Actions and Issues 
We had a look at the use of repertoires of action in the previous chapter; here, we 
can have a look at the relationship between the issues and the forms of actions 
used in raising them. As Table 7.4 demonstrates, conventional (35.7 percent) and 
demonstrative (35.7 percent) forms of actions are used for political issues. On the 
other hand, for raising educational demands protestors (mainly students) mostly 
used confrontational issues (44.9 percent). Not surprisingly, strikes (53.2 percent) 
are the main instrument to raise economic issues and issues related to labor policy. 
For international issues, demonstrative (44.1 percent) forms of actions are 
preferred. In the protests organized against murders and attacks targeting people, 
for commemorations and for social demands demonstrative actions are the most 
frequently used ones with respectively 39.1 percent, 50.4 percent, and 32.6 
percent.  On the other hand, protests organized against repression employed 
conventional forms of actions most frequently, with a share of 47 percent.  
With regards to the relationship between issues and repertoire of action 
used, we should also have a look at to the issue of violence. Table 7.5 shows us 
that the majority of the events where it was possible to code the demand are 
nonviolent. The share of the violent events is highest in commemorations and 
social issues.  
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Table 7.4: Issues according to forms of actions used in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %). 
 
 Issue Domain 
Forms of Action Political Education Economy International Murders/Attacks Repression Commemoration Social Ungrouped 
          
Conventional 35.8 24.2 15.2 27.9 34.4 47.1 15.2 27.4 25.0 
Demonstrative 35.8 27.6 17.6 44.2 39.1 17.7 50.5 32.6 25.0 
Confrontational 10.4 44.9 11.9 16.3 19.0 18.5 13.3 23.2 12.5 
Strike 7.8 .8 53.3 0 1.2 3.4 0 2.1 0 
Violence 10.4 2.6 2.1 11.6 6.3 13.5 21.0 14.7 37.5 
          
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 193 265 244 43 253 119 105 95 8 
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Table 7.5: Violence, non- violence and issues rose during protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %). 
 
 Issue Domain 
Violence Political Education Economy International Murders/Attacks Repression Commemoration Social Ungrouped 
          
Non-violent 89.6 98.5 98.0 90.7 93.7 87.4 79.1 85.3 62.5 
Violent 10.4 1.5 2.1 9.3 6.3 12.6 21.0 14.7 37.5 
          
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 193 265 244 43 253 119 105 95 8 
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7.4. Conclusion 
The chapter elaborated on the issues raised during the protest events took place in 
Turkey in the 1970s. It was explained earlier that the major actor of the wave of 
protest of the 1970s in Turkey is the students. In relation to this fact, a large 
number of the protest events organized during the decade in Turkey mainly 
addressed issues related to education. By claiming their rights to take part in the 
decision making processes in the educational system, students demanded a more 
democratic education and an autonomous university. Economic policies and 
industrial relations, including the crises that became apparent in the mid-1970s, 
high costs of living and IMF practices and the rights demanded by workers that 
were handled in collective bargaining processes that usually stuck, also concerned 
people. In addition, ideology based politics, such as demanding the resignation of 
the prime minister or the government, were also among the most frequent issues 
raised by protestors. On the other hand, thanks to the increasing violence 
throughout the cycle, people also protested against these mass attacks and killings. 
One prominent example of this kind of protests is the one organized by women 
who lost their children as a result of violent encounters between opposing groups 
with the participation of around two thousand people in January 1976.  
The data presented in this chapter also revealed the dynamics and timing 
of the issues raised. Accordingly, in line with the overall development of the wave 
of protest, the frequency of all the above mentioned issues started to increase after 
1974. This is, of course, related to the economic crises erupted in that years, 
increased political conflict even among established political actors such as 
political parties thanks to the election atmosphere and the certain openings in the 
political system such as the general amnesty announced in 1974.  
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With regard to the scope of the protests, the chapter showed that their main 
concern is national rather than international. Thus, it can be stated that the social 
movements of the time failed to link their activities to their counterparts abroad. 
In addition, as Uysal (2009) claims based on the 1968 movement in Europe, the 
“field of production” (champ de production) was not “imported” to Turkey and 
thus the movements in Turkey fell short compared to their European counterparts 
in generating collective frames.  
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Part IV 
 
Dynamics of the Cycle  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
175 
 
 
 
Chapter 8 
 
Institutionalization and Radicalization 
 
Cycles of protests evolve in time and have some inherent dynamics. The current 
chapter is related to the dynamics of the wave of protest in Turkey in the 1970s 
with regards to the repertoire of action, involvement of different organizations and 
goals of action. According to the existing scholarly studies dealing with several 
waves of protest (Koopmans 1993; della Porta and Tarrow 1986; Tarrow 1989; 
McAdam 1982; Jung 2010) there are two dynamics that can be observed during, 
more specifically at the end of, a cycle of protest:  institutionalization and 
radicalization. To be more precise, a combination of institutionalization and 
radicalization is claimed to accompany the decline of a cycle or wave of protest 
(Tarrow 1989; Koopmans 1993). These processes “(…) in tandem contribute to 
the decline of the cycle, as people are either satisfied by reforms, or scared the 
streets by violence” (Koopmans, 2004: 29).  
8.1. Institutionalization 
What does institutionalization and radicalization refer to? Institutionalization, 
according to Hipsher (1998: 157), “is a process that involves a shift toward more 
standardized, nonthreatening forms of collective action that entails less 
mobilization and less disruption”. In a similar manner, Jung (2010: 29) points out 
that institutionalization refers to “to pursuing social movements’ goals more 
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through established political channels than through extraparliamentary means”. 
Rucht et al. (in Seippel, 2001: 125), on the other hand, refer to institutionalization 
as a process of “successive development and reinforcement of movement structure” 
by putting the emphasis on organizational structures. In sum, it can be claimed 
that institutionalization is related both to the repertoire of action and to 
organizational aspects.  
This study operationalizes institutionalization with regards to the actors 
and organizational aspects and goals of actions. To trace institutionalization with 
regards to these elements, it is possible to examine four variables: 1) increase in 
involvement of established allies, 2) emergence of new parties, 3) increased 
support for established reformist parties, 4) increase in membership of social 
movement organizations (Koopmans 1993, 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995).  
As “complex social entities with vague and shifting boundaries” (Rucht, 
2004: 197), social movements have various kinds of relations with other groups, 
organizations. One variety of these relationships might be alliance-building: 
“social movements as whole, or parts of them, may also form alliances with 
external groups, such as other movements, interest groups, political parties, elites, 
intellectuals, and media” (Rucht, 2004: 203). Involvement of allies is accepted as 
a significant factor that facilitates mobilization of social movements. On the other 
hand, growing involvement of external allies from the parliamentary arena and 
among trade unions can be accepted as a sign of institutionalization. As 
mentioned above, movements might find allies within the party system, as well as 
from the professional sector. Allies within the party system might be among 
“small parties as well as large established parties that adapt their positions under 
the impact of the competition by the smaller challengers” (Kriesi et al., 1995: 29). 
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It can be argued that the left-wing in Turkey found allies among trade unions and 
professional organizations as well as political parties. In this regard, it is possible 
to consider DİSK whose foundation referred “(…) to the growth of a more 
politically radical Turkish labor activism driven by an alternative set of values” 
(Mello 2010). In addition, the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and 
Architects (Türk Mühendi ve Mimar Odaları Birliği – TMMOB), which is 
considered as the pioneer of the left-wing professional organizations (Bora,  2002: 
267), for example, reported in 1977 that it held joint meetings with “forces 
organized in squatter neighborhoods, in order to strengthen democratic solidarity” 
(Annual Report in Batuman, 2008: 1939). It was not only the left-wing movement 
that found external allies: the foundation of Hak-İş in 1976 reveals the desire in 
the Islamist movement to establish allies within the labor movement, as “MSP 
wanted to disseminate its ideology among workers and actively encouraged the 
formation of Hak-Iş to act as a labour wing of the party” (Duran and Yıldırım, 
2005: 231). This was also the case for the idealist movement: they were supported 
by MISK (Landau, 1982: 252) as well as other idealist civil society organizations 
such as Ülkü-Bir, etc. (see Chapter 5). Thus, in order to assess institutionalization 
of the wave of protest in Turkey in 1970s, I will focus on the involvement of these 
organizations. Figure 8.1 provides the relevant data about the participation of 
political parties, unions and chambers/benches in Turkey in the period covered. 
As the figure shows, the involvement of external allies decreased in time. The 
involvement of political parties peaked in 1977, a fact that, as already pointed out, 
can be explained by the elections held in that year and by increasing conflicts. On 
the other hand, the trade unions’ participation peaked earlier compared to that of 
political parties, in 1975, and started to decline from that time on. Involvement of 
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chambers/benches on the other hand remained very limited compared to other 
external allies. Their involvement also peaked in 1977, when the whole cycle 
intensified before it started to decline. In sum, it is not possible to talk about 
institutionalization in Turkey in 1970s with regards to the participation of external 
allies. Accordingly, the hypothesis on the higher participation of external allies 
during heightened phases of conflict (see Chapter 2, hypothesis 4) is partially 
supported and partially disconfirmed by data. Their involvement is higher in the 
period between 1974 and 1980; however, their presence is not steady and declines 
through the end of 1970s.  
 
Figure 8.1: Involvement of external allies in protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986. 
 
 
 
As Koopmans (1993: 646) puts it “(i)nstitutionalization may also find expression 
within the party system, either in the emergence of new parties, or in increased 
support for established parties”. Over the course of a cycle of protest, social 
movements as a whole, or some participants might decide to establish a political 
party,
61
 or there might be some political entrepreneurs who are willing to collect 
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votes from different movements by establishing political parties concerned with 
similar issues. Thus, we should first have a look at the foundation of new political 
parties as conventional actors of the political arena to assess the 
institutionalization of the cycle of protest in Turkey in the 1970s. According to 
data gathered from the website of the Turkish Parliament (TBMM, n.d.), 42 
political parties were established from 1971 to 1986 in Turkey. While this might 
be considered as a large number, it should be mentioned that 22 among these 42 
were established after the transition to a normal regime from the military rule in 
1983. Detailed information about 20 political parties established from 1971 until 
the coup held in September 1980 are provided in Table 8.1.
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Eight out of the 20 political parties established in nine years from 1971 to 
1980 can be labeled as right-wing, while 11 of them can be referred to as left-
wing parties. The existence of eight political parties with overt socialist political 
orientation among the 11 left-wing political parties established in those nine years 
can be read as a sign of institutionalization with regards to the left-wing; however 
none of these parties succeeded to become a mass political party. Indeed, these 
parties did not even run in the elections
63
; thus, they did not participate in the 
elections held in 1973 and 1977. In this regard, while the formation of new 
political parties constitutes as an attempt for institutionalization
64
, the 
establishment of these political parties should rather be considered as an example 
of the fractionized landscape of the left-wing presence in Turkey.  
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 Full list of political parties established from 1971 to 1986, with their establishment years, 
political orientations, reason of dissolution, can be found as Appendix 2.  
63
 Only two of these 20 political parties run in general elections in 1973 and/or in 1977, namely 
Milli Selamet Partisi and Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi. The later was founded by the unification of 
two political parties that were also founded in the covered period, Milli Güven Partisi and 
Cumhuriyetçi Parti.  
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 An attempt that became clearer especially in 1975 when four political parties with socialist 
tendencies were founded.  
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Table 8.1: Establishment years and political orientations of the political parties 
established in Turkey, 1971-1980. 
 
Year of 
Establishment 
Name of Party Political Orientation 
1971 
Milli Güven Partisi (National 
Reliance Party) 
Center-Right 
1972 
 
Cumhuriyetçi Parti 
(Republican Party) 
Center-Right, 
Nationalist 
Milli Selamet Partisi 
(National Salvation Party) 
Political Islam 
Türkiye Ulusal Kadınlar Partisi 
(National Womens’ Party of 
Turkey) 
Feminist 
1973 
 
Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi 
(Republican Reliance Party) 
Center-Right 
Büyük Kuvvet Partisi 
(Grand Strength Party) 
- 
Türkiye Kardeşlik Partisi 
(Fraternity Party of Turkey) 
Center-Left 
1974 
Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi 
(Socialist Workers’ Party of 
Turkey) 
Socialist 
1975 
 
Vatan Partisi 
(Motherland Party) 
Socialist 
Demokrat Parti 
(Democrat Party) 
Center-Right 
Türkiye Emekçi Partisi 
(Laborer Party of Turkey) 
Socialist 
Türkiye İşçi Partisi 
(Turkish Labor Party) 
Socialist 
Sosyalist Devrim Partisi 
(Socialist Revolution Party) 
Socialist 
1977 
 
Nizam Partisi 
(Party of Order) 
Conservative 
Sosyalist Hareket Partisi 
(Socialist Movement Party) 
Socialist 
Türkiye Sosyal Adalet Partisi 
(Social Justice Party of Turkey) 
Center-Left 
1978 
Türkiye İşçi Köylü Partisi 
(Worker Peasant Party of Turkey) 
Nationalist, Socialist 
1979 
 
Sosyalist Vatan Partisi 
(Socialist Homeland Party) 
Socialist 
Hürriyetçi Millet Partisi 
(Libertarian Nation Party)  
Center-Right 
1980 
Hür Demokratlar Partisi 
(Free Democrats Party) 
Center-Right 
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13 of the remaining parties on the other hand, were closed down by the 
Constitutional Court in the trials that took place after the military coup, a fact that 
is not surprising when the long history of political party closures in Turkey is 
considered.
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Besides the foundation of new political parties, increasing support for 
established parties is considered as another feature of institutionalization with 
regards to organizations, as mentioned above. Thus, we can have a look at the 
vote shares of political parties in two general elections that were held in the 
covered period, respectively in 1973 and 1977. The relevant data was presented 
already in Chapter 4; accordingly, it is possible to observe an increase in the vote 
shares of major political parties such as the AP (from 29.8 percent in 1973 to 36.9 
percent in 1977), CHP (from 33.3 percent in 1973 to 41.4 percent in 1977), and 
MHP (from 3.4 percent in 1973 to 6.4 percent in 1977). While it is hard to talk 
about reformist parties that run in the elections in the taken period, we can also 
have a look at the vote shares of the TİP as a socialist party: the party did not even 
run in 1973 elections and had a major setback in 1977 by receiving only 0.1 
percent of the total votes. With regards to the elections, we might also have a look 
at the changes in people’s participation to elections. The participation rate 
increased from 66.8 percent in 1973 to 72.4 percent in 1977, which demonstrates 
that people did not lose their faith in elections. Given these facts, it is possible to 
claim that some aspects of the electoral system and participation in elections 
revealed dynamics of institutionalization.  
Over the course of a cycle of protest, there might be changes in the 
membership structures of social movement organizations. People might decide 
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 For a detailed analysis/observation on party closures in Turkey see Kogacioglu (2003, 2004), 
Kaynar (2007), Güney and Başkan (2008). 
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either to participate in social movement organizations or to drop membership due 
to several reasons. Increase in membership of social movement organizations, as 
well as trade unions and political parties is considered as a variable to assess 
institutionalization of a protest wave. Unfortunately, institutionalization with this 
regard was not traceable for the Turkish case, since it is not possible to get 
membership data of social movement organizations of the time, as most of them 
do not exist anymore. As for the political parties, it was only possible to get the 
relevant data for the period after 1980.
66
 It is also hard to present accurate data on 
union membership due to several reasons, including the facts that workers were 
able to become members of different unions at the time, notarization was not 
required. In addition, given the need to appear strong because of inter-union 
competition, the unions and their confederations tended to over-report their 
membership (Mello 2010; Mahiroğulları, 2001: 186). Table 8.2 demonstrates the 
increase in the number of unionized workers. The two major confederations, 
DİSK and Türk-İş also reported an upsurge in their membership: DİSK’s 
members increased from 67.000 in 1967 to around 500.000 in 1980 while Türk-
İş’s members increased from 497.587 in 1967 to 700.000 in 1976 (Mello, 2010). 
Based on these data, it is possible to argue for an institutionalization for the labor 
movement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
66
 See Tosun and Tosun (2010) for a record of party membership in Turkey after 1985.  
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Table 8.2: Number of workers in the scope of Labor Act and number of 
unionized workers in Turkey, 1960-1980. 
 
Year  Number of Workers 
in the Scope of Labor 
Act 
Numbers of 
Unionized Workers 
1960 824.881 282.967 
1961 868.954 298.000 
1962 903.817 307.000 
1963 975.570 259.710 
1964 999.569 338.769 
1965 1.082.507 360.285 
1966 1.142.912 374.058 
1967 1.336.945 834.680 
1968 1.327.215 1.057.928 
1969 1.365.936 1.193.908 
1970 1.406.100 2.088.219 
1971 1.448.108 2.362.787 
1972 1.562.580 2.672.857 
1973 1.612.579 2.658.393 
1974 1.718.551 2.878.624 
1975 1.819.456 3.328.633 
1976 1.580.000 3.269.356 
1977 1.970.000 3.807.577 
1978 2.205.056 3.897.290 
1979 2.152.411 5.465.109 
1980 2.204.807 5.721.074 
 
8.2. Radicalization 
Radicalization is mostly considered in relation to the repertoire of action. 
According to McAdam et al. (2001: 69) radicalization refers to “(…) the 
expansion of collective action frames to more extreme agendas and the adoption 
of more transgressive forms of contention”. Similarly Jung (2010: 29) claims that 
“radicalization involves shifting protest actions and claims in a violent and 
extreme direction”. Radicalization might also be related to the organizational 
dimension, as it is important to see what kinds of organizations are involved in 
more radical forms of protests. In addition, the changes in the goals of actions, if 
any, in the curse of a wave of protests should be analyzed to assess radicalization.   
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In order to trace radicalization, this study focuses on three variables: repertoire 
of action, the organizational dimension, and goals of actions/issues rose during 
protests. However, it is clear that the core of the radicalization discussion will be 
the use of violence by participants or social movement organizations involved in 
the cycle of protest.  
 Examining radicalization, we should have a look at the evolution of the 
use of different forms of actions, more precisely conventional and demonstrative 
ones. While an increase in these kinds of actions might reveal a trend towards 
institutionalization, a decrease might be accepted as a sign of radicalization. The 
number of protest events in which conventional forms of actions were used 
increased until 1977, with an exception in the period between 1972 and 1973, as 
Figure 8.2 demonstrates. The same tendency is observable also for demonstrative 
actions. 1977 is the peak point for these kinds of events and their use decrease 
continuously until 1981. The number of conventional and demonstrative protests 
from 1981 until the end of 1985, on the other hand, is insignificant. In this regard, 
it is possible to talk about radicalization, especially after 1977.  
 
Figure 8.2: Number of conventional and demonstrative protest events in Turkey, 
1971-1986. 
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Besides the evolution of use of conventional and demonstrative actions, we might 
also analyze use of different forms of violence over time, as violence is the most 
frequent form of action used in Turkey in 1970s as already explained in Chapter 6. 
This will help us to understand the nature of the violence used and see the patterns 
of radicalization. We shall have a look at the most frequent violent forms which 
were mentioned in Chapter 6, namely attacks, shootings, bombings and clashes 
and other forms of violence targeting both objects and people. As shown in Figure 
8.3, these different types of violent forms follow different patterns of evolution 
overtime. As mentioned in earlier chapters, when talking about the 1970s in 
Turkey, one should focus more on the period from 1974 to 1981. The first striking 
information that we can drive from the Figure 8.3, is that while other forms of 
violence remain low until 1976, clashes or encounters between various groups 
dominate the cycle until it peaks in 1977. Thus we can claim that their incidence 
was greatest at the peak of the cycle and decreased in the last years of the period. 
Bombings, on the other hand, are dominant among the rest of other forms of 
violence which peak in 1978. However, we can say that shootings replace clashes 
from 1978 onwards and dominate the cycle until its end. When the results of the 
violent forms are considered, it is possible to claim that the  more  bloody  and 
directed forms of violence such as shootings grew continuously up to the  end of  
the cycle, while the number of less dramatic forms of violence tended to  
decline.
67
 According to Sayarı (2010: 204), “(t)he dialectical process of mutual 
escalation was the most distinguishing characteristic of ‘anarchy’ in Turkey”. As 
he explains, “(t)he attacks and counter-attacks between the revolutionary left and 
the ultranationalist right followed a predictable pattern of escalation: The murder 
                                                     
67
 Bombings, here constitute and exemption; while they are part of the more severe violent forms, 
their use decline after 1978. 
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of a leftist terrorist – who was immediately declared a ‘martyr’ by his comrades 
and given a political funeral- triggered the revenge killing of a right-wing terrorist. 
This, in turn, prompted the rightists to respond in a similar fashion: A political 
funeral for their ‘martyr’ was followed by the assassination of a leftist militant”. 
In addition to this vicious circle fed by the counter-attacks by different groups, the 
glorification of violence by some groups (see Ağaoğulları 1987) also contributed 
to this escalation. As a result, as in the Italian protest cycle of 1960s (Della Porta 
and Tarrow 1986), violent encounters coincided in magnitude with the peak of the 
cycle, while severe violence directed at people increased as the total magnitude of 
conflict declined. 
 
Figure 8.3: Use of different forms of violence in Turkey, 1971-1986. 
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Accordingly social movement organizations without an overt tendency to use 
violence are responsible for 41.5 percent of total violent events, a share that is 
even higher than illegal organizations. Political party organizations and/or people 
with overt party affiliation, on the other hand, are accountable for almost 23 
percent of total violent events.  This fact contradicts the idea that the more 
organizations involved the less contentious the protest tactics (Piven and Cloward 
1979; Staggenborg 1988). The high share of professional SMOs and political 
parties among the actors who employed violence in Turkey can be referred to as a 
sign of radicalization during the covered period. 
 
Table 8.3: Share of different organizations in violent events in Turkey, 1971- 
1986 (in %).  
 
Type of 
Organization 
Violence  
  
Illegal 
organizations 
22.9 
Associations 8.8 
Other SMOs 41.5 
Political parties 22.9 
Unions 3.4 
Chambers/Benches .5 
  
Total 100 
N 205 
 
On the other hand, it is not surprising to see the illegal organizations category 
among the groups using violent acts intensively. How did the involvement of 
these kinds of organizations evolved through the end of the wave of protest? In 
order to analyze the dynamics of institutionalization and radicalization, we should 
also answer this question, as an increase in the involvement of these organizations 
might be a sign of radicalization, while a decrease indicates institutionalization, at 
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least to some extent. As can be seen in Figure 8.4, illegal organizations’ 
participation increased towards the end of the wave, and they were still active 
after the military coup in 1980, at least for 2-3 years following it. This may also 
serve as an indicator of radicalization over the course of the wave of protest.  
 
Figure 8.4: Number of events organized by illegal organizations in Turkey, 1971-
1986.  
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“revolutionary martyrs”. Since these demands/motivations are related to 
heightened conflict among different groups and repression, it is possible to claim 
a link with radicalization more than institutionalization.  
Besides the issues raised during all protests events, we might also have a 
look at the issues raised during violent events in order to have a clue about the 
motives lying behind these acts and the dynamics of radicalization. As mentioned 
before, most frequent forms of violence in Turkey during the covered period are 
shootings and clashes. The share of less conflictual issues such as political and 
social ones, as well as issues regarding education, economy policies and 
international issues is 47.2 percent (see Chapter 7). Employing violence even 
during protests against increasing prices, against lack of teachers, against students 
who are wearing grey wolf pins, and against the second Nationalist Front 
government who obtained a vote of confidence might be taken as proof of 
radicalization of politics in Turkey during 1970s.   
8.3. Conclusion 
Based on the data presented in this chapter, I conclude that in contrast to the 
examples from Italy, Germany, the wave of protest in Turkey in the 1970s 
revealed mainly the dynamics of radicalization; institutionalization remained very 
limited. The wave radicalized with regards to the goals of actions, organizations 
involved and more specifically with regards to the repertoire of action: heavy 
violence followed lighter violence during the wave of protest of 1970s in Turkey. 
On the other hand, the degree of institutionalization for the labor movement, 
increase of membership in labor unions and increasing vote shares of the CHP in 
1977 elections thanks to the support from the labor (Kaleağasi Blind 2007; Mello 
2010) serve as relevant signs of such a process.  
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Koopmans (2004: 29) claims that “(i)n contexts where the political system 
offers multiple channels of institutionalized access to challengers and where 
authorities react by accommodation and concessions, institutionalization will 
predominate, and radicalization may remain very limited. If, however, the regime 
offers few channels of access, responds by repression and is unwilling to reform, 
radicalization will be the dominant outcome”. This was actually the case for 
Turkey. Young people whose only access to the politics was elections, and who 
were repressed harshly by the military memorandum on March 1971 followed a 
path towards radicalization. On the other hand, it can also be argued that, 
especially with regards to left-wing movement, factionalism and discussions about 
the revolutionary methods facilitated radicalization. With regards to the right-
wing movement, far-right anti-communist and Turkist ideology and the “shield” 
that is provided by the strong alliance structure with the Nationalist Action Party 
helped the radicalization of the idealist movement, and thus contributed to the 
radicalization of the wave of protest itself.   
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Chapter 9 
 
Repression 
 
Repression is accepted as a dimension of political opportunity structure (della 
Porta 1995; Brockett 1995; McAdam 1996). Scholars of social movements 
consider repression “as a factor that should have a strong impact on the levels and 
forms of protest mobilization” no matter what their theoretical approach is 
(Koopmans, 1997: 149-50).  
During the 1970s, but not limited to this era, repression has been a part of 
the political life in Turkey. Proclaiming martial law, detainments, postponing 
strikes are only some examples of repressive practices that have become a part of 
daily routine in those years. After the military memorandum on March 1971, with 
the anti-terrorist campaign, “the security forces managed to either kill or capture 
almost the whole leadership cadres” (Sayarı, 1987: 25). Besides targeting main 
cadres of various political groups, especially of left-wing ones, the military 
repression also addressed ordinary people. Samim (1981: 74), for example, writes 
that “(i)n an attempt to control meat prices, for example, the soldiers arrested 
butchers; to restore a semblance of order they shaved hippies and closed popular 
coffee shops”. Military sourced repression showed itself, again, after the coup on 
September 12, 1980 in various ways. As Demirel (2005: 251) writes about 65.000 
people are estimated to have been detained and many have lost their lives in 
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prisons because of mistreatment and torture. In addition, it is also claimed that 
state repression, especially mistreatments and torture in prisons in Eastern 
provinces such as Diyarbakır, after the military coup are the reasons for the 
radicalization of the Kurdish movement and the dominance of PKK within the 
movement starting from the mid-1980s (Bozarslan 2014; Ergut 2014). Thus, the 
dynamics of repression are another significant variable to understand the 
emergence and development of the wave of protest of the 1970s in Turkey. 
Being probably the most frequent form of reaction to protests, repression is 
broadly defined as “(…) any action by another group which raises the contender’s 
cost of collective action” (Tilly, 1978: 100). Based on this broad definition, 
repression may take several forms varying from direct police action during protest 
events, surveillance, military suppression of protest events, restrictions of free 
speech and assembly, arrests and/or imprisonments of participants to 
“disappearance” or murders of activists. Besides the forms, the purpose of 
repression may also vary. Explaining external efforts to facilitate or damage social 
movements, Marx (1979) mentions the following purposes: creating an 
unfavorable public image, gathering information on the movement targeted, 
inhibiting supply of resources such as money, encouraging internal conflicts that 
may end in displacing leaders, causing participants to leave the cadres and 
inhibiting or sabotaging some particular actions. Based on these diverse forms and 
purposes, repression should be “considered along a continuum” (McPhail and 
McCarthy, 2005: 3).  
In this regard, it is also possible to make more precise distinctions between 
different types and sources of repression. Earl (2003; 2007), for example, makes 
three common distinctions: between overt and covert repression, between 
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coercion and channeling and between state authorities and private actors. The first 
distinction that is between overt and covert repression, is grounded on the 
visibility of repressive acts (Earl 2007). While the surveillance or 
counterintelligence activities of state authorities might refer to covert repression, 
direct police action to a protest event and arrests may serve as examples of overt 
repression. The second distinction refers to the model of repression. Accordingly, 
coercion “involves shows and/or uses of force and other forms of standard police 
and military action (e.g., intimidation and direct violence)”, while channeling 
refers to “more indirect repression, which is meant to affect the forms of protest 
available, the timing of protests, and/or flows of resources to movements” (Earl, 
2003: 48). The last distinction concerns the actors of repression: repression might 
come from state actors such as national police, military, gendarmerie, as well as 
non-state actors such as a counter-movement or individuals.  
It is possible to argue that all these types of repression existed in Turkey in 
the 1970s. Police intervention in protest events co-existed with surveillance 
activities and the activities of “contra-guerilla”. 68  On the other hand, 
imprisonments accompanied postponements of strikes as a form of channeling. 
Finally, repression by state actors was accompanied by repression perpetrated by 
countermovements, especially in the form of repression by right-wing idealists on 
the left-wing groups. Analyzing the effects of all these dimensions of repression 
on protests is beyond the limits of this study. In addition, it is also not always 
possible to trace covert repressive activities/attitudes, such as the activities of the 
secret police, and repression coming from countermovements. Thus, the current 
study deals systematically only with overt repression, coming from state actors 
                                                     
68
 According to Zürcher (2004: 259), “contra-guerilla, an underground organization of rightist 
civilians who were paid and armed by the army” played an important role in the suppression of the 
left in Turkey. 
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and/or countermovements. On the other hand, both models of repression, namely 
coercion and channeling, are covered. Thus, considering repression along a 
continuum, as mentioned above, this study covers a range of repressive actions. 
Repressive actions targeting objects, protest actions and people are along the 
continuum, including banning newspapers, closing schools for a certain time 
period, imposing curfew, police search in political party or association buildings, 
taking city entrances under control, detaining, opening investigation against 
people, using tear and smoke gases, lock-outs, armed attacks targeting protestors, 
torture, etc. 
 As mentioned above, several forms of repression coming from different 
sources existed in Turkey during the period covered in this study. How did this 
repression evolve? One should answer this question before proceeding with a 
more complex analysis of different forms of repression. According to the data 
gathered from newspaper review, repression is detected in around 28.5 percent of 
total protest events (n=1524). Figure 9.1 shows the evolution of repression in 
Turkey in 1970 through the numbers of repressed protest events. According to the 
figure, the number of the repressed events starts to increase by 1974, peaks in 
1978 (the value is very close to the one in 1977) and then starts to decrease. It is 
important to mention that the curve of the repressed events is quite similar to the 
overall development of the wave of protest itself and the other curves that were 
represented in previous chapters.  
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Figure 9.1: Numbers of repressed protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986. 
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on the impact of repression on mobilization, the inverted U-curve model has been 
developed (Gurr 1969; DeNardo 1985; Muller 1985; Weede 1987). The inverted 
U-curve model suggests that “when repression is low, mobilization is also low 
because the availability of institutional channels for claims making alleviates the 
need for extrainstitutional protest” (Johnston and Mueller, 2001: 353). As 
repression reaches moderate levels, protest should be stimulated as people would 
consider state actions as unjust. “Only beyond a certain - theoretically 
undetermined - level of repression does the deterrent effect of repression begin to 
get the upper hand” (Koopmans, 1997: 151). In other words, “(t)he hypothesis of 
an inverted-U relationship implies that any state progressing from low or high 
coercion to midrange coercion would confront a substantial rise in protest” 
(Francisco, 1995: 265).  
 Combining these models, Neidhart (in Koopmans 1997) produces a “lying 
S-curve” model. According to this model, repression, on the first hand, decreases 
mobilization. However, if repression crosses the “line of proportionality”, 
mobilization increases. This line refers to the “normative boundary demarcating 
the difference between legitimate and illegitimate repression” (Johnston and 
Mueller, 2001: 354). However, when repression reaches a threshold, the costs 
caused by repression are too high; a point after which mobilization declines. This 
model proposed by Neidhart (in Koopmans 1997) is contradicted by Francisco 
(1995). Based on the cases where harsh repression increases mobilization, he 
claims that “the inverted-U curve might yield another rise in protest at the high 
end of coercion”, and arrives at the conclusion that “the relationship between 
protest and coercion may be nonlinear” (Francisco, 1995: 265). 
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 Given this lack of consensus on the impacts of repression on mobilization, 
I will try not to make general assumptions, but to describe the relationship 
between repression and mobilization in Turkey during the covered time period. In 
this regard, the data on Turkey shows us that the relationship between repression 
and the numbers of protest events is positive and strong, as the correlation 
coefficient is 0.89.  This means that as repression increases so does the number of 
protest events, and vice-versa.  
9.1. Repressive Acts 
As mentioned above, repression might take several forms. What kinds of 
repression were present in Turkey in the 1970s? In the following I will try to 
answer this question by also focusing on the sources of repression.  
The data on the forms of repression is presented in Table 9.1. Accordingly, 
the major form of overt repression in Turkey in the 1970s has been taking people 
under custody either during or after protest events. Thus, the main model of 
repression is coercion. Repressive actions might also target a protest event directly, 
i.e. in the form of delaying it or not allowing it at all. This form of repression is 
coded as “against events”. Repression targeting protest events, mainly in the 
forms of channeling, follow the act of custody with a share of 16.5 percent. 
Postponing strikes, for example, can be considered in this category. The Law on 
Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lock-outs (Act No. 275), accepted in 1963, 
allow the governments to postpone any strike or lockout for sixty days if it is 
deemed to endanger national security and public health (Çelik, 2008: 101). In this 
regard, from December 1963 to September 1980, 252 strikes were postponed due 
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to reasons of national security and public health (Topalhan, 1999: 30; Çelik, 2008: 
105).
69
 
 
Table 9.1: Types of repression used in Turkey, 1971-1986.  
 
Types of 
Repression 
Freq. Percent 
   
Custody 918 61.2 
Against 
events 
248 16.5 
Ungrouped 185 12.3 
Arrest 83 5.5 
Investigation 66 4.4 
   
Total 1.500 100 
 
Investigations, arrests and judicial cases opened against movement organizations 
have also been a means for political repression, especially after the military 
memorandum on March 1971, as Table 9.1 shows. Harris (2011: 206) mentioned 
that the series of non-partisan governments that ruled the country in the early 
1970s started a wave of arrests that even targeted people who had no direct 
involvement in violent events. The establishment of State Security Courts also 
coincides with this period. As a result of a change in the 1961 Constitution made 
in 1973, these courts were designed for cases deemed threatening to the security 
of state
70
 and played important political roles as they dealt with crimes covered in 
99 articles of the Penal Code and infringements of laws related to demonstrations, 
                                                     
69
 To be more precise, 143 strikes were postponed due to national security, 43 were postponed 
based on the reasons related to public health and 55 were postponed for both national security and 
public health (Topalhan, 1999: 30). However, since the concepts of “national security” and “public 
health” were not described in the constitution in detail, they were interpreted very broadly and 
caused controversial decisions on postponement of strikes (Çelik 2008); a fact that can be accepted 
as a feature of repressive state.  
70
 Here, it is important to make a reference to “meta-ideology of national security” in Turkey, 
which refers to the overall  importance of national security justifies interventions by the security 
services and the  judiciary in the areas of political parties, social activities, the distribution of 
information, the  media, education, and so on” (Dorronsoro in Casier 2010).  
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strikes, lock-outs and organizations (Hale, 1977: 187).
71
 This explains the fact that 
the workers mobilized against the DGMs, as explained in Chapter 5. It is possible 
to group the political juridical cases opened after the memorandum into two types: 
the first group consists of cases against workers, youth, and teachers. 
organizations and associations which are founded according to the law and 
operate in line with their bylaws such as DİSK, Dev-Genç, Teachers Union of 
Turkey (Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası – TÖS), while the second group involves 
cases against party and guerilla organizations that mainly adopted armed struggle 
as a strategy such as THKPC, THKO, etc. (Özdemir, 2002: 266-67). The judicial 
cases, of course, were also mobilized after the military coup in 1980: as Jacoby 
(2003: 678) wrote “by September 1981, 167 mass trials were underway, of which 
the majority focused on ‘left-wing’ allegations”. 
Declaration of martial law in some cities, or in the countryside is another 
form of repression. After the military memorandum on March 1971, martial law 
was declared in 11 provinces (namely İstanbul, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Zonguldak, 
İzmir, Eskişehir, Ankara, Adana, Hatay, Diyarbakır and Siirt) and lasted until 
September 1973. This martial law in practice, as Karabelias (1999:144) argues, 
“permitted the local commanders to concentrate the judicial, legislative and 
executive powers in their own hands”. It was not only the local commanders that 
gained power with this practice, but also the right-wing movement as the militant 
cadres of MHP were “instrumental in establishing martial law and undertaking 
operations in which large numbers of socialists were arrested, silenced or killed” 
(Jacoby, 2003: 675). Later, in 1978, martial law was declared again in 13 
provinces on the basis of increasing violence. The execution of martial law was 
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 DGMs functioned until 1976, when the Constitutional Court annulled the law creating the courts. 
However, the DGM system was restored again after the military coup in 1980, in 1982.  
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then extended to include 22 provinces in total (namely Adana, Ankara, Bingöl, 
Elazığ, Erzincan, Erzurum, Gaziantep, İstanbul, Kahramanmaraş, Kars, Malatya, 
Sivas, Urfa, Adıyaman, Hakkari, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli, İzmir, Hatay 
and Ağrı) and prolonged ten times until the military coup in 1980. Repression 
through the implementation of martial law became harsher after the coup in 1980, 
as it was declared in every province in the whole country and was only repealed 
completely in 1987.  
 With regard to the source of repression, as shown in Table 9.2 below, 
security forces, including the police and the gendarmerie,
72
 are the main actors 
with a share of 81 percent. Given the role of countermovements in Turkey in the 
1970s, this might be considered as a surprising fact. However, it should be kept in 
mind that especially from the mid-1970s, thanks to its role in the Nationalist Front 
governments, security forces in Turkey were heavily under control of the far-right 
Nationalist Action Party, whose unofficial youth organization Grey Wolves 
constituted the countermovement of the left-wing student movement in Turkey. In 
addition, it should also be considered that detecting and reporting the repressive 
activities of security forces might be far easier than the activities of 
countermovements. On the other hand, the high share of security forces in 
repressive acts might be explained by the changes in the Law on Duties and the 
Authority of Police (Law No. 2559) made respectively in 1965, 1973 and 1980. 
According to Gönen et. al. (2014: 20), these changes made in the Law expanded 
the police department and increased its authority, for example, by providing the 
police with the right to enter universities which have been one of most frequent 
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 Gendarmerie in Turkey is a part of the armed forces with the responsibility for policing in rural 
areas. “The gendarmerie takes care of law enforcement, conducts criminal investigations, controls 
traffic within their areas of responsibility” (Mutlu, 2000: 384). While the branch is connected to 
the Chief of Staff with regards to training and education, it is directly related to the Ministry of 
National Defense on issues of security and order (Satana, 2007: 13).  
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scenes of protests with students being the major actors of the cycle of protest. 
Besides, the onsite intervention in the protest events and police surveillance 
strategies took other forms, too. According to Uysal (2007: 381), these strategies 
that have a long history in Turkey included the suspension of activist knowledge, 
illegitimating protest events by pejoratively labeling the protesters as separatists, 
provocateurs, etc., unpredictability of risks and penalties and polarizing the 
protesting groups.
73
  
 
Table 9.2: Sources of repression in Turkey, 1971-1986.  
 
Source of 
Repression 
Freq. Percent 
   
Security forces 1.226 81.3 
Other 283 18.8 
   
Total 1.509 100 
 
9.2. Repression, Actors and Goals 
As mentioned above, around 28 percent of protest events in Turkey between 1971 
and 1986 were repressed. It was discussed in Chapter 2 that use of repression 
might vary according to the organizing or participating actors of a protest event. 
In this regard, it is significant to differentiate the groups who were subjected to 
repression. Table 9.3 presents the relevant data on the target groups of repressive 
acts. Accordingly, students, who “(…) were reconstructed in public discourse as a 
“threat” to the national interest” (Neyzi, 2001: 419), are the ones who suffered 
most from repression, as 67.8 percent of the total number of repressed events were 
                                                     
73
 For a more detailed account of policing, with a special focus on the organization of riot policing, 
in Turkey see Uysal (2010).  
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carried out by them. Students were also the main actors of the cycle of protest as 
explained in Chapter 5.   
 
Table 9.3: Targets of repression in Turkey, 1971-1986.  
 
Actors  (in %) 
  
Students 67.8 
Groups with 
opposed views 
16.7 
Workers 6.8 
General public 6.5 
Terrorists 2.0 
Elites .3 
  
Total 100 
N 976 
 
In order to understand the dynamics of repression with regards to the actors of the 
cycle, we might also have a look at the repression that targeted organizations. In 
this regard, according to the data presented in Table 9.4, social movement 
organizations that are not directly involved in violent attacks or illegal activities 
are the ones that are repressed more than any other type of organization. 
Associations and political parties are following these social movement 
organizations. Repression of organizations operating in the formal political arena 
and whose activities are limited and controlled by law, such as the associations 
and political parties, is a significant sign of the repressive character of state in 
Turkey. This fact clearly demonstrates that even the formal and conventional 
political organizations can be subjected to repression in various forms.  
 
 
 
 
 
203 
 
Table 9.4: Targets of repression with regards to organizations in Turkey, 1971-
1986.  
 
Organization (in %) 
  
Other SMOs 26.0 
Associations 23.7 
Political parties 23.7 
Unions 13.3 
Illegal 
organizations 
12.7 
Chambers/benches .6 
  
Total 100 
N 173 
 
With regard to the relationship between repression and actors, one should also 
analyze the role of ideological orientations of the protestors. Table 9.5 presents 
relevant data on the share of the leftists, rightists, Islamists and Kurdish groups’ 
events that are repressed. According to the table, the share of right-wing protest 
events that is repressed is higher than the left-wing. However, the share is highes 
in Kurdish groups, a fact that can be explained by the fact that the state in Turkey 
has been repressive towards the Kurds since its foundation. On the other hand, 
given the fact that the Kurdish movement, at first, was part of the left-wing 
movement in Turkey, as explained already in Chapter 5, and that it has located 
itself in the left-wing ideology, it can be claimed that share of repressed events of 
the left-wing is higher than the right-wing. 
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Table 9.5: Share of events repressed according to ideological orientation in 
Turkey, 1971-1985 (in %). 
 
 Ideological Orientation of Groups 
Repression Leftists Rightists Islamists Kurdish Groups 
     
Not repressed 66.5 63.1 87.2 61.9 
Repressed 33.5 36.9 12.8 38.1 
     
Total 100 100 100 100 
N 635 382 39 21 
 
As discussed in the relevant literature, state repression, even in liberal 
democracies, targets some groups more harshly than others (Moss 2014). Combes 
and Fillieule (2011: 7), for example, write that the “(…) policing styles remain 
selective and dependent on several factors, starting with the perception of 
marginalized groups by the authorities”. Left oriented social movements in 
Turkey are a case in point. Zürcher (2004: 259), for example, writes that the 
martial law declared after the military memorandum in March 1971 was used “(…) 
to institute a veritable witch-hunt against anyone with leftist or even progressive 
liberal sympathies”. The situation got worse after the formation of the first 
Nationalist Front government in 1975, as the nationalists gained power in the 
bureaucracy; a fact that acquired state protection for the Grey Wolves (Samim, 
1981: 75). In this regard, it can be hypothesized that the security forces’ 
repressive activities would target left-wing groups more (see Chapter 2, 
hypothesis 2). Also the anti-terror campaign which started after the coup in 
September 1980 was “biased against the left” (Zürcher, 2004: 279). The data 
presented in Table 9.6 supports the hypothesis as around 58 percent of events 
where the security forces were the source of repression targeted left-wing 
militants.  
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Table 9.6: Sources of repression according to ideology in Turkey, 1971-1986 
(in %).  
 
Ideology of 
Actors 
Source of Repression 
 Security 
Forces 
Other 
Leftists 58.1 54.7 
Rightists 37.7 43.8 
Islamists 1.4 1.6 
Kurdish groups 2.8 0.0 
   
Total 100 100 
N 289 64 
 
How is repression related to the goals of actions? The data presented in Table 9.7 
shows that among different goals of protests, commemoration events are the ones 
that have the highest share of repression, as 43.8 percent of such events were 
repressed. In addition, around 26 percent of protest events organized against 
repression are also repressed. Thus, it can be claimed that protests organized as a 
result of violence and repression were also met with repression like in a vicious 
circle. Protest events having an educational goal, meaning protests demanding 
amelioration, change on education issues, are also repressed with a share of about 
24 percent. The same is true for the protests that have a direct and overt political 
goal; around 23 percent of such events are repressed. This indicates that 
repression, in one way or another, became a part of daily routine of student life, 
when even a protest event related to any aspect of educational and political life 
risks to be repressed. This contradicts the general expectation that “activists with 
radical goals and strategies are more likely to be subjected to repression, whereas 
moderate wings are more likely to receive facilitation” (Koopmans, 1993: 645).  
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Table 9.7: Goals of repressed protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %). 
 
 Goal of Action 
Repression Political Education Economy/Labor 
Policies 
International Murders/Attacks Repression Commemoration Social Ungrouped 
          
Not 
repressed 
76.7 75.9 82.8 79.1 77.9 74.0 56.2 76.8 75.0 
Repressed 23.3 24.1 17.2 20.9 22.1 26.1 43.8 23.2 25.0 
          
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 193 266 244 43 253 119 105 95 8 
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9.3. Repression and Repertoires of Action 
Constituting a part of the political opportunity structure, repression also has an 
impact on the forms of actions used by social movements. However, this 
relationship is complex: on the one hand it can be inferred that high levels of 
repression will moderate the repertoire of action due to high costs, on the other 
hand it might escalate tension and thus radicalize the repertoire of action 
especially in the case of countercultural movements (Kriesi et. al. 1995: 39).  
To start with, it can be claimed that more moderate forms of actions would 
meet less repression. This expectation is not met in the Turkish case, as seen in 
Table 9.8. Around 40 percent of demonstrative events are repressed. Also, around 
24 percent of conventional forms of actions are met with repression. However, it 
is also observable that 30 percent of confrontational protests and 28 percent of 
violent events were subjected to repression. In this regard, it is possible to claim 
that repression in Turkey did not focus on particular forms of actions, but it 
targeted protest events in general regardless of the forms of actions used.  
On the other hand, the data showed us that there is a positive correlation 
with the use of repression and number of violent protest events, as the correlation 
coefficient is 0.81. This strong relationship infers that when use of repression 
increases so does the use of violent forms of actions.  
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Table 9.8: Repression according to the forms of actions used in Turkey, 1971-
1986 (in %).  
 
 Forms of Action 
Repression Conventional Demonstrative Confrontational Strike Violence 
      
Not 
repressed 
76.3 60.3 70.1 86.0 72.0 
Repressed 23.7 39.7 29.9 14.0 28.1 
      
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
N 448 468 448 171 3.825 
 
What is the relationship between different forms of repression and forms of 
actions? Table 9.9 presents data on the types of repression according to 
conventional, demonstrative, confrontational forms of actions, as well as strikes 
and violent events. In this regard, custody has been the major type of repression 
for those actions which were repressed. It is mentioned before that the vast 
majority of repression is functioned by the security forces. In this case, it is not 
surprising to see custody as the major form of repression for these diverse forms 
of actions, as custody can only be employed by security forces. On the other hand, 
it is clear that demonstrative and confrontational protest events and the violent 
ones are tried to be channeled by banning, postponing events and emptying school 
buildings, etc. 
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Table 9.9: Types of repression according to the forms of protests in Turkey, 
1971-1986 (in %). 
 
 Forms of Actions 
Type of 
repression 
Conventional Demonstrative Confrontational Strike Violence 
      
Against 
events 
7.6 19.0 26.5 8.0 15.9 
Custody 43.8 44.0 47.0 36.0 68.4 
Arrest 6.7 4.9 2.3 8.0 5.9 
Investigation 0.0 0.0 3.0 4.0 5.8 
Ungrouped 41.9 32.1 21.2 44.0 4.1 
      
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
N 105 184 132 25 1.053 
 
Who was in charge of repression of protest events in which different forms of 
actions were employed? According to the data presented in Table 9.10, except for 
the strikes, security forces, including policemen and gendarmerie, are the main 
source of repression for each form of action. The reason lying behind the 
exceptional case for strikes is coming from the nature of industrial relations: main 
source of repression for the workers’ strikes are employers with their repressive 
means including lock-outs, etc.    
 
Table 9.10: Sources of repression according to different forms of protests in 
Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %). 
 
 Forms of Actions 
Source  
of 
repression 
Conventional Demonstrative Confrontational Strike Violence 
      
Security 
forces 
 
75.3 
 
81.9 71.2 48.0  83.8 
 
Other 24.7 18.1 28.8 52.0 16.2 
 
      
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
N 97 182 132 25 1.072 
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The data presented here is on repression during the cycle. On the other hand, 
repression was also present before and after the cycle, i.e. between 1971 and 1973 
and after 1980 as a result of the military (interim) regimes established after 
military interventions. This massive repression that took various forms including 
mass arrests, declaration of curfew, dismissals, party closures, torture, death 
penalties, had a clear effect on social movement mobilization in Turkey and the 
number of protests organized as already shown in Figures 2.1 and 5.1. Thus, it can 
be claimed that this mass and multi-layered repression of the military regimes that 
took various forms was capable of doing away with any form of protest. While 
repression also existed during the cycle, it was not capable of ending the protests 
as it was done by the military regimes. It was the opening up of the system, such 
as the amnesty announced in 1974, that led to the number of protests increase. 
However, it was observed that the cycle that flourished after 1974 was violent 
from the start and showed only weak signs of institutionalization. This can be 
partly explained by the fact that the system did not open up widely enough to lead 
more established and conventional mobilization. Thus, it can be claimed that it’s 
the partial opening of the system that contributed to the emergence of mass 
violence, as predicted by the inverted U-curve model. The system provided 
human resource to the social movements as the main cadres of both the left and 
right-wing movements were released after the general amnesty announced by the 
efforts of the center left CHP and Islamist MSP. However, it did not provide 
access to formal politics and decision making processes. The only way to 
participate in politics was seen as voting in elections. Thus, the system did not 
provide wide opportunities to the movements, which had their human resources 
back, to institutionalize and the amnesty, which was actually an election campaign 
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promise before the 1973 general elections, was a partial opening with regards to 
the movements that. On the other hand, repression in prisons during the period 
between the military memorandum and the amnesty led to more radicalization 
among the youth. It is widely accepted that it was the mistreatments towards the 
Kurdish youth contributed to formation of the PKK in the coming years.  
9.4. Conclusion 
The chapter elaborated on the dynamics of repression of the cycle of protest in 
Turkey in the 1970s. According to the data presented in this chapter, it can be 
claimed that the majority of events were not repressed, at least not overtly.  
However, around 25-30 percent of all forms of protest events were repressed. This 
showed us that repression along with violence became a part of the political life in 
Turkey in the 1970s, regardless of forms of actions used.  
Despite the fact that the increasing militancy of left-wing youth created a 
strong countermovement, a vast majority of repression was carried out by the state 
apparatus via security forces including the police and the gendarmerie. This fact is 
explained by the fact that during the Nationalist Front governments, the MHP and 
other right-wing parties managed to “to colonise the state by placing their 
supporters in various ministries” (Ahmad, 2008: 252).  
 The chapter also revealed that repression mainly targeted students with 
left-leaning ideological positions. While the right-wing was also subjected to 
repression, considering the Kurdish groups and the left-wing, it can be claimed 
that it was not wide as the repression of the left.  
With regards to the forms of actions, while all types of events were 
repressed as mentioned above, the share of repressed events was higher in 
demonstrative actions which are accepted to the be least challenging ones among 
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other unconventional forms of actions. Repression of violent events came only the 
second after demonstrative ones. On the other hand, the empirical data showed 
that there is a strong positive relationship between repression and the numbers of 
protests events and use of violence.  
Finally, considering the repression during the military regimes, not during 
the cycle, it is claimed in the chapter that the partial opening of the system, i.e. the 
amnesty announced in 1974, contributed to increasing violence after transition to 
a normal regime as is was predicted by the inverted U-curve model.  
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Chapter 10 
 
Conclusion 
 
Considered as a chaotic period, the 1970s in Turkey have long been disregarded 
politically as well as academically. Those years are usually referred to by 
politician when talking about social movements and collective actions. Burhan 
Kuzu, a founding member of the ruling Justice and Development Party and head 
of the Constitutional Committee of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, pointed 
out in 2012 that people involved in contemporary street movements are after a 
chaotic environment, making a reference to pre-1980 period. He also added that 
under their rule the military went back to its barracks, the judiciary is normalized 
and now it’s the turn for the “streets” to be emptied (Radikal, 24.12.2012). “Are 
you aiming at going back to the pre-1980 period?” is a question that is still asked 
after almost every attempt of resurgence in social opposition, as also mentioned 
by Yaşlı (2013).  
 This study aimed at showing that the 1970s were more than a chaotic 
period and a dark era that should be disregarded. We should keep in mind three 
significant developments with regard to the social movements sector in Turkey: 
First, those years have been the years of politization of the youth in Turkey. 
Thanks to the basic rights provided by the 1960 Constitution, a growing interest in 
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politics flourished among the university youth as well as high-school students. As 
empirically shown in this study, students were on the streets especially from 1974 
onwards to make some claims and react to some socio-economic and political 
developments. While their major concerns were related to the education system 
and its democratization, they also engaged in directly politically oriented protests 
such as the ones organized against the governments of the time and economically 
led protests including the ones against increasing prices.  
The crystallization of a class perspective is another significant feature of 
those years in Turkey. This is an important fact given the “classless” 
understanding of Turkish society by the founders of the republic. With the 1970s, 
the labor movement raised consciousness with regard to their class interest and, 
supported by several laws guarenteering labor rights, started to get organized 
politically. The strike that lasted for two days on June 15-16, 1970 constitutes one 
of the milestones of the labor movement and is often compared to the TEKEL 
resistance that took place in 2010 in Ankara and elsewhere.  
Finally, as shown empirically in this study, widespread and extensive use 
of violence marked those years. Inspired by several international models i.e. 
Soviet and Chinese models and Latin American guerilla movements, some of the 
left-wing organizations adopted violent tactics as a means for a socialist 
revolution. Their lack of access to the formal political structures, the defeat of the 
Labor Party and the military interventions in 1971 and 1980 and state repression 
preceding and following these interventions might be listed as causes in addition 
to the ideological bases of violence. On the other hand, some other groups 
resorted to violence as a way of self-defense against the increasing militancy of 
the right-wing.  
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One of the main arguments of this study is the need to consider the 1970s 
as a cycle of protest. Increasing militancy of students that diffused to other groups, 
use of various forms of actions and the dynamics of protests, heightened phases of 
conflict and diverse forms of interactions between the state and social movements 
that are explained in detail in the individual chapters are among the features of 
those years that help us to label the period as a cycle. Figure 2.1 and Figure 5.1 
documented the start and termination of the cycle very clearly. Considering the 
period as a cycle of protest, and analyzing it accordingly would contribute to the 
“normalization” of perception of street protests and collective action in Turkey.  
If it is possible to consider the mobilization in the 1970s as a cycle of 
protest, then we should also consider its development and ebb and flows. 
Departing from the political process approach and the concepts central to it, this 
study argued that changes in the political opportunity structure shaped the overall 
development of the cycle of protest. In this regard, the defeat of the TİP in 1969, 
the military intervention in the form of a memorandum in March 1971, the general 
amnesty announced in 1974 and the formation of National Front governments as 
well as the military coup in September 1980 can be listed as milestones for the 
social movement activity within the covered period. The clear-cut impacts of 
these developments on the level of mobilization in Turkey in 1970s are clearly 
shown in Figure 2.1 and Figure 5.1. As we have seen, there were some protest 
events in the period between 1971 and 1973, however they remained insignificant. 
The repressive character of the military regime established in March 1971 that 
operated through bans on some political parties and organizations, declaration of 
martial law and the following mass investigations and imprisonments is 
responsible for this low level of mobilization. The same is true for the period after 
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the military coup in September 1980: harsh repression and imprisonments of the 
main cadres of major movements and organizations contributed to the loss of 
human sources of these movements and thus emptying the streets. On the other 
hand, the period from 1974 until the military coup marks a phase of heightened 
conflict that involved different groups and use of various forms of actions. Again, 
it can be claimed that the changes in the political opportunity structures shaped 
mobilization of social movements in those years. Changes in the configuration of 
power, unexpected coalitions with the center left CHP and Islamist MSP which 
led to the general amnesty announced in 1974, the formation of National Front 
governments in the late 1970s, economic crises, and restructuring of economy 
with the 24 January Decisions, are some of the developments that marked this 
period and that modified the political opportunity structure significantly, with 
important implications for the mobilization of protestors.   
Each cycle of protests has its own components that vary according to the 
context and timing of the cycle. In this regard, in order to be able to reconstruct 
the cycle in Turkey in the 1970s, this study focused on three components, namely 
the actors, repertoires of actions used and the issues raised during protests. The 
empirical analysis of the actors of the protests in Turkey that took place between 
1971 and 1986 shows that students, who were also the early risers, led the protest 
events. Politicization of students that started in the mid-1960s, supported by the 
rights provided by the 1961 Constitution and several other developments 
explained in this study, ended up in radicalization caused by a combination of 
their lack of access to formal politics, increasing factionalism, and reactions and 
attacks by opposing groups. In this regard, the right-wing idealist youth that 
positioned itself next to the state apparatus with the aim of protecting it against the 
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“threat of communism” flourished as a countermovement, especially under the 
protection of its allies especially within the Nationalist Front governments. Thus, 
it is not surprising to see a similar pattern in the mobilization of these groups. The 
labor movement, on the other hand, accompanied students and mobilized for their 
socio-economic rights. This was possible thanks to the rights provided by several 
laws including the 1961 Constitution including the right to establish unions, and 
the right to bargain collectively and to strike. In addition, the Trade Union Law of 
1963 provided freedom of organization to workers and employers. However, 
while seeing the struggle in both political and economic terms, the data showed us 
that the workers were mainly concerned about their collective rights with regards 
to the industrial relations.  
Actors of a cycle of protest are not solely composed of social groups, but 
also by several organizations. In this regard, the empirical data showed that in line 
with the increasing labor militancy, the unions emerged as the dominant 
organizations within the first years of the period covered. In the late 1970s, their 
role was replaced by associations mainly in the forms of university student 
associations that played a leading role for student mobilization. Professional 
organizations such as TMMOB, on the other hand, emerged as the external allies 
of social movements in Turkey in those years. However, increasing militancy and 
the use of violence led to the dominance of illegal organizations in the years 
preceding and following the 1980 military coup. The military intervention and the 
repressive strategies of the regime closed the door for “legal” organizations. The 
legacy of the coup in 1980 is significant in this regard: it created a rupture with 
regard to the organizations, as a vast majority of the organizations, including 
political parties, active in 1970s do not currently exist in Turkish political life.   
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Repertoires of actions constitute the second one of the main characteristics 
of cycles of protests and distinguishing features of social movements. One of the 
differentiating features of the 1970s in Turkey has been the use of extensive 
violence; a fact that can be explained based on several dimensions including 
culture, socio-economic developments of the period, ideologies that are dominant, 
alliance structures, factionalism and repression coming from both the state and 
third parties. Besides the high share of violence, this study also showed that cycle 
has been violent since the start. This is a striking fact considering other cycles of 
protest in those years in some European states, such as Italy and Germany, where 
the cycle radicalizes towards its end and where violence was the outcome of the 
cycle, not an important component of it. The majority of the rest of the protest 
events were unconventional too: class boycotts, leaving black wreaths in front of 
party buildings or central squares in cities, demonstrations, forums should be 
considered in this respect. Only around 8 percent of the total numbers of protest 
events were conventional, thus the vast majority of the protests were 
unconventional; a fact that reveals the innovative dynamic of the actors. Instead of 
dealing with more conventional forms of actions such as press releases, 
participants of social movements of the 1970s in Turkey preferred employing 
more radical forms of actions. The data also clearly demonstrated that the actors 
did not employ political and judicial forms of actions, a fact that serves as an 
indicator of distrust in formal politics.  
Finally, this study dealt with the issues raised by several actors during the 
protests. However, it was possible to detect the goal of action in only around 25 
percent of the events. Based on the data, I showed empirically that the struggle 
was mainly educational and industrial. While students were concerned about 
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educational issues, the labor movement was concerned about the economy and 
labor policies. At the beginning of the 1970s, when the streets were filled with the 
labor movement, as the student movement was crushed by the military 
intervention, economic issues were relatively significant. Following economic 
issues and labor policies, issues regarding education system mainly raised by 
students took the scene in the mid-1970s when the student movement regained its 
momentum. Towards the end of the 1970s, the number of protests against murders 
and attacks became more significant as a result of increasing violence, and 
decrease in protests related to political and educational issues. In this regard, it 
can be argued that the social movements of the 1970s in Turkey failed to generate 
a master frame for their events, and the concerns of new social movements 
emerged in Europe in the same years did not resonate in Turkey.  
As mentioned above, this study is not aimed at analyzing the emergence or 
development of several social movements in Turkey in the 1970s. Rather it aimed 
at demonstrating the characteristics of the period that help us to consider it as a 
cycle of protest. Once showing this, the next step was to analyze the dynamics of 
this cycle and the way it evolved. In this regard, this study focused on two 
dynamics. First, based on the general expectation of institutionalization and 
radicalization as two hand to hand processes towards the end of the cycle, I 
empirically analyzed the existence of these processes in Turkey in 1970s. For this 
purpose, I focused on the increase in the involvement of external allies, 
emergence of new parties, increased support for parties in favor of reform, and 
increase in the membership of social movement organizations. The data showed 
that the involvement of external allies decreased in time. In addition, while there 
were 20 political parties founded between 1971 and 1980, none of these became 
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mass parties. Thus, it would be appropriate to accept this fact as an indicator of 
factionalism in Turkey rather than an attempt towards institutionalization. With 
regards to the increase in the vote shares of reform parties, it is possible to observe 
and increase in the votes of center-left CHP, while the share of TİP decreased. 
Finally, membership data of social movement organizations is very limited. 
However, an increase in the membership of labor unions is observable. In this 
regard, it is only possible to speak about a limited attempt towards 
institutionalization in Turkey in 1970s.  
Radicalization, on the other hand, is discussed with regard to the evolution 
of the use of different forms of actions, more precisely conventional and 
demonstrative forms, and use of different forms of violence, involvement of 
organizations in the use of violence and the development of issues rose during 
protest events. The data showed that the number of conventional and 
demonstrative actions increased until 1977, but decreased from that time on. On 
the other hand, considering the use of different forms of violence, it can be 
claimed that the more bloody and direct forms of violence such as shootings grew 
continuously up to the end of the cycle, while the number of less dramatic forms 
of violence tended to decline. With regard to the involvement of organizations in 
violent events, in the Turkish case, contradicting the idea that the more 
organizations involved the less contentious the protest tactics (Piven and Cloward 
1979; Staggenborg 1988), political parties and social movements organizations 
without an overt tendency to do so also employed violence. The number of 
protests targeting the repression coming from adversaries and aiming at 
commemorating the death of militant or “revolutionary martyrs”, on the other 
hand, increased throughout the end of the cycle. Based on these empirical results, 
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the wave of protest in Turkey in the 1970s, in contrast to the examples from Italy, 
Germany, revealed mostly the dynamics of radicalization, while 
institutionalization is limited to the labor movement with regard to the increase in 
members of labor unions. Lack of channels of institutionalized access, 
factionalism and discussions about the revolutionary methods within the left-wing 
movement and strong alliance provided to the right-wing movement especially 
during the Nationalist Front governments facilitated radicalization.  
Secondly, repression, as a dimension of political opportunity structure, is 
considered. Based on Earl’s (2003; 2007) distinction I focused on overt repression, 
coming from state actors and/or countermovements, in the forms of both coercion 
and channeling. The empirical data on repression of protest events showed us that 
state as well as countermovements employed various forms of repressive acts 
including banning newspapers, closing schools for a certain time period, imposing 
curfew, police search in political party or association buildings, taking city 
entrances under control, detaining, opening investigation against people, using 
tear and smoke gases, lock-outs, armed attacks targeting protestors, torture, etc. 
However, the major form of repression was taking people under custody, 
especially during on site interventions to protest events. Thus the main strategy of 
the state towards social movements and protests was coercion, rathen than 
channeling. Aiming at suspension of activist knowledge
74
, illegitimating protest 
events by pejoratively labeling the protesters as separatists, provocateurs, etc., 
making risks and penalties of participation unpredictable and polarizing the 
protesting groups (Uysal, 2007: 381), the main source of repression in Turkey in 
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 Activist knowledge is defined as a “process of (trans)forming social consciousness through a 
certain course of socio-political contentions and communicative actions – mostly undertaken in 
‘public spheres’, around a vital set of interrelated social issues, in order to explain and respond to 
them” (Hosseini, 2010: 341).  
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those years have been the security forces that include both the police and 
gendarmerie. The data also revealed that it was the left-wing students who 
suffered more from repression. Another significant feature of repressive dynamics 
in Turkey in 1970s is that the level of observable repression followed a similar 
path with the level of mobilization: it started to increase in 1974, made a peak in 
1978 and declined from that time on. This is related to the fact that vast majority 
of repressive events took place during protest events. The effect of repression on 
the use the choice of repertoire, especially on violent events, is a highly debated in 
the literature. Based on the statistical analysis of the relevant data a strong positive 
relationship between repression and number of protests can be claimed: thus, as 
repression increased so did the number of protest events. The same kind of 
relationship also existed between repression and use of violence. As the statistical 
analysis demonstrated as repression increased so did the number of violent events. 
With regard to the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2, it can be said that 5 
out of 7
75
 hypotheses are supported. In this regard, the number of protest events is 
insignificant under military regimes, given their repressive character. In addition, 
growing polarization that expanded the opportunities for new alliances caused 
increasing levels of external ally participation to protest events during heightened 
phases of conflict. Moreover, having a closed institutional context, low levels of 
access to formal politics and strong state tradition facilitated the radicalization of 
the cycle, at least with regards to the forms of actions used. However, the 
repressive character of the military regimes did not lead to more radicalization. On 
the other hand, repressive acts in Turkey in the 1970s, especially of security 
forces are biased towards the left-wing students. Finally, right-wing groups who 
                                                     
75
 Hypothesis 3a and 3b were competing (see Chapter 2).  
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were more successful in finding powerful allies, especially during the Nationalist 
Front governments, compared to the left-wing were subjected to repression less 
and able to employ higher levels of violence as they were somehow protected by 
their allies.  
As I have already pointed out, there is a strong positive relationship 
between repression and levels of mobilization. However, this was not the case 
under military regimes. In this regard, it can be claimed that repression led 
mobilization to some extent; harsher and covert repression during the military 
regimes did not cause an increase in the number of protests, nor did it radicalize 
the forms of actions. This fact might be explained by the fact that the military 
interventions and coups in Turkey, that are accepted as reflections of the coercive 
(ceberrut) state tradition in Turkey (Heper 1985), seriously damaged the human 
resources of social movements of 1970s in Turkey. In addition, especially the last 
coup in 1980 managed to ensure suspension of activist knowledge, and to 
establish a pejorative understanding of street protests among the Turkish society; 
a legacy that still exists. It can be claimed that even in early 2010s, actors of the 
social movement sector try to differentiate themselves from the “old left” in 
Turkey in search for their own legitimacy. Repertoire choice, i.e. use of violence, 
of these groups of course contributed to this fact. In this regard it is possible to 
consider the coup in 1980 as a rupture from the period preceding it.  
It can be claimed that the changes in the regime structure in Turkey had a 
significant effect on the mobilization of several groups including students and 
labor. Based on the centralized institutional structure of the state apparatus and the 
exclusive prevailing strategies of the elites Turkey is considered as a “strong” 
state. The coercive state tradition, rampant multi-party system, incapable 
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governments as well as the exclusive political system that lead to distrust in 
formal politics contributed to the radicalization of mobilization in those years.  
The inheritance of those years in Turkey is still alive with regard to both 
the state apparatus and social movements. Conserning the social movements, there 
are still protests against the military coup, especially on its anniversary. For 
example, on September 12, 2011, some groups demonstrated and organized a 
march against the coup in Bursa, an event that ended in a conflict between groups 
with opposed views as some people threw stones at the protestors (Radikal, 
12.09.2011). The next year, again on the anniversary of the coup, protests were 
organized by several groups including DİSK in several cities including Ankara, 
İstanbul and Diyarbakır (Aljazeera, 12.09.2012).   
In addition, analyzing the previous cycles of protest helps us to build some 
analytical bridges between the social movements of the past and contemporary 
ones. Thus, some of the activists that took part in the anti/alter-globalization 
movements in Turkey, who were also somehow related to the “old-left” in Turkey, 
tried to differentiate themselves and their repertoire of action from the ones used 
in the 1970s. Recent Gezi protests of 2013 are also compared to those of the late 
1960s, especially the 1968 movement.  
In addition, some of the forms of action used in the 1970s became popular 
again very recently. For example, after the Gezi Park protests in Turkey during 
summer 2013, people started to organize forums in public parks. This “new” 
practice attracted significant attention. However, as mentioned in Chapter 6, 
forums have been one of the frequent forms of actions used by students to make 
decisions on how to proceed with their struggle within universities in the 1970s. 
The same is valid also for occupations: it is possible to see different forms of 
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occupations in contemporary Turkey, while occupations were an important tool of 
university youth in late 1960s. On the other hand, it can be claimed that the recent 
mass labor protests in the late 1990s and in TEKEL resistance in 2009 rose on the 
shoulders of the historical background of the labor movement in Turkey including 
the 1970s. In this regard, it is possible to trace some extent of continuity within 
the Turkish context across decades.  
The legacy is still alive also with regard to the state and use of repression. 
As mentioned in Chapter 9, the postponement of strikes was used as a mean of 
repression in the 1960s and 1970s. Even though a new law on trade unions and 
collective bargaining was introduced in 2012, the regulation that gives the 
government the authority to postpone strikes was kept. In this regard, besides 
some other examples from early 2000s, in June 2014 the Turkish government 
postponed the strike of Şişecam factory workers for 60 days, as it was considered 
as constituting a threat to public health and national security. 
In this regard, it is important to understand the developments of the 1970s 
and the dynamics of the cycle of protest and repression as the source of rupture, to 
understand the contemporary dynamics of street politics in Turkey. In addition it 
is also important to understand the across time diffusion of several forms of 
actions and mechanisms that facilitate this diffusion. Future researches addressing 
these issues would contribute to our understanding of social movements in Turkey. 
This is why this dissertation should not be considered as an end result but only a 
beginning of a larger project, which would examine the relationship between 
changes in the political opportunity structure and social movements in Turkey 
within a historical perspective.  
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APPENDIX 1: Governments of Turkey, 1971-1986. 
Period Prime Minister Ruling Party 
06.03.1970-26.03.1971 Süleyman Demirel 
(3
rd 
term) 
AP 
26.03.1971-11.12.1971 Nihat Erim 
(1st term) 
--- 
11.12.1971-22.05.1972 Nihat Erim 
(2
nd
 term) 
--- 
22.05.1972-15.04.1973 Ferit Melen --- 
15.04.1973-26.01.1974 Mehmet Naim Talu --- 
26.01.1974-17.11.1974 Bülent Ecevit 
(1
st
 term) 
CHP 
17.11.1974-31.03.1975 Mahmut Sadi Irmak --- 
3l.03.1975-21.06.1977 Süleyman Demirel 
(4
th 
term) 
AP 
21.06.1977-21.07.1977 Bülent Ecevit 
(2
nd
  term) 
CHP 
21.07.1977-05.01.1978 Süleyman Demirel 
(5
th 
term) 
AP 
05.01.1978-12.11.1979 Bülent Ecevit 
(3rd  term) 
CHP 
12.11.1979-12.09.1980 Süleyman Demirel 
(6th
 
term) 
AP 
12.09.1980-13.12.1983 Bülent Ulusu --- 
13.12.1983-21.12.1987 Turgut Özal 
(1
st
 term) 
ANAP 
Source: Compiled from 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/e_kaynaklar_kutuphane_hukumetler.html (accessed on March 
19, 2012). 
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APPENDIX 2: Political Parties Operated in Turkey, 1971-1986 
Name of Party  
Year of 
Foundation Position 
Reason for 
Closure 
Year of 
Closure 
Milli Güven Partisi 1971 Center-right Resolution 1973 
Cumhuriyetçi Parti 1972 Center-right Resolution 1973 
Milli Selamet Partisi 1972 
Political 
Islam Military coup 1981 
Türkiye Ulusal Kadınlar 
Partisi 1972 Feminist Military coup 1981 
Cumhuriyetçi Güven 
Partisi 1973 Center-right Military coup 1981 
Büyük Kuvvet Partisi 1973 * Resolution 1973 
Türkiye Kardeşlik Partisi 1973 Center-left Resolution 1973 
Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi 
Partisi  1974 Socialist Military coup 1981 
Vatan Partisi 1975 Socialist Military coup 1981 
Demokrat Parti 1975 Center-right Military coup 1980 
Türkiye Emekçi Partisi 1975 Socialist 
Constitutional 
Court decision 1980 
Türkiye İşçi Partisi 1975 Socialist Military coup 1981 
Sosyalist Devrim Partisi 1975 Socialist Military coup 1981 
Nizam Partisi 1977 Conservative Military coup 1981 
Sosyalist Hareket Partisi 1977 Socialist *   
Türkiye Sosyal Adalet 
Partisi 1977 Center-left Resolution 1978 
Türkiye İşçi Köylü 
Partisi 1978 Socialist Military coup 1981 
Sosyalist Vatan Partisi 1979 Socialist Military coup 1981 
Hürriyetçi Millet Partisi 1979 Center-right Military coup 1981 
Hür Demokratlar Partisi 1980 Center-right Military coup 1981 
Milliyetçi Demokrasi 
Partisi     1983 Nationalist Resolution 1986 
Anavatan Partisi  1983 Center-right Resolution 2009 
Büyük Türkiye Partisi 1983 Center-right 
National Security 
Council decision 1983 
Halkçı Parti 1983 Center-left Resolution 1985 
Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi  1983 Center-left Resolution 1985 
Yüce Görev Partisi 1983 Center-left Resolution 1983 
Doğru Yol Partisi  1983 Center-right Resolution 2007 
Yeni Doğuş Partisi 1983 Center-right Resolution 1984 
Yeni Düzen Partisi  1983 Center-left Resolution 1985 
Fazilet Partisi 1983 Center-right Resolution 1984 
Cumhuriyetçi 
Muhafazakar Parti 1983 Nationalist Resolution 1983 
Muhafazakar Parti 1983 Nationalist Resolution 1985 
Bizim Parti 1983 Center-right Resolution 1983 
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Refah Partisi  1983 
Political 
Islam 
Constitutional 
Court decision 1998 
Türkiye Huzur Partisi 1983 Center-right Resolution 1983 
Huzur Partisi 1983 Center-right 
Constitutional 
Court decision 1983 
Bayrak Partisi 1983 Conservative Resolution 1992 
Atılım Partisi * * * * 
Islahatçı Demokrasi 
Partisi  1984 Nationalist Resolution 1992 
Demokratik Sol Parti  1985 Center-left Active   
Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı 
Parti 1985 Center-left Resolution 1995 
Milliyetçi Çalışma 
Partisi  1985 Nationalist Resolution 1993 
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